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Abstract  
 
 
Social cognition encompasses the outcome of a wide range of cognitive functions 
and processes that underlie our ability to understand and act appropriately in social 
situations. One common complaint made by families of brain injured patients is that 
‘they have changed’—typically referring to some change in the patient’s everyday 
social behaviour. However, efficient instruments for the assessment of social 
cognitive abilities of these individuals have been lacking. To fill this gap, a novel 
instrument was designed to assess fifteen social cognition elements, which takes about 
one hour to complete. The instrument was administered to healthy controls and stroke 
survivors to ascertain its psychometric properties, including reliability, validity, norms 
progression and cut off scores.  
This thesis also provides further theoretical insights into social cognition by 
investigation carried out in three levels: First, it aimed to identify commonalities 
among the social cognition elements using factor analysis. The analysis revealed four 
factors that explained 71% of the total variance: Social Cognition Control; 
Motivation; Interest in Others; and Mindreading. At the second level, the thesis 
addressed the associations and dissociations between social cognition elements and 
‘general cognitive domains’ including executive functions, episodic memory, 
language and praxis. This analysis revealed that social cognition elements are mostly 
processed independently.  However, level of education and spatial attention predicted 
performance on the reading of emotions task, and inhibition control predicted false 
belief and figurative language performance. Third, the thesis explored connectional 
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anatomical relationships with social cognition syndromes. Hodological analysis was 
conducted to explore association of social cognition performance with integrity of 
white matter pathways. This analysis revealed ten white matter pathways that cluster 
into distinct networks, and which uniquely were associated with three of the social 
cognition factors.  
Finally, a single case study of a stroke survivor who exhibited involuntarily 
swearing, and suggests that inappropriate behaviour may result from impaired access 
to stored knowledge about social norms, perhaps due to damage to fronto-temporal 
connections. This case study also demonstrated degrees of convergence/divergence 
vis-à-vis the track-wise lesion-deficit analysis from the group study. These results 
speak in favour of the use of multi-faceted social cognition test battery in stroke 
patients, and underscore the importance of single-case studies in this population as a 
complement to group-based analyses.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Stroke rates have gradually been increasing over recent decades. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, the rates of individuals having a stroke increased by 8.4% 
between year 2000 and 2012 (World Health Organization, 2012). These rates were in 
concurrence with an increase in the numbers of the younger segment of society, 
namely individuals aged 20 to 65, by 25% from 1990 to 2010 worldwide (Stroke 
Statistics, 2015). Leaving behind national losses of energy and years of productive 
working contributions, as well as disabilities that place a great burden on individuals, 
caregivers and economic costs afforded by societies. Despite of relatively good 
clinical outcome, the majority (68%) of stroke-survivors suffer from difficulties in 
returning to work, social dysfunction and familial disturbances (Hommel et al., 2009).  
One of the most successful methods to reduce these losses and address the 
disabilities after incidences is by accurately evaluating the damage accrued, in order 
to design rehabilitation plans commensurate with the physical, emotional, cognitive 
and social impairment. Successful social interactions are brought about by using a 
range of cognitive, relational and emotional abilities (Bach, Happè, Fleminger, & 
Powell, 2000), and plays a critical role in neurogenesis and recovery after stroke 
(Venna, Xu, Doran, Patrizz & McCullough, 2014). 
Damage to certain brain areas are often accompanied by degraded cognitive, 
emotional and behavioural performance. However, according to Kleim and Jones 
(2008), the brain never stops learning, so in cases of brain damage, the parts of the 
brain that remain unimpaired, establish alternative networks “to encode new 
experiences and enable behavioural change”. Individuals also develop behavioural 
strategies to perform daily activities to compensate for lost functions. Although this 
sounds like a positive development, it may mean that the impaired part of the brain is 
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left unstimulated and less likely to be rehabilitated to the fullest extent that this is 
possible.  
People can experience a range of cognitive problems following brain injury, 
including language abilities, concentration and memory. They can also encounter 
further difficulties that might be linked to higher cognitive and social abilities which 
lead to impairments in interacting with the environment, social reasoning and 
behaviour, understanding others’ perspectives, inadequate emotional feelings and 
expressions. “The extent of cognitive problems in general determines how well people 
functionally recover after brain injuries and their ability to settle back into the 
community” (Humphreys et al., 2012, p. 1). From this stand point, estimating the 
sequelae of the damage to the abilities thought to be vital for normal behaviour is 
essential for early intervention care planning.  
Following a brain injury, patients and carers frequently report changes in 
personality and social behaviour. For instance, patients may become more impulsive 
or aggressive—changes that have long been associated with frontal lobe dysfunction 
(Aron et al., 2004; Blair, 2003; Brower & Price, 2001), although the mechanisms 
involved remain in dispute. For example, these behaviours may be due to a 
disconnection in fronto-amygdala connectivity; general reduction of executive 
control; or a specific loss of inhibitory capacity (Derefinko, DeWall, Matze, Walsh, & 
Lynam, 2011). 
Individuals may also misapprehend others' behaviour due to misunderstanding of 
their mental states such as their beliefs and intentions; alternatively they may be 
unable to understand how their own behaviour affects others, so their behaviour may 
not comply with social etiquette and expectations (Happè, Powell & Winner, 1999). 
Some may even retreat from social involvement due to difficulty in initiating any 
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spontaneous activity such as starting or sharing a conversation (Lane-Brown & Tate, 
2009). It is essential to review social cognition operations in order to visualize 
methods to address these problems. 
 
1.2 SOCIAL COGNITION: A THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
Social cognition refers to a set of social abilities and processes involved in 
analysing social psychological phenomena. Bandura (1989) presents a social 
cognitive theory, which revolves around the acquisition of social knowledge through 
the “triadic reciprocal causation model”. In his account, Bandura (1989) explains that 
human behaviour causation is governed by modelling process to the observed 
behaviour. A fundamental principal of social cognition theory in acquisition of social 
knowledge is “observational learning” which is believed to teach social rules and 
strategies of transaction in different social events and situations including behavioural 
patterns, judgmental standards, cognitive competencies, and generative rules for 
creating new forms of behaviour. The modelling is not limited to only direct observed 
patterns of behaviour from interpersonal relationships and media, but also from 
indirect forms such as written behaviour. This model is governed by four sub-
functional cognitive processes as follows:   
1. Attention: focusing selectively on the specific information from the 
surrounding stimuli to extract the relevance, complexity and the functional value 
of the observed behavior.   
2. Retention: involves converting the observed action and their subsequent 
outcome to a symbol and conceptions for memory representation. 
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3. Production: involves reproducing the symbolic representation of the originally 
observed behaviour into action and adjusting future representation due to feedback 
from others. 
4. Motivation: choosing to ‘refrain from’ or ‘re-perform’ a specific action due to 
its expected consequences by expressing the self-satisfying and rejecting the 
disapproved actions. 
Moreover, Bandura (1989) specifies that the modelling involves triadic reciprocal 
determinism which includes personal, behavioural and environmental factors. The 
bidirectional influence between the determinant factors considered to be the 
foundation of social cognition internalisation and production during the life span. The 
impact of each factor varies in strength as some may have stronger influence than 
others. Within the personal, which is also called the cognitive, factor are a number of 
components which include but not limited to knowledge, memory, attention, 
attribution, attitudes, expectations and cognitive schema; cognitive schema refer to a 
set of organized preconceived ideas that act as a framework that represents some 
aspect of the world. In addition to biological and other internal events that can affect 
perceptions and actions, the behavioural factor encompasses skills, practice and self-
efficacy, which is the extent of self-belief in one’s own ability to complete a specific 
assignment and reach goals (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995). Finally the 
environmental factor includes social norms, access in community, and influence from 
others.  
In this model the interaction between personal and behavioural factors ultimately 
reflect the interaction between thought, affect and action. Expectations, beliefs, self- 
perceptions, goals and intentions give affect behaviour. More specifically, what 
people think, believe, and feel affect how they behave, and how they interpret and 
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perceive others’ intentions, thoughts and feeling may, in turn, influence their own 
feelings and behaviour. Individuals also create and select environment through their 
actions. The two way influence between behaviour and environmental factors 
represent how we deal with different environmental challenges and conditions in our 
everyday life, and in turn, how our environment is altered by every condition it 
creates. In summary, this “triadic causation model” (Bandura, 1989) can have diverse 
psychological effects that promote the development and forging of new capabilities, 
cognitive skills, and behaviour patterns.  
Within social cognition theory, Chiavarino, Apperly, and Humphreys (2012) 
presented a specific model for the ability to understanding the “intention” of others 
based on neuroimaging evidence. According to this model, humans ‘extract’ a 
perception of the intentional behaviour of others through three distinct levels: (i) 
“mirroring” which involves extracting the explicit purpose of the observed conduct as it 
appears physically; (ii) “representation” which denotes the psychological element of the 
observed action, through associating a mental state believed to reflect or symbolize the 
observed action; and (iii) “conceptual understanding” which transcends the association 
of actions with a mental state, and involves the ability to associate intention with an 
understanding of the motivation of the observed actions and their original causes. They 
conclude that metalizing and mirroring systems may work independently from one 
another but within one system; in other words, they are interdependent.  
This model is compatible with the principles of social cognitive theory in terms 
of epistemic internalization of social knowledge, and is applicable to the evolutionary 
processes of most of social cognition elements including beliefs, empathy, moral 
reasoning and aggression, along with underlying cognitive capabilities including 
executive functions and self-regulation (Bandura, 1989). However, producing belief 
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attribution by adults may not occur automatically (Apperly, Simpson, Riggs, Samson 
& Chiavarino, 2006), but on the contrary it is an effortful function that might depend 
on underlying cognitive abilities in order to operate normally (Samson et al., 2010).    
Developmentally, social cognitive abilities develop very early in life. One of the 
first cognitive processes by which social knowledge is internalized is the automatic 
response of the mirror neurons in motor system, which enables the child to mimic 
other’s behaviour and actions. Mirroring system involves activation to the same 
observed moving body parts. For example, when we see someone extend his arm to 
pick up a ball from the ground, the mirror neurons activity in our brain detects the 
observed moving body parts, as if we are doing the same action. Through this 
mechanism, children develop the ability to read other individuals’ emotions based on 
non-verbal cues, such as facial expressions. Matsumoto and Hwang (2011) in their 
review noted a number of cross-cultural studies have clearly demonstrated the extent 
of humans to “read” other’s basic emotions, particularly through facial expressions. 
The basic emotions include happiness, sadness, surprise, fear, disgust and anger. The 
authors suggested that this might be a biologically innate ability to aid young humans 
to better understand the intentions of others, as well as providing a deeper meaning of 
perceived actions. Facial expressions at the “macro level” may last only a fraction of a 
second, yet they are perceived and the meaning associated with those expressions is 
clearly understood. This has been validated as a universal construct. 
Children’s perceptual abilities during development extend beyond the facial 
expressions to voice tone, gestures and body language enabling them to communicate 
with others and understand what others might desire (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). 
And since the nature of human behaviour is often driven to achieve a specific goal, 
they learn to associate meanings with specific behaviour, and speculate on the 
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motives behind the goals. Over time they tend to employ their expertise to predict and 
have some expectation of others’ behaviour. "Humans' unique aptitude for reasoning 
about mental states" is known as Theory of Mind (ToM) (Apperly, Samson, & 
Humphreys, 2005). This term was first presented by Premack and Woodruff (1978) to 
encompass the ability "to impute mental states to self and others" implicating the 
mind's ability to think generally about a range of mental states including knowledge, 
pretence, thoughts, and preference, which develops around the age of four (Gweon & 
Saxe, 2013). For nearly four decades after introducing the concept of ToM, many 
researchers have considered it as a key aspect of social cognition that enables humans 
to engage in complex social interaction by using a variety of visible cues (e.g., eye 
gaze or facial expression) or inferred cues (e.g., representations) in order to predict 
and explain others' behaviour and to respond to situations in a socially appropriate 
manner. Specifically, ToM is seen as a prerequisite for the development of more 
advanced socio-cognitive abilities such as the distinction between self and others’ 
feelings, empathy, and faux pa recognition and understanding. The ability to 
understand that others may have feeling different than their own develop by the age of 
five (Bandura, 1989); empathy, which refers to the ability to express concern for the 
distress of others (Baron-Cohen, 2002) is continuous process that evolves throughout 
childhood, and which culminates with the recognition and understanding of faux pas 
(i.e., the ability to recognize and understand the consequences of unintended and 
inappropriate actions of behaviour) around 9-11 years of age (Stone, Baron-Cohen & 
Knight, 1998). 
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1.3 SOCIAL COGNITIVE DEFICITS 
Social cognition is the key to the individual’s social behaviour, and its integrity is 
dependent on functioning cognitive structures and processes involved in analysing 
social cognitive phenomena, such as cognitive control processes. Inefficient social 
cognition functioning is common after brain injuries, whether for internalizing new 
social competences or in re-producing social schema. Individuals may suffer from 
variety of interpersonal difficulties including social discomfort, frustration in social 
relations, failing to accomplish well-learned social skills, as well as difficulties in 
controlling behaviour and engaging in social events.  
In terms of reproducing social knowledge, many studies linked some aspects of 
social cognition to higher cognitive abilities especially language and the executive 
functions including working memory and inhibition (Apperly, Samson & Humphreys, 
2005; Baker, Peterson, Pulos & Kirkland, 2014; Henry, Phillips, Crawford, Ietswaart 
& Summers, 2006), however, the results were not always consistent. Satpute and 
Lieberman (2006) proposed a dual system of automatic- vs controlled-cognitive 
processes that is involved in social perception. These processes are subserved by two 
sets of brain regions that differentially contribute to social perception. First is the 
‘reflexive system’, which is involved in automatic coding of the trait and evaluative 
implications of the observed behaviour. The automatic system is characterised by 
slow learning, fast operating, bidirectional, parallel-processing structures and 
repression of common cases. The brain regions posited for this system include: the 
amygdala, basal ganglia, the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and the dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex (daCC). Second is the ‘reflective system’ that is responsible 
for inferential goals in mind, and which takes situational constraints and other prior 
knowledge into account to alter the dispositional inferences drawn from observed 
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behaviours. The features associated with controlled operation are proposed to be fast 
learning, slow operating, symbolic or propositional structure, representation of 
abstract concepts and special cases. The brain regions posited for this system include 
lateral PFC, ACC, the hippocampus and the surrounding medial temporal lobe 
(MTL). 
In order to understand social cognition deficits following stroke, researchers have 
attempted to explain the impact of focal and diffuse brain injury on social cognition 
mechanism(s), and asked a wide of range of questions such as (i) whether social 
cognition is an automatic or controlled process? (ii) Can social cognition operate as an 
independent or rather a dependant function that process as a part of higher cognition 
ability? (iii) Which general cognitive domain dysfunction can predict social cognition 
impairment? (iv) Is social cognition a unitary function or rather formed of several 
sub-functions? (v) Are social cognition elements associated with each other? (vi) To 
what extent might a deficit in a specific element (e.g. false belief understanding) have 
an impact on other social cognition element (e.g. emotion recognition)? And (vii) 
which brain regions, neural circuits and cognitive structures underlay these processes? 
Which neuro anatomical damage can predict social cognition impairments? 
In relation to the assumption of social cognition as a unitary ability, by testing 
ToM as key aspect of social cognition, it can be argued that people who fail false 
belief tasks are expected to fail other mindreading tasks. However, evidence from 
some studies showed differences between the ability to attribute various mental 
statuses. For instance, patients’ performances may vary within the same domain of 
social capacity such that they may manage to pass a false belief task but fail to 
identify a faux pas (Martín-Rodríguez & León-Carrión, 2010). Individuals may 
successfully determine others’ intentions but fail to detect others’ belief (Grèzes, 
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Frith, & Passingham, 2004) or emotions (Atique, Erb, Gharabaghi, Grodd, & Anders, 
2011). Also a lack of correlation between tasks that purportedly measure the same 
construct has been reported. For example, no correlation was between the ‘reading the 
mind in the eyes test’ and performance on faux pas tasks (Ahmed & Miller, 2011; 
Muller et al., 2010). The contradictory results of such studies may be due to different 
mechanisms underlying elements of social cognition, particularly when separate 
anatomical constructs for cognitive and emotional elements of ToM have been 
identified (e.g., Abu-Akel & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-
Peretz, 2007).  
 The investigation of selective brain regions that are associated with social 
cognition deficits in general, ToM, intention, moral judgment and emotion 
recognition have been linked to the right hemisphere (Happé, Brownell & Winner, 
1999; Ortigue & Bianchi-Demicheli, 2011; Yuvaraj et al., 2013), although the results 
of some studies reveal ToM impaired ability among patients with unilateral left 
hemisphere lesions (Channon & Crawford, 2000; Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino & 
Humphreys, 2004).  
Social cognition deficits also have been associated with the frontal lobe. Rowe, 
Bullock, Polkey and Morris (2001), for example, investigated ToM abilities of 31 
patients with unilateral frontal lobe (16 with left damage and 15 with right damage), 
and showed that patients’ performance was significantly impaired on both first and 
second false belief tasks (what one thinks vs what one thinks another thinks). 
Moreover, parietal and frontal lesions have been associated with impaired socio-
cognitive abilities or processes that are required for socio-cognitive functioning. 
Within the frontal lobe, a number of sub-regions have been implicated including the 
frontal pole, the medial frontal cortex, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and the ventral 
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frontal cortex (Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Grèzes, Frith, & Passingham, 2004; Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2007; Stone, Baron-Cohen & Knight, 1998; Stone & Hynes, 2011). For 
example, lesions to the vmPFC in particular have been linked to cognitive executive 
failures such as poor frustration tolerance, indecisiveness, poor judgment, lack of 
planning and lack of insight, as well as emotional problems such as inappropriate 
affect, blunted emotional experience, low emotional expressiveness, and apathy 
(Geraci, Surian, Ferraro & Cantagallo, 2010; Mendez, 2009; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; 
Turner et al., 2007). Moreover, behavioural difficulties such as irritability, social 
inappropriateness and lack of initiation and persistence have also been noted (Barrash, 
Tranel, & Anderson, 2000).  In fact, comparing patients with bilateral damage to the 
vmPFC with patients with brain lesions in other areas showed significantly more 
disturbed social behaviour, erratic decision-making and a tendency to have more 
diminished motivation in the vmPFC patients (Barrash et al., 2011). 
With respect to parietal lesions, lesions to the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) 
appear to lead to impairment in social cognitive functions, including ToM, intention 
and moral judgment. For example, Samson et al. (2004) examined false belief 
reasoning, comparing the results of two groups. The first group consisted of three 
stroke survivors with injuries to the left TPJ, and the second was a control group of 
people without such injuries. The participants were asked to carry out two types of 
false belief tasks: verbal and nonverbal. Stroke patients exhibited poor performance in 
comparison with the control group on both tasks, suggesting that the left TPJ is 
necessary for understanding others’ beliefs. 
Furthermore, Chiavarino, Apperly and Humphreys (2009) investigated the impact 
of frontal lobe and TPJ damage on processing intention reasoning. The performance 
of three groups of frontal lobe and TPJ damaged patients were compared with healthy 
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controls.  The participants were asked at the first session to judge scenes on videos 
and categorize the behaviour displayed as real or false actions. Three videos were 
played in which real intentional, real accidental and pretend actions were shown, and 
the participants were asked to decide whether the actions were real or pretended. Both 
groups of patients, and more especially the TPJ patients, exhibited poor execution of 
the tasks compared to the control group in understanding deliberate lying.  
Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone and Saxe (2010) tested the impact of 
the right TPJ (rTPJ) on moral judgment. They created an artificial defect to this area 
by using transcranial magnetic stimulation to deactivate the neurons of the rTPJ in 
two experiments; before and during a situation that required moral judgment.  The 
results of the experiment showed that the defect impacted the participants’ 
understanding of intention. The disruption resulted in participants judging murder as 
morally less prohibited than a mere intention to commit an assault. 
Taken together, while extant research suggests that stroke patients suffer from 
deficits in social cognition, it remains unclear whether these deficits are the results of 
a failure in cognitive control or rather due to representation difficulties. This is further 
compounded the fact that studies to date mostly focused on testing single or a limited 
number of variables (e.g. false belief, emotion recognition) assuming a unitary 
function, while neglecting many social cognitive components found to be impaired 
commonly after stroke.  This has led to a scarcity in studies that take a comprehensive 
approach to investigating the associations/dissociations between cognitive and socio-
cognitive components and how these components function after the damage caused by 
stroke. This is particularly important given that previous research highlights the 
multiplicity of dysfunctional cognitive and socio-cognitive abilities in stroke patients.  
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In the following sections, I summarize the critical social abilities that have direct 
impact on everyday life and commonly affected after stroke and which need to be 
covered by any social cognitive screen. From a theoretical point of view, these 
abilities may be classified into three categories; (1) Attribution, including identifying 
others intention, false belief, desire, motivation, empathy, emotion, and psychological 
attitudes; (2) Social knowledge, including faux pas, moral reasoning, humour, and 
understanding figurative language (proverbs); and (3) Neurobehavioural dysfunctions 
including impulsivity, anger and apathy. These critical abilities have guided the 
development of the social cognition screen and validation for use in stroke patients 
and to test further theoretical hypotheses, pertaining to the relationship between 
cognitive and socio-cognitive abilities and their neurobiological underpinnings. 
 
1.4 SOCIAL COGNITION COMPONENTS  
1.4.1 False Belief 
False belief testing is a method used by psychologists to examine the ability of an 
individual to think about and respond to others' beliefs. It is believed that being able 
to distinguish between ones’ own beliefs and others' beliefs is an indication of having 
“a theory of mind” ToM. In this respect, false belief has been widely investigated in 
terms of its development and functioning over the lifespan, its functionality in various 
clinical populations and chiefly within the spectra of autism and schizophrenia 
disorders, degenerative diseases (such and frontotemporal dementia (FTD) as well as, 
albeit to a lesser extent, in individuals with brain injuries including stroke and 
traumatic brain injuries.  
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The ability to distinguish between self and others’ mind and beliefs has a cardinal 
role for the proper functioning of daily living and social interactions, as well as in 
teaching, learning, identifying deception and manipulating events. Internalizing social 
knowledge after brain injuries depends on distinguishing between self and others’ 
beliefs, thoughts, desires, motivations and intentions as it underlies social learning and 
modelling (Bandura, 1989). Social knowledge is considered to be formed 
hierarchically upon social schemata, namely, beliefs, thoughts and information 
gathered from the surrounding environment. For example, holding a false belief may 
lead to the distortion of social schemata, which, in turn, may result in the formation of 
distorted social knowledge that could lead the individual exposed and in confusion. In 
this regard, it has been commonly reported that brain injured survivors fail false belief 
tasks (Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino, Bickerton & Humphreys, 2007; Apperly, 
Samson, Chiavarino & Humphreys, 2004; Happé, Brownell & Winner, 1999; Dennis 
al., 2013; Muller et al., 2010; Samson, Apperly & Humphreys, 2007).  
Neuroimaging research has shown that false belief reasoning is robustly 
associated with activation in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), the right 
lateral rostral PFC and the right temporo-parietal junction (R-TPJ)  (Sommer, Döhnel, 
Sodian, Meinhardt, Thoermer, & Hajak, 2007; Dohnel, Schuwerk, Meinhardt, Sodian, 
Hajak, & Sommer, 2012), and left TPJ (L-TPJ) (Samson et al., 2004).  In their review, 
Gallagher and Frith (2003) highlighted other areas that are consistently activated in 
conjunction with ToM including the anterior paracingulate cortex, the superior 
temporal sulci (STS) and the temporal poles bilaterally. 
A study by Saxe, Schulz and Jiang (2006) in healthy adults found that both 
domain-general and domain-specific cognitive resources are involved in ToM. They 
found that brain regions involved in belief attribution also have been linked to 
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attention, response selection and inhibitory control. Specifically, they point out that 
representing beliefs and attentional reorienting within the rTPJ are in fact associated 
with adjacent but distinct subdivisions within the region. This result has been partly 
supported with a quantitative meta-analysis of 70 functional neuroimaging studies 
(Decety and Lamm, 2007) showing that the rTPJ plays a crucial role in processing 
different aspects of social cognition, as it engages during both low and higher level 
cognitive processes.  
Taken together, most studies of false belief mechanism depended on healthy 
subjects, and far fewer on participants with brain injuries. Current knowledge draws 
on studies with small samples and case studies. To further our knowledge in the field, 
it is important to explore to what extent focal brain injury following stroke have 
impact on false belief operation, and localize the critical areas that are involved in 
processing. It is also important to explore whether the extent to which general 
cognitive domains are necessary for false belief attribution in particular socio-
cognitive functions in general.   
1.4.2 Emotion Reading 
Emotion reading refers to the ability to identify others’ emotional status by 
interpreting their voice, body, face expressions and gestures. It is a complex ability 
that merges emotion recognition and attribution abilities. Emotion recognition plays a 
significant role in most social skills including communication, interaction between 
individuals and groups, and may be a key component of other social cognitive 
elements such as empathy. However, there is increasing evidence suggesting that it is 
a function that is strongly associated with general intelligence. For example, 
individuals with higher IQ perform significantly better on reading the mind in the 
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eyes test (RMET), a task that measures one’s ability to read the emotions of others 
from the region of the eyes (Baker, Peterson, Pulos and Kirkland, 2014). 
Impairments in emotional processing can disrupt both emotion regulation and 
emotion perception (Newsome, Scheibel, Mayer et al., 2013; Scott, O'Donnell, & 
Sereno, 2012), and they are associated with impaired mood and altered emotional 
reactivity (Stanton, Luecken, MacKinnon & Thompson, 2013). These effects can 
detrimentally influence many aspects of patients' social interaction and participation. 
Impaired emotion recognition after stroke found to be related to a verity of 
interpersonal problems including expressing dissatisfaction and frustration in social 
relations, feelings of social discomfort, lack of desire to contact with others, feelings 
of social disconnection and controlling behaviours (Yuvaraj, 
Murugappan, Norlinah, Sundaraj & Khairiyah, 2013). Therefore, assessing the ability 
to read other’s emotion is an essential part of a social cognition screen, which may 
indicate the presence of other inter- and intrapersonal problems.  
A review by Yavaraj et al. (2013), covering 92 studies of post-stroke deficits, 
suggests that emotion recognition is not dependant on a specific brain hemisphere. 
Patients with frontal-lobe traumatic injuries have been shown to have significant 
difficulties recognizing facial emotional expressions (Callahan, Ueda, Sakata, 
Plamondon, & Murai, 2011). However, facial emotion recognition is a particular 
cognitive ability that recruits many diverse brain structures that engage at various 
points of time. Adolphs (2002) investigated the regular activations of these structures 
and proposed three stages: (1) a first stage that starts from stimulus onset to 120ms 
and involves activation of a 'core system' including superior colliculi, thalamus, 
amygdala and striate cortex; (2) the second stage lasts between 120ms and 170ms and 
involves activation in an 'extended system' including the striate cortex, the fusiform 
 18 
 
gyrus (FFG), the superior temporal gyrus (STG), the amygdala, OFC, basal ganglia, 
hypothalamus, and brainstem; and (3) the final stage runs from 170ms to >300 ms and 
is based on activation of the 'cognitive emotion system' comprised of FFG, STG, 
OFC, somatosensory and insula (Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun, & Young, 2000). 
Damage to any part in this network may lead to potential deficiency in identifying and 
attributing emotional states.  
As far as brain-damaged patients are concerned, Adolphs, Tranel and Damasio 
(2003) reported on a patient who had bilateral damage to the insula, and showed 
substantial deficits in recognizing the facial expression of disgust, although he had 
preserved recognition of other facial expressions, such as fear. Woolley, Strobel, 
Sturm et al. (2015) found that patients with frontotemporal damage were most likely 
to exhibit disgusting behaviours and were, on average, the most impaired at 
recognizing disgust in others, or what Gallese et al. (2004: 399) called “disgust 
deafness”.  
Turner, Paradiso, Marvel et al. (2007), using positron emission tomography 
(PET) with stroke patients, uncovered associations between cerebellar lesions and 
reduced reactions to pleasant stimuli, while they showed similar responses to 
frightening stimuli as healthy controls. The activity observed in relation to these 
stimuli in the right ventral lateral cortex and left dorsolateral PFC, amygdala, 
thalamus and retrosplenial cingulate gyrus was significantly lower than controls. 
Turner et al. (2007) found that patients with damage to the cerebellum showed some 
dysfunctionality in the subjective experience of pleasant feelings in response to 
happiness-evoking stimuli although the damage did not appear to affect the ability to 
experience unpleasant emotions. What they found was that brain systems subserving 
the processing of emotional material are able to adapt and develop new coping 
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mechanisms. Rather than processing emotions itself, the cerebellum played a 
coordinating role in a dynamic network of various parts of the brain, such as the 
amygdala and the insula, that process emotion-laden stimuli. When the cerebellum is 
damaged, this network develops an adaptive response by engaging alternative nodes. 
Turner et al. (2006) concluded that the cerebellum is a central node in the neural 
network underlying the subjective experience of emotion.  Supporting data supplied 
by Schraa-Tam, Rietdijk et al. (2012) suggest that the potential role of the cerebellum 
in control of emotions may be relevant for goal-directed behaviour needed for 
observing and reacting to another person’s negative expressions (such as fear or 
disgust) which are initiated in the amygdala and insula as discussed above. 
Taken together, emotion recognition has been the focus of previous social 
cognition deficits following stroke research and findings provide insights for brain 
areas critical for this ability to operate normally. Further research could usefully 
explore the relationship between emotional reading and general domain processes, as 
well as others aspects of social cognition such as empathy, anger and desire 
recognition.  
1.4.3 Empathy   
Empathy refers to “the drive to identify emotions and thoughts in others and to 
respond to these appropriately” (Baron-Cohen, 2002). In another words, evaluating 
what another person is feeling and experiencing, and demonstrating an appropriate 
response. It is a selective process rather than automatic, and is a dipole function that 
can be evidenced through human cruelty and kindness (Baron-Cohen, 2012). 
Kindness encompasses activating the awareness and willingness to acknowledge how 
others' may feel during social interactions by adapting a ‘double-minded’ focus of 
attention and imagining the self in another's position. In contrast, cruelty represents 
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the negative tail end of a bell curve of empathy, and it occurs when empathy is 
switched off, and a ‘single-minded’ focus of attention is adopted (Baron-Cohen, 
2012). Empathy increases social coherence and it is essential for successful social 
interaction (De Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Ioannidou & Konstantikaki, 2008), and 
developing interpersonal and intrapersonal relationships; developing conscience 
(Schinkel, 2007), permitting individuals to understand others and makes them feel 
valued and their feelings are protected.  
Research in this area has distinguished between "cognitive empathy" which is 
believed to refer to the tendency towards self-awareness of others’ thoughts and 
emotions, and "emotional or affective empathy", which refers to a specific emotional 
response to the subjective emotion experience of others. This emotional response 
ranges between sympathy (a concern felt for another in need) and compassion (the 
feeling that arises in witnessing another's suffering and that motivates a subsequent 
desire to help) (Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen & David, 2004; Goetz, 
Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010).  
Following right hemisphere stroke, particularly patients who had lesions in the 
temporal pole or anterior insula, were more likely to do poorly on tests of emotional 
and cognitive empathy (Fitzgerald, 2013). Brain-injured people have demonstrated 
poor performance in empathy as well as emotional recognition tests (Callahan et al., 
2011; De Achával, Constanzo, Villareal et al., 2010; Hillis, 2014). Previous 
neuroimaging findings are inconclusive regarding hemispheric involvement in 
processing empathy. For instance, in comparing activation during empathy 
assessment between patients with left and right temporal lobe atrophy, Perry, Rosen, 
Kramer, Beer, Levenson and Miller (2001) linked greater empathy deficits to the right 
hemisphere, while Rueckert and Naybar’s (2008) study on healthy subjects found that 
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this was limited to female performance only. However, in a lesion study, Shamay-
Tsoory, Tomer, Berger and Aharon-Perez (2003) found a limited relationship between 
empathy deficits and the right hemisphere when the damage is restricted to the 
posterior regions; their findings also demonstrate the significance of empathy deficits 
among vmPFC lesions compared to posterior-damaged patients and healthy subjects.           
Fan et al. (2011) investigated the neural underpinnings of empathy using a whole-
brain based quantitative meta-analysis (MKDA) which included 40 fMRI studies. It 
was hypothesized that a broad core of active regions could be found during empathy 
task performance, and the findings highlighted the core regions that were consistently 
activated during empathy task performance. These regions included the 
supplementary motor area (SMA), the anterior insula, the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC), the mid-cingulate cortex (MCC), and the bilateral anterior insula. Authors 
distinguish between ‘cognitive’ and ‘affective’ empathy based on the tasks performed. 
For instance, in a cognitive empathy task, the subjects are required to imagine others’ 
feelings or evaluate the emotion from others’ perspectives, while in an emotion 
empathy task, subjects are required to share the emotional states of other individuals 
and make judgments according to others’ feelings. During cognitive empathy tasks, 
the dorsal aMCC is engaged more frequently, the right anterior insula has been shown 
to be recruited for affective empathy while the left anterior insula has been seen to 
operate for both forms of empathy. Fan et al. (2011) concluded that dACC, aMCC, 
SMA and bilateral insula can account for the network which deals with empathy.  
Eres, Decety, Louis and Molenberghs 2015, provide an evidence to suggest 
autonomous distinction between cognitive and affective empathy. In a Voxel-Based 
Morphometry (VBM) study, they examined gray matter density in the neural circuits 
association with empathy scores, they found that cognitive and affective empathy 
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were represented by distinct neural circuits and structural brain regions, where higher 
scores on affective empathy were associated with greater gray matter density in the 
insula cortex and higher scores of cognitive empathy were associated with greater 
gray matter density in the MCC and dmPFC. 
Emotional responses are, however, mediated to a large extent by the social 
context and the two systems will seldom work entirely independently of each other. 
Different neurochemical systems also appear to be involved. As a result of studies 
indicating that the two systems may work together, but that they may also be 
behaviourally, developmentally, neurochemically, and neuroanatomically dissociable.  
   The above studies propose potential mechanisms for cognitive and emotional 
empathy. In this thesis, I aim to assess cognitive and emotional empathy separately 
and investigate the extent to which empathy and its cognitive and affective 
components may be affected after stroke, as well as in relation to other social 
cognitive deficits. For intense, can false belief or intention recognition performance 
affect or be predictive of deficits in cognitive empathy? As mentioned, emotional 
empathy mechanism among healthy sample has been linked to the aCC a brain region 
that linked previously to processes of inhibitory control and attention (Saxe, Schulz & 
Jiang, 2006), therefore I will also investigate if this association is evidenced among 
post stroke survivors. 
1.4.4 Intention       
The term ‘intention’ often used to refer to a self-regulatory strategy for goal-
directed behaviour a strategy to execute a plan that determines what, how and when a 
desired goal can be accomplished (Gollwitzer, 1999). Understanding others' intentions 
is a critical ability for social communication as it enables people to evaluate, interpret 
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and predict others' behaviour during social interactions in various events. For 
instance, when unfavourable incidence occurs and its being subject to evaluation from 
moral prospective, it is the capacity for mental state reasoning that enables us to 
distinguish between intentional harm and accident (Koster-Hale, Saxe, Dungan & 
Young, 2013).  
Impaired intention recognition accounts for both over- and lack of metalizing,    
found often associated with the right hemisphere damage (RHD) (Hird & Kirsner, 
2003; Krukow, 2012; Mattingley, 1999). In order to identify the underlying pragmatic 
reasons for impairments following RHD, Weed et al. (2010) assessed intention as a 
ToM-relevant ability in RHD individuals by using animated films, which, based on 
the film description, were divided into three categories. The first category included a 
description of the action only, the second involved a spoken description of the 
intention but without referring to the specific mental state on intention, and the last 
category included an ascription of the mental state. The study aimed to assess ToM by 
using the examinee’s evaluations of the animated films. The RHD patients' 
performance revealed a diminished ability to differentiate between the film categories 
in addition to a bias towards minimizing description in the ToM film category. 
In an fMRI study of healthy participants, Carter, Hodgins and Rakinson (2011) 
examined the processing of intention by comparing brain responses to three animated 
displays (using similar stimuli presented in similar starting positions but moving with 
different goals). In each condition, a hand moved toward one of two objects. In the 
first case, it picked up the object, in the second, the hand missed the object, and in the 
last case, it changed its path halfway to lift another object. Increased activation was 
observed in the right posterior superior temporal sulcus (rpSTS) for the second and 
third conditions reflecting the violation of the initial intention. 
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Other work has highlighted a network including the precuneus, the left and right 
posterior STS and TPJ and the medial PFC (Enrici, Adenzato, Cappa, Bara, & 
Teltamanti, 2011), using fMRI on healthy subjects and contrasting conditions in 
which tasks were designed to estimate linguistic communicative intention, gestural 
communicative intention, linguistic physical causality and gestural physical causality. 
This network was engaged independently of the modality used in communication 
(e.g., language, gestures), which indicates that different types of intentional 
information are equivalent from mental processing perspectives.    
In evaluating intention recognition following focal damage caused by stroke, I 
examine (i) whether failing intention recognition can be related to other prospective 
taking abilities, such as cognitive empathy and false belief, (ii) which general 
cognitive domains might be linked to such deficits, and (iii) whether dysfunctional 
intention recognition can be linked to specific brain regions.   
1.4.5 Moral Reasoning 
Moral reasoning is a fundamental ability required for establishing social 
interactions as it helps to reserve others’ entitlements, making the right decisions, and 
allows individuals to improve their interactions with other people.  
The term 'moral reasoning' has been applied to situations which involve 
evaluating intentions, actions and making decisions based on the society’s code of 
values, norms and customs in which the appropriateness of a particular conduct is 
determined. The principles of the morality are derived from philosophy, religion and 
culture. Therefore, moral standards are influenced by the characteristics of each 
society. Although moral standards are universally fixed throughout the ages such as 
the infringement of others’ right, our understanding and knowledge of the limits of 
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moral violation are nonetheless changing over time. However, the knowledge of 
moral standards does not function as fixed internal regulator of conduct. Self-
regulatory mechanisms do not operate unless they are activated, and there are many 
processes by which moral reactions can be disengaged from inhumane conduct’ 
(Bandura, 1986; 1988c as cited in Bandura, 1989, p. 54).  
Moral reasoning is a complex process draws on many social cognitive aspects 
and can include tests requiring either explicit or implicit knowledge of the moral 
norms (e.g., the social values of the society), intention (e.g., spontaneous vs. planned), 
motivation (e.g., social rewards, personal satisfaction), and empathy (e.g. considering 
what thoughts and emotions a specific action would arouse and refusing any action 
that cause emotional harm to others. It has been proposed that moral reasoning require 
an ability to infer the mental states of other individuals, which makes moral judgment 
potentially dependent on ToM processing (Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & 
Woodward, 2011). Although the knowledge provided about an agent's intention has a 
great impact on forming a moral judgment, it can be also influenced by self-beliefs as 
to whether the conduct itself is considered to be good or bad (Knobe, 2005). The 
relationship between ToM, moral reasoning and non-moral reasoning has also been 
demonstrated in fMRI studies. It is apparent that greater levels of activity are apparent 
in a ‘ToM network’, when moral judgements are required. It has been suggested that 
moral decision-making requires a greater degree of internally directed processing and 
representation of intentions and feelings than non-moral decision-making (Reniers, 
Corcoran, Völlm, Mashru, Howard & Liddle, 2012). In fMRI studies on healthy 
subjects, moral reasoning has been linked to a wide range of brain areas including the 
frontal polar, the left lateroposterior OFC, ventrolateral PFC, L-TPJ, medial thalamus 
and globus pallidas and bilateral inferior occipital clusters. The findings suggest a 
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particularly significant role for the anterior-medial PFC (amPFC) in moral decision 
making (Eslinger, Robinson-Long, Realmuto et al., 2009). 
In general, focal brain damage to the frontal and temporal lobes affect moral 
reasoning among patients. In a study that compared between patients with 
fronotemporal dementia and stroke survivors with vmPFC damage found that both 
groups failed integrating intention and outcome information for moral judgment and 
performed significantly worse than healthy controls (Baez et al., 2014). Moreover, a 
study of traumatic brain injuries suggested that frontal lobe plays an essential role in 
social emotion processing and moral judgment (Martins, Faisca, Esteves, Muresan & 
Reis, 2012). The findings of Kemp et al. (2013) also suggested that OFC in particular 
plays a key role in moral reasoning.  
Previous studies have provided some insight into the relationship between moral 
reasoning and other abilities. Classically, patients such as Phineas Gage have been 
noted as having marked moral problems after damage to the OFC (Haas, 2001), in the 
presence of intact intellectual abilities (Harlow, 1848, cited in, Kihlstrom, 2010). 
More recent studies have also suggested that problems in social cognition in patients 
with OFC damage can be unrelated to other cognitive deficits associated with frontal 
lobe function. For example, Roca et al. (2010) reported that OFC patients fail on ‘faux 
pas’ tests of social interaction (judging whether a statement is appropriate or 
inappropriate according to the social context) but not on tests of executive function, 
and suggested that the OFC may play a particular role in social decision-making. In 
addition, in a lesion study of patients with neurological and neuropsychiatric 
disorders, De Oliveira-Souza, Hare, Bramati et al. (2008) found that grey matter 
reduction in frontopolar, OFC and anterior temporal cortices, the STS and insula were 
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linked to high scores of psychopathy—a condition associated with altered moral 
sensibility.  
In summary, moral reasoning is an essential function for social interactions that 
its impairment has been evident in various groups of patients with focal brain damage. 
Therefore, the assessment of moral reasoning is an important element to be included 
in any social cognition screens. This assessment of moral reasoning in post-stroke 
individuals could provide additional insights regarding it association with other 
cognitive and social cognitive abilities, as well as the identification of brain regions 
that subtend it. 
1.4.6 Desire  
Desire refers to that "feeling or emotion which is directed to the attainment of 
some object from which pleasure or satisfaction is expected" (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 1971). This definition suggests that desire is a concept that transcends 
mere like and dislike, and that it involves selecting a planned behaviour to convert the 
impulse into action, resulting in an expected sensation. Thus, it can be said that desire 
is the goal for satisfying a specific impulse (motivation) (Reiss, 2004). Understanding 
other peoples’ mind, what they think, feel, want and intend to do is essential to 
comprehending their behaviour (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).   
Developmentally, children acquire the ability to reason about other people’s 
desire before developing the ability to reason about others’ beliefs (Repacholi and 
Gopnik, 1997). Children from about 18 months of age are able to recognise desires in 
others and are able to distinguish between what other people want or desire, and what 
they do not want, whether they comply with the other person’s desire. They also 
understand the link between desires and emotions, recognising that desired objects 
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cause happiness, whereas undesired objects may cause disgust (Repacholi & Gopnik, 
1997). Past infanthood, a greater level of understanding of the subjectivity of desires 
begins to appear, furthermore, they are able to distinguish between reality and 
pretence. Evidence from a cross cultural study shows that three years old children can 
pass a false belief task (Shahaeian, Peterson, Slaughter, & Wellman, 2011). It is 
suggested that the differences in developing belief-desire reasoning are associated 
with the development of cognitive abilities, specifically the executive functions. This 
is supported by Leslie, German and Polizzi (2005) and Apperly, Benjamin, Andrews, 
Grant and Todd (2011). Their studies examined belief-desire reasoning in participants 
between 6 years of age to adulthood, who completed simple, computer-based tests of 
belief-desire reasoning. They found that on belief-desire reasoning tasks, children ﬁrst 
pass tasks involving true belief and positive desire before those involving false belief 
and negative desire. It was also found that participants of all ages had greater 
difﬁculty in reasoning about false belief and negative desires than true beliefs and 
positive desires. 
Using fMRI, studies explored the brain regions related to desire in general, and 
whether the identified brain regions respond quantitatively to the intensity of the 
desire. For example, Kawadata and Zeki (2008) presented pictures of persons, objects 
or activities that were categorised – based on a previous pilot study – into 'desirable', 
'indifference' and 'undesirable' items. The superior OFC was particularly activated by 
the 'desirable' stimulus, and the level of desirability was positively correlated to the 
activated region. In contrast, the mid-cingulate mCC and the anterior cingulate aCC 
cortices were linked to the 'indifference' stimulus, while no specific areas were more 
activated by the 'undesirable' stimulus. The link between the OFC and desire has also 
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been highlighted by Wang, Volkow, Telang et al. (2004) who observed increased 
activation in the right OFC in association with a self-reported desire for food. 
Impaired desire recognition has been linked to the damage in specific brain 
regions. The desire recognition performance of patients with localized lesions in the 
vmPFC was compared to responses of patients with dorsolateral PFC lesions, mixed 
PFC lesions, and posterior lesions and healthy controls. The patients with vmPFC 
damage demonstrated the worst performance compared to the other groups (Shamay-
Tsoory, & Aharon-Peretz, 2007). Moreover, Chiavarino, Apperly and Humphreys 
(2010) investigated the processes involved the ability to reason about others desire 
and intention, in three samples; parietal and frontal damaged patients, in addition to 
age resembled control sample. The stimuli used for assessment consisted of pictures 
of a game where “a man wanted to find a hidden ball in one of eight boxes. In order to 
get the ball (desire), the man had to first choose the box he thought contained the ball 
and then try to hit it by throwing a ball (intention). This design led to four conditions, 
in two conditions the desire and intention of the man were congruent (desire-
satisfied/intention-fulfilled, desire-unsatisfied/intention-unfulfilled) and in two other 
conditions the desire and intention were discrepant (desire-satisfied/intention-
unfulfilled, desire-unsatisfied/intention fulfilled). Participants were then asked about 
the desire and the intention of the man” (2010, p. 205). For example, when the man 
hit the box he had indicated his intention was fulfilled, while when he hit a different 
box, his intention was unfulfilled, and when he found the ball he wished, his desire 
was satisfied, while when he found a ball but with different colour, his desire was 
unsatisfied. Chiavarino et al. (2010) reported impaired desire processing in the frontal 
lobe patients where there was inconsistency between desire and intention, while 
damage to the TPJ was linked to frontal lobe lesions in cases where there was 
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inconsistency between desire and intention, and partial lobe damage – specifically, 
lesions to the L-TPJ –  may cause critical deficits in processing desire and intention. 
To sum up, the majority of research focused on the development of desire 
attribution, and only a limited number of studies investigated desire in individuals 
with brain damage. Our knowledge regarding the link between desire and other 
components of social cognition is limited as well as the neural networks that are 
critical for this ability. This thesis will investigate how desire is impacted in post-
stroke patients and examine gather insight about possible neurobiological correlates.  
1.4.7 Motivation 
Psychological theories refer to motivation as the reason behind individuals’ 
behaviour that usually stem from a need or a desire. Norman, Cacioppo and Berntson, 
(2011) explain that motivation emerged as consequence of the evolutionary 
development of locomotion, that is essential to decisions pertaining to what 
environmental stimuli to approach and what to avoid. Although motivation has been 
linked to our needs and desires, and which play an important role in reflexive and 
social behaviour, the role of motivation has not been discussed explicitly within the 
framework of ToM research. 
Reiss (2004) based on studies that involved more than 6,000 participants, found 
that motivation can be synonymous with impulse. Based on his theory, he drafted a 
16-desire motivation checklist as follows:  
1. Power (desire to influence)  
2. Curiosity (desire for knowledge) 
3. Independence (desire for autonomy) 
4. Status (desire for social standing) 
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5. Social contact (desire for peer contact) 
6. Vengeance (desire to win, compete or get even) 
7. Idealism (desire to improve society) 
8. Physical exercise (desire to exercise muscles) 
9. Romance (desire for sex and beauty) 
10. Family (desire for raising own children)  
11. Acceptance (desire for approval) 
12. Tranquillity (desire to avoid, tranquillity or fear)  
13. Saving (desire to collect) 
14. Honour (desire to obey a traditional moral code) 
15. Order (desire to organize) and 
16. Eating (desire to consume food) 
These desires differ from person to person and may be experienced and satisfied 
at different levels. For example, a person who has a desire for social contact might 
spend all night partying while another might find meeting with a few friends for a 
meal for one or two hours satisfies that desire. The satisfaction of each human striving 
is associated with an intrinsically valued feeling, such as wonder, freedom or fun, 
among others. Desires may nevertheless be over-satisfied. A simple example is 
overeating which leads to physical discomfort: the person will then usually refrain 
from eating anything until that feeling of discomfort abates, and the next time he eats 
he may eat a small meal in order not to feel overfull and bloated. The same principle 
applies to any of the 16 desires; and it has been found that most people aim for a 
moderate level of satisfaction of these desires, rather than complete satisfaction which 
can lead to addiction if prolonged. According to Reiss (2004), the competing theory is 
used to validate or explain the data. The Reiss Profile of Fundamental Goals and 
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Motivation Sensitivities (a desire profile according to Havercamp & Reiss, 2003) is 
often used to study motivational traits. Reiss (2004: 189) avers that the “16 basic 
desires are truly fundamental to human behaviour”. It seems apparent, therefore that 
these desires will lead to actions that bring about the intrinsically-valued feeling 
associated with the desire; for example, the desire to organise may be displayed by 
ensuring that a house is clean and neat in order to ensure health which results in the 
intrinsically valued feeling of stability. Motivation can therefore be defined as the 
primary psychological process that leads to forming a strategy towards obtaining a 
desired goal that meets the expectation of a need, seeking pleasure or avoiding pain. 
Motivation could generate several plans to meet the demands of a given situation. 
For instance, a person who is motivated to lose weight might plan to start a specific 
diet or to perform some exercise at home. Individuals also may share the same 
motives but to varying degrees.  Past experience and the strength of a motivation are 
important factors that influence strategy selection to sustain the behaviour toward the 
desired goal. 
Leotti and Delgado (2011) pointed out a set of brain structures, which have been 
highlighted by neuroimaging research linked with reward-related activity that aids 
goal-directed behaviour. This network consists of cortical regions including the OFC, 
mPFC and subcortical regions including the caudate, putamen and nucleus. Leotti and 
Delgado investigated the possibility of a common neural basis for social and non-
social rewards by analysing the existing neuroimaging literature. Based on 
categorizing the results in relation to both the main effects of reward (e.g., reward vs. 
punishment), and the reward value (e. g., high vs. low), individual regions have been 
distinguished dealing with primary (e.g., food, drink), monetary and social (e.g., 
charitable donations) categories. In addition, the striatum is noted to be active across 
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all reward types, which, they concluded, reflects the reward value to the brain 
irrespective of the type of reward, which they present as the 'neural currency' for 
motivation. 
Little is known about motivation recognition after stroke. To my knowledge, 
there no tool that are specifically designed to assess motivation representations. Such 
tool is needed to examine the extent to which stroke can affect people’s ability to 
speculate about others motivations, and how it corresponds to deficits in other aspects 
of social cognition. Executive functioning and whether this ability can be linked to 
specific brain region (s).  
1.4.8 Psychological Attitudes 
Psychological attitudes are a stable pattern of positive or negative appraisals of 
ideas (e.g. ideology), people (e.g. ethnicity) and other things related to our 
environment (e.g. sport). The outcome of the appraisal is believed to affect peoples' 
choices and to guide their immediate behaviour towards, or away from, the evaluated 
subject. The broad use of the term 'evaluation' is sometimes equated with 'attitude', 
whereas evaluation reflects the current preference of the stimulus and deciding 
whether in favour or disfavour, while ‘attitude’ can be said to be a relatively stable set 
of representations (Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, & Van Bavel, 2009). The stability of 
an individual’s attitude is believed to be modulated by the constant interaction 
between three factors over a period of time: (i) the cognitive factor, including beliefs, 
past experiences, attributes that we would associate with an object, (ii) the affective 
factor, including the preference and feelings linked to an attitude object, and (iii) the 
behavioural factor, representing the preferred reaction toward approaching the attitude 
subject or away from it (Breckler, 1984; Maio & Haddock, 2015). 
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Psychological attitude involves the creation of personal and social schemas that 
categorize people and things in terms of characteristics, relationships and affiliations, 
therefore researchers suggest that people have an adaptive attitude which is guiding the 
immediate behaviour -toward or away from the an object- as well as facilitate social 
interactions, particularly towards unfamiliar people and events, and enables individuals -
who affected by past learning- to acclimatise to the world through the selection of 
advantageous decisions with concluded anticipation for future rewards or punishment.  
There are limited studies that link social psychological attitudes and evaluative 
processes to their presumed neural bases. Cunningham, Haas and Jahn (2011), on the 
basis of reviewed neuroimaging data, proposed that attitudes are determined by 
activity in the OFC, the amygdala and nucleus accumbens, which provide information 
regarding expected outcomes.  
It is evident that attitude is an important social cognition function that shapes and 
governs different aspects of our social behaviour and interactions. However, to my 
knowledge social and psychological attitude representation were not studied in focal 
brain injuries and, and more broadly there is scarcity in attitude studies with the social 
neurosciences. To bridge this gap, I have developed a unique task (along with a 
control version) that assesses this function to understand how this function is 
impacted following focal brain injury. 
 
1.5 SOCIAL KNOWLEGDE COMPONENTS 
1.5.1 Faux Pas 
Faux pas is a situation where an individual unknowingly behaves inappropriately, 
leading to unintended consequence, often insulting or hurting the other’s feelings. 
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Thus the recognition component requires the ability to infer the mental state of the 
actor, and an understanding of its effect on the recipient requires and empathic 
inference about how the recipient would feel. This test has been used widely in 
developmental studies as well as in populations with psychiatric disorders and focal 
brain damages. For example, Stone et al. (1998) assessed performance on a set of 
twenty stories, six containing social faux pas, and fourteen control stories that 
contained a minor conflict but in which no actual faux pas was committed. They 
compared faux pas performance between patients with bilateral damage to the OFC 
and patients with unilateral damage in left dPFC. The dPFC group performance was 
similar to the control group and detected all of the faux pas correctly, while almost all 
of OFC patients made errors detecting faux pas. 
In a focal lesion study, Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger, Goldsher and Ahron-
Pretz (2005) compared the performances of three groups: patients with PFC damage, 
patients with posterior lesions and a group of healthy controls, on three measures of 
ToM: second false belief, understanding irony and distinguishing social faux pas. 
Damage to the right vmPFC was linked to the most impaired execution of ToM tasks 
particularly on irony detection and faux pas and secondly in false belief tasks.       
Geraci, Surian, Ferraro and Cantagallo (2010) also compared the performance of 
brain lesioned patients in faux pas tests and reported deficits in relation to lesions in 
two brain areas: the bileteral and left vmPFC and the left dPFC. Impaired 
performance has been connected predominantly to the left vmPFC lesions. Taken 
together, these results suggest that faux pas detection may not depend on domain-
general executive processes associated with dPFC, but with more specific processes 
(e.g., concerned with the violation of social rules), and associated with more ventral 
and anterior lesions.  
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1.5.2 Figurative Language 
Another element that can disrupt social communication, but not typically viewed 
as a language-specific deficit, is impaired use and comprehension of figurative 
language. The term figurative language refers to language that uses words or 
utterances that are literally different from their surface interpretation, and 
understanding figurative language has been judged to important for interactions in 
social contexts (Baldo, Kacinik, Moncrief, Beghin, & Dronkers, 2016). Figurative 
language includes proverbs and idioms (Bohrn, Altmann, & Jacobs, 2012). Proverb 
and metaphor interpretation, along with tasks requiring the judgment of irony have 
been used to assess the ability to comprehend figurative language. It is thought that 
grasping figurative language is dependent upon working memory (Kiang, Light, 
Prugh, Colson, Braff, & Kutasi, 2007) among other abilities. Proverb tests have been 
used to investigate the pattern of comprehension impairment in relation to figurative 
language. The results on this relationship to executive dysfunction (e.g., working 
memory, language) in different patient samples, such as alcoholic and schizophrenic 
patients, assist the hypothesis that their deficits stem from their inability to adopt 
abstract attitudes (Thoma, Hennecke, Mandok et al., 2009). It was found by Thoma et 
al. (2009) that schizophrenia patients chose incorrect abstract and meaningful 
interpretations more often and correct concrete (both meaningless and meaningful) 
proverb interpretations less frequently than alcohol-dependent patients and healthy 
controls. Compared to the alcohol-dependent group and the healthy control group, 
these results suggest that severe impairment of complex higher-order cognitive 
functions such as executive behavioural control and non-literal language 
comprehension may be associated with frontal lobe dysfunction. A study by Martin 
and McDonald (2003) supports this finding. 
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Moran, Nippold and Gillon (2006) investigated the relationship between working 
memory and comprehension of low-familiarity proverbs in adolescents with traumatic 
brain injury (TBI). A control group of individually age-matched peers with typical 
development was used in this study. In the authors’ view “it is important for 
adolescents with traumatic brain injury (TBI) to be able to comprehend figurative 
language in order to experience success in social and academic contexts” (ibid., 417). 
Be that as it may, TBI adolescents experience difficulty in interpreting figurative 
language as their higher-order language skills are generally impaired. The tests, using 
the figurative language comprehension test of the Test of Language Competence 
(TLC), provided variable results with insignificant differences in performance with 
the control group. Language-impairment appeared to be a more significant factor in 
the performance differences. However, on language comprehension tests, half the 
participants performed below the average of the control group with the remainder 
performing at an age-appropriate level. Moran et al. (2006) found that working 
memory, which has been related to comprehension abilities in individuals both with 
and without brain damage, was a factor in understanding figurative language, more 
particularly with regard to the interpretation of proverbs. This was determined from 
the application of the Proverbs Comprehension Test (PCT), a task containing low-
familiarity proverbs. The findings showed that there was a significant difference 
between the adolescents with TBI and non-TBI adolescents in terms of their overall 
understanding of low-familiarity proverbs, and that working memory was positively 
correlated with proverb comprehension. The implications of this are that TBI 
adolescents would experience some difficulty in performing adequately within social 
and academic contexts. 
 38 
 
Kiang, Light, Prugh, Coulson, Braff and Kutas (2007) also conducted studies 
among schizophrenic patients on impaired proverb interpretation, which, in their 
view, is a hallmark of schizophrenia. They used the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function 
System (D-KEFS) Proverb Test and the California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT-II). 
The Scale for Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS), the Scale for Assessment 
of Positive Symptoms (SAPS) were used to measure both accuracy and abstraction of 
proverb interpretation, and the Letter-Number Span Test (LNS) was used to measure 
attention-dependent auditory working memory. They found that schizophrenic 
patients produced less accurate and less abstract descriptions of proverbs than did 
controls but found that impaired working memory was of greater significance than 
other cognitive functions such as auditory sensory-memory encoding (as indexed by 
the mismatch negativity (MMN), event-related brain potential (ERP); executive 
function; and social/occupational function, and was possibly related to generalized 
frontal cortical dysfunction.   
Rinaldi, Marangolo and Baldassarri, (2004) investigated metaphor 
comprehension in 50 right-hemisphere damaged (RHD) patients and 38 control 
subjects using both a visuo-verbal and a verbal test. In the visuo-verbal test, 
participants were required to match a metaphorical sentence with one of four pictures 
representing the correct metaphorical meaning, the literal meaning, a control 
metaphor and a control literal meaning. In the verbal test, patients were asked to 
match a metaphorical sentence with a correct written metaphorical interpretation, a 
literal or a control interpretation. On both tests, the number of correct metaphorical 
responses in the RHD group was lower than in the control group. The visuo-verbal 
test appeared to be more of a challenge than the verbal test where the RHD scores 
were slightly higher. Of note is that when they selected the wrong response, the RHD 
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patients tended to select the literal answer only in the visuo-verbal test. Context did 
not seem to be responsible for the dissociation between the two tests. The influence of 
the RHD patients' major visuo-spatial deficits was also checked to exclude their role 
in the tendency to interpret visuo-verbal material literally. The results obtained with 
visual material did not appear to be connected to visuo-perceptual and/or spatial 
deficits.  
Citing other studies an fMRI study (Calvert et al., 2001) and an MEG study (Raij 
et al., 2000) Rinaldi et al. (2004) conclude that the right hemisphere is involved in the 
integration of cross-sensory information (audio-visual information), and thus the test 
results appeared to be linked to an integration deficit. 
Understanding the meaning behind the utterance is important ability for social 
communication. Assessing proverbs can thus help discern between healthy and social 
impaired individuals. Moreover, tests of figurative language comprehension often 
employ a familiar set of words that older adults often feel comfortable dealing with it. 
The assessment of post stroke survivors on a proverb task in conjunction with the 
other tasks can provide insight into the relationship between language understanding 
and performance on social cognitive functions. 
1.5.3 Humour 
Humour is an ever-present human activity that occurs in all types of social 
interactions, and it is considered to have a pivotal role in social interaction. It 
encourages positive emotions and thus can be an effective means of communication 
(Shiota, Campos, Keltner & Hertensetein, 2004). Post-stroke survivors often complain 
from changes in their sense of humour including in their ability to understand and 
produce jokes. Indeed, RHD patients and their spouses reported a statistically 
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significant decline in the patients’ orientation to humour post-stroke (Heath & 
Blonder, 2004). This can be due to the focal damage to brain mechanism or to the 
disturbance affecting the underlying cognitive processes critical for humour. 
Humour recognition is believed to require a higher-order cognitive ability which 
is reliant on both rational and social knowledge (Shammi & Stuss, 1999). Rational 
abilities include cognitive flexibility which enables revision of the apparent meaning 
of an utterance, and social knowledge to comprehend the ironies of an event  or the 
punch line in the case of joke formation (Pérez, 2012). Humour impairments have 
been found to be related to ToM (in terms of belief and intention) and executive 
functions (working memory, set shifting and inhabitation) in a sample of alcoholic 
subjects (Uekermann, Channon, Winkel, Schlebusch, & Daum, 2006).  
Uekermann et al (2006) drew on studies that found that the frontal lobe 
hypothesis asserts a specific vulnerability of the PFC to the toxic effects of alcohol. A 
comprehensive neuropsychological test battery was administered to 29 alcoholic 
patients and 29 healthy controls. The test battery included measurements of executive 
functions, humour processing and theory of mind. In the humour processing task, the 
participants were presented with a series of joke stems with alternative endings 
(correct, slapstick, logical and illogical alternatives). It was found that the alcoholics 
selected a significantly lower number of correct punch lines and chose a higher 
number of slapstick and logical alternatives in comparison with healthy controls. In 
addition, alcoholic patients rated correct, slapstick and illogical alternatives as being 
less funny than healthy controls. The findings of the investigation thus suggest that 
alcoholics are impaired with respect to the cognitive component of humour 
processing. These findings may imply that executive functions (such as working 
memory) are associated with the cognitive component of humour.  
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What this study has shown was that the PFC plays a central role in humour 
processing. The results revealed cognitive humour processing deficits of alcoholics in 
comparison with the controls. The observed impairments were related to theory of 
mind and executive functions. It can, therefore, be assumed that damage to the PFC 
would affect humour processing in non-alcoholic TBI patients. The deficits may 
contribute to interpersonal problems and are thus of relevance to rehabilitation. 
Wild et al. (2003) reviewed the neural correlates of humour in the literature and 
identified several brain areas for humour perception. These are the right frontal 
cortex, the vmPFC, the right and left posterior (middle and inferior) temporal regions 
and they also suggested a possible involvement of the cerebellum.  
Shammi and Stuss (1999) showed that impairments in humour processing were 
mostly linked to lesions in the right frontal lobe. However, the authors suggested that 
cognitive processes involved in humour recognition can vary according to the kind of 
stimuli used in evaluations and so they may show distinct patterns. Verbal humour has 
been associated with verbal abstraction abilities and mental shifting, while non-verbal 
humour has been related to the ability to focus attention on details and to visually 
search the environment. The association between verbal humour and abstraction and 
mental shifting abilities has been confirmed by Polimeni, Campbell, Gill, Sawatzky 
and Reiss’s (2010). In addition, a meta-analysis reviewing the neural basis of humour 
processing, Vrticka, Black and Reiss (2013) suggested that that humour processing 
recruits a large set of cortical and subcortical brain areas that maintain both the 
cognitive and the emotional components of humour in a stimulus modality and task-
dependent manner. However, recent findings showed that humour appreciation is 
uniquely linked to the superior temporal gyrus (STG), and humour-comprehension 
responses to the left TPJ (Campbell et al., 2015). 
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Given evidence of significant decline the sense of humour of post stroke 
survivors, humour assessment is potentially an essential part of any social cognition 
screens. This is underscored by an overlap in brain regions associated with humour 
processes and social cognition more generally.  
 
1.6 NEUROBEHAVIOURAL DYSFUNCTIONS 
Apathy, anger, depression and anxiety with rates between 19% and 57% are the 
perhaps the most common symptoms of emotional distress often diagnosed in 
individuals after brain injuries irrespective of the side of lesion (Thomas & Lincoln, 
2008). In this section, I present the theoretical background to these psycho-
behavioural disorders. However, hence depression and anxiety are routinely assessed 
in hospitals using the hospital anxiety depression scale (HADS) (Zigmond & Snaith, 
1983), they will not be included in the battery of tests that I intend to create. The 
following sections review apathy, anger and impulsivity.  
1.6.1 Apathy 
The emergence of this problem is common after stroke with prevalence rates 
ranging from 19% to 57% of the samples (Mayo, Fellows, Scott, Cameron & Wood-
Dauphinee, 2009; Sagen et al., 2010). In general, post-stroke functional recovery is 
negatively influenced by apathy as it has been related to significant complications 
such as "reduced functional level, decreased response to the treatment, poor illness 
outcome, caregiver distress and chronicity" (Van Reekum, Stuss, & Ostrander, 2005). 
Apathy is deﬁned by Benoit, Clairet, Koulibaly, Darcourt and Robert (2004: 864) 
as a “lack of motivation in behaviour, cognition and affect” which is mediated by 
different fronto-sub-cortical circuits, and evidenced as “emotional blunting”, in other 
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words a lack of emotional responses. It is measured by using the Apathy Evaluation 
Scale (AES) which was developed by Marin (1991) (as cited in Glenn, 2005) as a 
method for measuring apathy resulting from brain-related pathology. The Brixton 
Spatial Anticipation test, developed by Burgess and Shallice (1997), has also been 
extensively used to test apathy related to brain injury. Test studies using the Brixton 
test have found that apathy is related to cognitive dysfunction rather than behavioural 
or emotional aspects of apathy (Vordenberg., Barrett, Doninger, Contardo, & Ozoude, 
2014). Andersson and Bergendalen (2002) also found that apathy was related to 
reduced performance on acquisition and memory, psychomotor speed, and executive 
functions, and not to behavioural or emotional aspects of apathy. More specifically 
this is related to frontal lobe dysfunction resulting in problems with divergent 
thinking, or flexibility and problem solving ability.  
Njomboro and Deb (2014) found that apathy was not so clear cut and solely 
related to cognitive apathy, stating that apathy is a multifaceted and multidimensional 
syndrome. They identified the constructs of affective apathy and behavioural apathy 
which they called “subdomains of neurocognitive functioning”. In their study, they 
used the Emotion Hexagon test (developed by Young, Perret, Calder, Sprengelmeyer, 
& Ekman, 2002) which evaluates perceptions of the facial or macro-expressions used 
to express happiness, sadness, surprise, fear, disgust and anger to evaluate emotional 
apathy. They found that the influence of affective apathy symptoms on emotion 
perception was not significant when considered in isolation, but was significant when 
combined with cognitive and behavioural symptoms. 
Despite Njomboro and Deb’s contestation, this appears to confirm results of the 
Vordenberg, et al. (2014) and the Andersson and Bergendalen (2002) studies. Njoro 
and Deb (2014) also investigated behavioural apathy, using the Iowa Gambling Test 
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(IGT) which assesses motivational decision making and performance. The IGT test 
was developed by Bechara, Damasio, Damasio and Anderson (1994). However, they 
found that the IGT did not significantly predict behavioural apathy which is evidenced 
by indolence and a need to prompt someone to initiate physical activity.  
According to Chow, Binns, Cummings et al. (2009), this is better predicted by 
using 12 behavioural subscale items from the Neuropsychiatric Inventory (developed 
by McKann et al., 1984). Chow et al. (2009) found that the patients tested displayed 
concurrent affective, behavioural, and cognitive apathy symptoms, which points to 
further confirmation that the three domains of affective, behavioural and cognitive 
apathy are highly integrated and it is difficult to isolate or separate them 
Apathy has been linked to frontal lobe and to bilateral basal ganglia damage in 
many studies; however, Hama et al. (2011) report results that support that only post-
stroke apathetic depression can be linked to the damage of the bilateral basal ganglia, 
in both the left and right hemispheres (Andersson, 2000; Carota, Staub, & 
Bogousslavsky, 2002; Cummings, 1993; Robinson, 1997; Santos, Kövari, Gold, et al., 
2009; Starkstein, Federoff, Price, Leiguarda, & Robinson, 1993).   
Levy and Dubois (2006) investigated the functional anatomy of the prefrontal-
basal ganglia system in relation to apathy. Three subtypes of disrupted processing 
were distinguished due to the underlying mechanisms which are responsible for 
apathy, and each type was related to lesions in a specific area of the brain. 'Emotional-
affective apathy' was linked to orbital-medial prefrontal cortex damage or to the 
connected subregions (e. g., the limbic territory) within the basal ganglia (e.g., the 
ventral striatum and the ventral pallidum). 'Cognitive apathy' was linked to the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the related subregions (associative territory) within 
the basal ganglia (e.g., the dorsal caudate nucleus). Finally, the disruption due to 
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'auto-activation' was linked to the damage to the bilateral, the associative and the 
limbic territories of the internal portion of the globus pallidus. 
1.6.2 Anger  
Gross (2013) posited that anger is an emotional state that emerges as a response 
to a social context that has been judged by the individual as involving some form of 
violation, a failure to achieve a wanted goal or a situation that creates high levels of 
frustration. Physiologically, anger is associated with increased heartbeat, higher blood 
pressure and high levels of hormones which can be noticed on facial expression, body 
language, and tone of voice. 
Anger is a natural state for all people (i.e. everyone becomes angry at some time 
or another) but is exacerbated by contributory physiological or psychological 
conditions, such as TBI or schizophrenia (Rae & Lyketsos, 2000). Kashdan, 
Goodman, Mallard and DeWall (2015) found that there are ﬁve anger trigger 
categories: other people, psychological and physical distress, intrapersonal demands, 
environment, and diffuse/undifferentiated/ unknown. 
Ahmed, Kingston, DiGiuseppe, Bradford and Seto (2012) reported that anger has 
been associated with negative outcomes, including physical health problems such as 
myocardial ischaemia and infarction and life-threatening arrhythmias (Verrier & 
Mittelman, 1997), poor quality of life, interpersonal conflict and self-harm although it 
has also been associated with positive outcomes such as mobilizing psychological 
resources, facilitating perseverance, and protecting self-esteem. They cite research 
that has shown that anger increases one's propensity toward aggressive behavior, 
including intimate partner violence, child abuse, “road rage”, assault and homicide. 
 46 
 
Bilge, Kocer, Kocer and Turk Boru (2008) found that post-stroke anger (termed 
emotional incontinence) is related to serotonergic dysfunction in the brain. 
Serotonergic dysfunction has also been found in patients with Parkinson’s disease 
(Qamhawi, Towey, Shah et al., 2015); schizophrenia (Wyss, Hitz, Hengartner et al., 
2013); and suicidality (Kim & Park, 2013). Anger clearly has major consequences for 
life. Gross (2013) reported that emotional regulation has been the focus of many 
studies in the last four decades, and that there is a distinction between problem-
focused coping, which aims to solve the problem, and emotion-focused coping, which 
aims to decrease negative emotion experience.  
In a ground-breaking study, Szasz, Szentagotai and Hofmann (2011) investigated 
the effects of different emotion regulation strategies (reappraisal, acceptance, and 
suppression) on experimentally-induced anger at the subjective and behavioural level, 
as measured by anger and task persistence. They used the proﬁle of affective distress 
(PAD); affective style questionnaire (ASQ), attitudes and beliefs scale II (ABS-II), 
computerized mirror-tracing persistence task as measures to test the three constructs. 
They found that suppression was the least effective and reappraisal the most 
effective strategy for regulating anger: participants in the reappraisal condition 
reported lower levels of state anger and persisted signiﬁcantly longer with a 
frustrating task than those who were instructed to suppress or accept their negative 
feelings. They did, however, point out that their experiment only examined the short-
term effects of different emotion regulation strategies, and that future studies should 
examine long-term effects in longitudinal and ecologically valid experiments.  
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1.6.3 Impulsivity  
Impulsivity can be defined as "actions that appear poorly conceived, prematurely 
expressed, unduly risky, or inappropriate to the situation and that often result in 
undesirable consequences" (Daruna & Barnes, 1993, p.23 as cited in Giovanelli, 
Hoerger, Johnson & Gruber, 2013, p. 1092). It is a common problem found after brain 
injury, that affects one third (Hainline, Devinsky & Reding, 1992) to 56% of stroke 
survivors (Ghika- Schmid, van Melle, Guex & Bogousslaysky, 1999), and has been 
linked to right frontal lobe damage (Floden & Stuss, 2006; Floden, Alexander, Kubu, 
Katz & Stuss, 2008). 
Impulsivity is considered to be a behavioural characteristic underlying both basic 
motor responses (Aron, Fletcher, Bullmore, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003) and higher-
order decision making (Moran, Lengua, & Zalewski, 2013), and can be evidence of 
inhibitory control deficits (Logan, Schachar & Tannock, 1997) and attention deficits 
(Scheffer, Monteiro, & de Almeida, 2011), which contribute to the production of a 
distorted social knowledge. The ability to inhibit inappropriate responses is crucial for 
solving both cognitive and social cognition representation, especially false belief 
detection (Apperly, Samson & Humphreys, 2005; Stone, 2005). Poor inhibition can 
also play a role in correctly attributing others' emotions, desires and visual 
experiences when these experiences conflict with the participant’s own experiences 
(Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan & Humphreys, 2005), although this may also 
be true for the rest of social cognitive elements. 
Floden, Alexander, Kubu, Katz and Stuss (2008) found that impulsivity and risk 
taking behaviour are associated terms, although the difference between the two 
concepts is that impulsivity is a response to disinhibition, whilst risk-taking is linked 
to the reward based aspects of decision making.  In their study, Floden et al. explored 
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the neural bases of impulsivity and risk-taking behaviour. They found that risk-taking 
was not a general consequence of frontal lobe damage but occurred only in patients 
with ventrolateral and orbitofrontal lesions. Even then, people tended to be more risk-
averse than risk-taking. Poor decision-making, which can be linked to risk-taking, was 
detected in patients with ventromedial lesions, with laterality and the size of the 
lesions and gender being significant factors. Left-sided lesions appear to lead to 
greater levels of risk-taking behaviour, and were more pronounced in men than in 
women. They concluded that there was little evidence of impulsivity in a group of 
well-recovered patients with frontal lobe damage, that impulsivity was related more to 
poor calibration of stimulus-response criteria or a failure to reverse learned reward 
associations. In addition, behaviour tended to become more risky when reinforcement 
opportunities were delayed. This means that impulsive people tend to decide quickly 
irrespective of the consequences, while risk takers consider the consequences but they 
tend to under estimate them. 
 
1.7 RESEARCH AIMS 
This project aims to contribute to clinical and psychometric studies of social 
cognition, and to provide further theoretical insights into social cognition by studying 
social cognitive problems in patients after stroke. To do this, the project has four 
goals: (a) to develop a social cognitive screen applicable to the stroke population 
(Chapter 2); (b) to explore the relations between different deficits on the screen 
(Chapter 3); (c) to explore the relations between the deficits in the social cognitive 
screen and the cognitive profile of the patient (Chapter 4); and (d) to explore the 
relationship between social cognition and the site of the brain lesion (Chapter 5). 
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(a) The need for the screen and issues in screen design. 
One common complaint made by friends and family of brain injured patients is 
that ‘they have changed’ – typically referring to some change in the patient’s 
everyday social behaviour in addition to difficulties in cognitive (e.g. language, 
attention, memory) and motor functions. In many cases, the problems in social 
cognition are major determiners of successful outcome of rehabilitation process 
(Andersson, Gunderson & Finset; 1999; Fett et al, 2011; Shimoda & Robison, 1998; 
Venna, Xu, Doran, Patrizz & McCullough, 2014), especially when intervention is 
planned at early stages (Avendano et al., 2006). Identifying impaired social cognition 
construct and related elements will help to generate rehabilitation plans that are 
specifically focused on those deficits, which is essential to enhancing the functional 
recovery of stroke survivors. 
Currently there are no standardized measures of the social cognitions that might 
determine everyday behaviours and that might be affected by brain damage. Hence, 
there is a need, often underscored by clinicians and carers and even by patients 
themselves, for clinically applicable measures of social cognition that are sensitive to 
problems in brain-injured individuals. To date, studies evaluating social cognition in 
clinical populations have been largely experimental and even here there have been 
limitations in terms of task design, assessment of relevant domains and lack of 
standardization.  
Regarding the task design, many studies have for example, considered ToM 
assessment as a key function of social cognition relying on a single task (e.g., false-
belief), and considering ToM, for example, as a unitary underlying function, although 
there is clear evidence that ToM utilizes different cognitive mechanisms (Ahmed & 
Miller, 2011), within both the cognitive and affective domains of ToM (e.g., desire) 
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(Abu-Akel, 2003; Kalbe, Schegel, Sack et al., 2010; Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-
Peretz, 2007). Similar arguments can be made about other aspects of social cognition. 
In addition, there have been few attempts to control the level of cognitive 
demands which are required to pass the task (high-level e.g., faux pas recognition and 
low-level e.g., the first false belief task) (Martín-Rodríguez & León-Carrión, 2010). 
Higher-level tasks are more challenging for patients so they may not pass them for 
reasons not related to social cognition, while they are more likely to manage to pass 
the lower-level tasks successfully (Apperly, Samson & Humphreys, 2005). In order to 
obtain more accurate results, it is recommended that specific tests should be used for 
each sub-process (Stone & Hynes, 2011), and control tasks should be used where 
possible matched for level of difficulty. Similar tasks need to be designed to be 
(relatively) unaffected by problems in language, visual neglect and motor 
performance, all of which are commonly associated with stroke. Notably we need a 
specially designed test instrument with minimal dependence on spatial skills, motor 
ability and language and which operates in a time efficient manner. Moreover, 
designing the social cognition tasks appropriately, factors such as working memory, 
the inhibitory demands of tasks, or other executive functions (Apperly, Samson & 
Humphreys, 2005) need to be controlled and matched for in control tasks, while the 
social cognition task themselves must be designed with a clear definition of the 
mental states to determine which specific states are tapped by various tasks (Stone, 
2005). 
Like most concepts in psychology, there is no consensus among researchers on 
the definition of each aspect of social cognition, therefore it is important to determine 
and define the scope of each aspect assessed in the study. A lack of theoretical content 
definition may result in misinterpretation of the findings and make impossible the 
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sampling of a set of tasks that is intended to reflect the content of given theory.  In 
addition, these uncontrolled task demands, especially with patient groups, may result 
in errors in the required domain measured, for example the group may fail a ToM task 
because of its working memory demands (Apperly, Samson, & Humphreys, 2005; 
Stone et al., 1998).  
A lack of standardization and group norms of measures is another limitation 
facing social cognitive assessment. Standard norms should provide a frame of 
reference that embraces a range of individual differences, something which allows the 
examination of the average magnitude of differences between an individual patient's 
performance and the average performance of healthy group of equivalent age, gender 
and years of education. Age-standardization could also illustrate trends of 
performance related to the characteristics of each age group. 
(b) The relations between different aspects of social cognition 
The second aim of this study is to evaluate the relationships of the social 
cognitive screen aspects with one another, and explore the common features and 
possible underlying factors. Previous investigations of some social cognitive aspects 
have revealed inconsistent results; for example, while significant relations have been 
found between empathy and emotional recognition (Lawrence et al., 2004), a lack of 
correlation has been reported between the ‘reading the mind in the eyes test’ and 
performance on faux pas tasks, although both are considered to reflect aspects of ToM 
in healthy subjects (Ahmed & Miller, 2011) and TBI samples (Muller, Simion, 
Reviriego et al., 2010). As stated above, most of the studies present ToM as a unitary 
social cognitive function associated with attributing mental states to others such as 
thoughts, emotions and intentions, whilst evidence from brain functional studies are in 
favour of partly distinct mechanisms for cognitive and emotional aspects of ToM 
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(Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007), and empathy (Eres, Decety, Louis & 
Molenberghs, 2015). These issues can be addressed through a large-scale clinical 
study that assesses the associations and dissociations between tests.  
In the present study, tests will be included to reflect those most typically used in 
the field, while some extra domains will be included in order to assess motivation and 
attitude attribution (both theoretically linked to social behaviour). Hence the 
relationships between some of the screen domains remain unknown. The relationships 
between the tests will be assessed using, amongst other approaches, factor analysis. 
(c) The relationship between social cognition and other aspects of cognition  
Another specific aim of this study is to carry out a comprehensive assessment of 
the relationships between poor social cognition and other aspects of cognition that can 
be affected in patients. Although some aspects of social cognition (e.g. false belief, 
apathy, emotion recognition, humour) are linked to general cognitive domain, only 
few previous studies have examined the relationship between more general cognitive 
components of cognition and aspects of social cognition. Examples here are whether 
poor understanding of social norms (e.g., in faux pas tests) is related to poor 
understanding of other concepts (e.g., tests of semantic memory more generally), or 
whether poor inhibitory control generally affects cognitive as well as social cognitive 
judgments. By measuring patients on standard cognitive as well as social cognitive 
tests, a better understanding of the relationships between the different aspects of 
social cognition and other key cognitive processes will be formed. Here patients will 
be assessed using the BCoS battery (Humphreys, Bickerton, Samson & Riddoch, 
2012), and also with a ‘cognitive measures’ (Go/No-go task performance) of 
impulsivity not covered in the BCoS.  
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(d) Lesion localisation 
The fourth aim of the study is to explore the relationships between social 
cognitive deficits and brain lesions. Cortical brain regions including the PFC, vmPFC, 
dmPFC, ACC, TPJ and STS, as well as limbic regions including the amygdala, insula, 
thalamus, were repeatedly empathized in previous studies as parts of neural circuits 
subserving aspects of social cognition (Abu-Akel & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). This will 
be done using lesion-symptom mapping based on voxel-based morphological 
techniques. It is hoped that analysis of lesion-symptom relationships will give insights 
into which brain regions are involved in social cognition function(s). The correlation 
of the behavioural description with the quantified anatomy of the patients’ lesions will 
provide a novel assessment of whether aspects of social cognition can be localized in 
the brain, or whether (e.g., due to the complexity of the processes involved) social 
cognition depends on widely distributed brain functions. 
 
1.8 SUMMARY AND STRUCTURE OF THESIS  
Reviewing the literature illustrated a wide range of processes underlies our ability 
to understand and to act appropriately in social situations. For any screen of social 
cognition, it will be important to capture this diversity of processes, especially as the 
literature indicates that many of the different processes are associated with contrasting 
brain regions. In this thesis, my aim is to develop a new screening tool for deficits in 
social cognition in brain-lesioned patients, to validate the tool against existing tests 
designed to assess different social cognitive processes, and to examine whether it can 
be used to detect abnormalities in a group of neurological patients. To this end, I have 
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created new assessments for many of the abilities noted above, combining them into a 
test battery which takes about 1 hour to complete.  
In Chapter 2, the literature on the methods employed to address common social 
cognition difficulties arising from brain injuries, in addition significant problems that  
have a direct impact on everyday life is reviewed. The limitations that may occur in 
the assessment process will be evaluated to suggest how these challenges could be 
overcome. A description of the tasks and measures of the screen designed by the 
researcher particularly to scan social cognition abilities following stroke is provided. 
Then the samples of the study and the statistical methods used to extract the 
psychometric feature for this screen, including reliability, validity, norms progression 
and differences between groups are discussed. 
In chapter 3, the social cognitive performance of a group of stroke survivors is 
analysed, in terms of its latent factors, as revealed through Factor Analysis. This is in 
order to evaluate the potential contribution of clusters of variables (or factors) to 
impairments in social cognition in this sample, and paving for analysing the 
relationships of social cognition factors to cognitive dysfunction and brain lesioned 
areas for next two chapters. Using factor analysis, the model produced four factors; 
social cognition control, motivation, interest in others and mindreading. The common 
main features of each factor are described and the relationships between the factors 
are discussed. 
In chapter 4, cognitive processes that can affect the functioning of social 
cognition are discussed. The relations between social cognition aspects and general 
cognitive abilities in four cognitive domains include; attention and executive 
functions, language, episodic memory and praxis including everyday multi-step 
action. Using factor analysis to describe the cognitive/social cognitive syndromes 
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revealed seven factors, and the characteristic of each factor is described. The 
underlying cognitive domains that can contribute to the deficits of social cognition 
functions are explained, and possible cognitive predictors are detected. 
In chapter 5, the anatomical associations of socio-cognitive functioning and in 
particular to each of the social cognition factor is investigated. Using a track-wise 
lesion-deficits analysis approach, the associations of the behavioural data with the 
quantified anatomy of the patients’ lesions are analysed. The analysis revealed a 
unique association between distinct networks of white matter tracks and three factors 
of social cognition, namely; social cognition control, motivation and interest in others. 
In chapter 6, a case study of a stroke survivor with apparent problems in everyday 
social behaviour and involuntary swearing which were not apparent before the brain 
lesion are presented. The stroke resulted in large cortical and subcortical lesions 
involving frontal and temporal lobes. Using the SCS, BCoS and OCS, his general 
cognitive abilities and social cognition functions is assessed. In addition to quantified 
lesion analysis to the anatomical regions and white matter tracks. The results of 
behavioural data in light of white track lesions associated with the social cognition 
factors were discussed.  
Chapter 7, a general discussion that linked all the findings of this thesis together 
is presented. Including; the practical application of the screen, placing the findings in 
general context of social cognition studies, the impact of the findings on social 
cognition and neurological fields and finally the strengths and limitations of the thesis 
is discussed.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE SOCIAL COGNITION SCREEN 
 
  
Synopsis 
 
In chapter 1, I defined the different components of social cognition and discussed 
possible factors that contribute to the degradation of these abilities after stroke. In 
chapter 2, I focus on the methods applied in the literature to assess social cognition 
capabilities, taking into account to overcome their limitation aspects in designing the 
Social Cognition Screen (SCS). I strived as much as possible to design the tasks and 
measures to take into account post-stroke survivors’ common difficulties, such as 
using visual scenarios rather than language, using vertical procedures to avoid neglect 
and using forced-choice procedures to avoid aphasia. Here I report on how these 
different components were incorporated into the novel screen of social cognition that 
forms the backbone of the thesis, along with reliability studies including internal 
consistency and stability over time, as well as study validity of the new tests in 
relation to other standard tests in the literature. Data from healthy controls in addition 
to stroke survivors were collected and the Social Cognition Screen (SCS) age norms 
were developed. The differences between healthy controls and the clinical sample on 
the measures of the SCS were discussed. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION  
Social cognition broadly refers to the outcome of the cognitive structures and 
processes influencing the interaction between individuals in social contexts. Socio-
cognitive abilities enable us is to comprehend social psychological phenomena by 
analysing the cognitive processes underlying these phenomena, and include, but not 
limited to, how people think about themselves and others, and how these perceptions, 
in turn, influence their behaviour.  
Following stroke, patients and caregivers often report changes in their personality 
and social interactions. In recent decade, stroke has been on the rise among younger 
populations (aged 20-65) (Stroke Statistics, 2015), leaving the majority of them 
(68%), and despite relatively good clinical outcome, with difficulties in returning to 
work and to social dysfunction and familial disturbances (Hommel et al., 2009). 
Assessing these difficulties becomes a major issue for early intervention and 
rehabilitation targeted at specific problems, to help the patients overcome their 
handicap. Providing such a psychometric tool can also bring more insight to the 
theoretical aspect of social cognition functions. Various aspects of social cognition 
have been investigated in the cognitive neuropsychology literature, however, we are 
yet to build an understanding of how the different aspects of social cognition may 
interact with each other and correspond to the lesion area, and how this interaction 
may determine patients' everyday life functioning.  
In this study, tasks are established to test a wide range of social cognitive 
competences. All tasks included in the SCS are chosen based the following principals; 
(a) sensitive to inter-individual differences, and denote the defected social cognitive 
operations commonly affected after stroke that (b) compose significant problems and 
have direct impact on patients’ everyday life, and (c) have been shown to reliably 
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activate mentallizing networks in neuroimaging studies, and have been linked in prior 
studies with brain lesions or/and with specific impaired general cognitive domain 
dysfunction. The tasks have been designed to minimize effects of the more common 
difficulties after brain injury, more particularly language and movement disabilities. 
In addition, control tasks are provided to rule out contributions of basic factors (e.g., 
memory for the events in a social context), which could contribute to the problems in 
social cognition. The tasks are designed to form a screen of social cognition, 
generating a social profile over different underlying abilities. Finally, to interpret any 
pattern of performance in patients, the data from patients are compared to those from 
a group of healthy, age- and education- matched participants, to enable patients to be 
classified as having normal or abnormal social cognitive functions.  
2.1.2 Background to the Screen 
As social beings, individuals naturally engage in social interactions that 
essentially involving various degrees of difficulty. Individuals depend largely on their 
intellectual abilities (e.g. critical and creative thinking, social knowledge) and social 
skills (e.g. social communication) to overcome social problems. Social cognition 
studies attempt to detect people's social skills and knowledge by examining basic 
abilities that are thought to permit them to understand, make a decision, analyse, 
evaluate and judge behaviour.  In this section, I review the most widely used methods 
to assess social cognition aspects, which were used in clinical samples. 
False belief has been assessed using a wide variety of formats including 
figurative play, verbal stories and computerised scenarios. The tasks are typically 
accompanied or followed by formative comprehension questions concerning what an 
individual in the scenario thinks or believes. False belief performance shows a 
consistent developmental pattern, even across various countries and various task 
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manipulations (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). In a typical study, a participant 
may be required to make a judgement based on a false belief held by another person 
in the face of a contradictory ‘true belief’ held by the participant him or herself. The 
tasks presented to assess false belief can vary in their orientation, and could reflect the 
content of the belief, a belief about the location of a stimulus or about whether a 
stimulus is possessed by an individual. The level of reasoning involved can vary from 
first-order views about what an individual thinks to second -and higher- order views 
where nested attributions are required (testing someone’s understanding of the 
understanding a second individual might have of a third party). 
False belief attribution has intrigued developmental psychology researchers, with 
much of the work built around ‘classic’ procedures, such as the Sally Ann task 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985), which assesses false 
belief location and focuses on developmental progression and the disruption of this 
ability. In a typical study, the experimenter introduces two dolls saying, “This is Sally 
and this is Ann, Sally has a basket and Ann has a box, Sally also has a marble, she 
puts her marble into the basket and goes out of the room. While Sally was out, Ann 
takes the marble from the basket and puts it in the box and goes out. Now when Sally 
comes back to the room, where she does she think the marble is?”   The essential 
principle for these experiments is that individuals have to establish a fact that their 
belief is false, then they have to put themselves inside the mind of another child in 
order to predict that child's belief.  Children who project their own belief to others 
may lack the ability to distinguish that others have independent thinking and therefore 
they fail to determine the thoughts of the other agent. Other experiments were 
performed to assess false beliefs based on stimulus, content, possession and 
deception. False belief known content vs. unknown content; introducing a selected 
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known box (e.g. crayons box) filled with other content (e.g. candles) and asking the 
child: what's inside the box? The expected answer for the child is the known object 
(e.g. crayons), then the experimenter opens the box showing the different content to 
child inside the box. Then the experimenter introduces a toy figure (e.g. Teddy) 
saying that Teddy hasn't seen this box, he never seen it opened up, then the target 
question is presented: What does Teddy thinks is inside the box? And an answer 
contrary to the reality is regarded as reflecting a lack of ToM.  Adapting the same 
measurement techniques placed within adults oriented scenarios is thought to be more 
appropriate for testing old people’s ToM (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie & Frith, 1985). 
Desire studies have been discussed in a ToM framework (Repacholi & Gopnik 
1997; Wellman & Liu, 2004; Wellman & Woolley, 1990). The classic experiment 
was performed by presenting a toy figure to a child, then showing two diverse likable 
items such as snacks or stickers, then asking the child about their own favourite 
choice, and then the experimenter gives information about the figure's preferable item 
which is the opposite choice to that of the child. Lastly, the child is asked about the 
figure's favourite choice. If the child's presents his/her own desirable item as the 
response, then this is interpreted as a lack of independent thinking and ToM. In 
contrast if the child gives the opposite answer to their own desire then this it shows 
that child is able to suppress his/her own drive and has a ToM.  
Accumulating evidence—especially from brain imaging studies—on different 
aspects of mind reading, has revealed dissimilarity in processing the cognitive and 
affective aspects of ToM. Although these aspects both share networks linked to the 
attribution of others' mental states, emotional inference processing recruits an 
additional network (Völlm, Taylor, Richardson et al., 2006). This notion has been 
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supported in a lesions study comparing patients’ performances on tasks stressing 
cognitive versus affective aspects of ToM namely “the Yoni task”, where it has been 
argued that cognitive and affective mentalizing abilities are partly dissociable 
(Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007). The latter study required the ability to 
judge mental states (thought and desire) based on verbal and eye-gaze cues with 
minimal language and executive demands. It is a computerised task that consists of 64 
trials including cognitive, affective and control trials presented in first and second 
order conditions, each showing a cartoon outline of a face (named Yoni) and four 
coloured pictures of objects belonging to a single category (e.g. fruits, objects, faces) 
one in each corner of the computer screen, the participant is asked to point to the 
correct answer (the image to which Yoni is referring), based on a sentences that 
appears at the top of the screen and Yoni’s eye gaze, to determine Yoni’s mental state. 
A comparable paradigm was used on brain-damaged patients to investigate the 
differences between the processing of desire and intention. A task was designed to 
allow the researcher to manipulate the fulfilment of intention and the satisfaction of 
desire to equal degrees. The findings have confirmed the disparity between desire and 
intention and suggested two distinct mechanisms related to two brain regions; the 
parietal lobes were highly linked to processing the conceptual understanding of the 
semantic and logical properties of intention, and while the frontal lobes were 
significantly linked to coordinating the notions of desire and intention when their 
outcome were incongruent (Chiavarino, Apperly & Humphreys, 2010). 
Since the beginning of ToM studies, several measures were presented to assess 
other peoples’ intentions. Sarfati, Hardy-Baylé, Besche and Widlocher (1997) 
designed the ‘intention inference task’ which was used in other research (such as that 
of Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Baylé & Decety, 2000). This nonverbal task consisted of 10 
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short comic sequential stories. Each scenario represented the intention of a character 
performing a direct action, and was depicted on six cards, four showing a complete 
story plus two distracting cards. Three cards containing an uncompleted story 
sequence were presented to the patient, and he/she had to choose a fourth card as 
relating to the story. Control questions were included to rule out potential effects of 
poor understanding and memory load. The authors aimed to test the ability of 
schizophrenic patients to recognize others intentions and the clinical pattern of action 
planning and disorganization. Compared with a control sample, the results showed 
significantly poorer performance in the patient group, with impaired intention 
attribution being linked to thought and speech disorganization.     
Emotion recognition is a core component of emotional intelligence, and thought 
to be essential to develop social skills. Facial emotion recognition has been related to 
executive functions in general, revealing that IQ estimated scores can be a significant 
predictor of mastering this ability among healthy people (Ahmed & Miller, 2011). 
Several methods have been used to assess emotion recognition including expressions 
of a full face (Ekman & Friensen, 1976), parts of a face (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001), body expressions (Saxe, Carey & Kanwisher, 2004), 
vocal expression (Nowicki and Duke, 1994) and a combination of face, body and 
voice expression (Golan & Baron-Cohen, 2006; Banziger, Grandjean & Scherer, 
2009).  
The 'Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test' is psychological assessment of emotional 
and mental state reading based on facial expressions. The revised version of this test 
comprises 36 photographs of the eyes region of male and female actors, each one 
exhibiting a specific mental or emotional state and each provided with four forced 
answers.  The test does not contain photos depicting basic emotions (happy, sad, 
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angry, fear and disgust) but more complex emotions such as stress, modesty, shame, 
anger, empathy and patience which can avoid ceiling effects in performance 
(Lawrence et al., 2004). 
Impulsivity is a common problem found after brain injury, for example affecting 
one third of stroke survivors (Hainline, Devinsky & Reding, 1992). As discussed in 
Chapter 1, impulsive behaviour can be evidence of inhibitory control deficits (Logan, 
Schachar & Tannock, 1997; Roberts, Fillmore & Milich, 2011). Specifically, 
impulsive individuals are expected to fail inhibiting inappropriate responses and 
commit more mistakes comparing to the control group. The capability of selecting the 
appropriate behaviour by tendering an appropriate response and holding back an 
inappropriate response are both linked to inhibition control ability (Simmonds et al., 
2008). Several methods have been used to estimate impulsivity including 
questionnaires. However, Go/No-go tasks presented in both simple or complex forms, 
are the most frequent and allow to assessing one’s ability based on commitment to the 
rules and reaction time.  Logan et al. (1997) assessed a group of students (n=136) 
using impulsivity questionnaire and then participated in a stop-signal experiment. 
Students who score high on the questionnaire performed worse comparing to others 
and exhibited slower estimated stop-signal reaction time, similar results from 
populations with pathological problems with impulse control. The simple form of this 
task requires participants to respond to a specific consistent stimulus, which appears 
on the majority of trials (67%), and to withhold their response to certain minority 
stimuli, while the complex task requires that the go stimulus may switch to no/go on 
some trials, and so places more memory demands on performance.  
One other area that captured the attention of social cognition researchers is moral 
judgment. When assessing the literature on this, it is crucial to take cultural 
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differences into account, as the sort of morality targeted in the study can vary and 
significantly affect performance. Mendez (2009) drew attention to classifying 
morality into two categories: 'descriptive morality' indicating the moral rules derived 
from the values of the society in determining right and wrongs, reflecting the 
characteristics of a particular group, and 'normative morality' which reflects rules 
acknowledged worldwide. 
Moral Judgment studies have placed reliance on written scenarios for assessment. 
Scenarios or short stories involving moral dilemmas are often followed by questions 
designed to reveal the participant's moral judgment about the decision taken by the 
main subject in the story. An example here is the dilemmas presented in Figure 2.1 
by Young, Cushman, Hauser and Saxe (2007). Using cognitive neuroscience 
approach, the purpose of their study was to test whether information about an agent's 
beliefs and the consequences of his/her actions contribute to moral judgment. The 
pattern of activation showed highest levels for cases of attempted harm, where 
protagonists were condemned for actions that they believed would cause harm to 
others, even though the harm did not occur. The results suggest a general role for 
belief attribution during moral judgment. 
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Figure 2.1 The coffee moral dilemma (from Young et al., 2007, p 8236). 
2.1.3 Issues Concerning Social Cognition Assessment 
Although we are beginning to learn about the neural underpinnings of social 
cognition, the application of this knowledge towards diagnostics and rehabilitation of 
impaired social cognition remains poorly developed. With two thirds of stroke 
survivors being at vocational age, the consequences of social cognition impairments 
can be disabling and have devastating impact on the rehabilitation process (Hommel 
et al., 2009). While some hospitals may assess post stroke survivors for potential risk 
of developing anxiety and depression after the incident, very often they are not 
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assessed on social cognitive abilities. Hence there is a need perceived by clinicians, 
carers and even by patients themselves for clinically applicable measures of social 
cognition sensitive to problems in brain injured individuals. The studies evaluating 
social cognition in clinical populations have been largely experimental and even here 
there have been limitations in terms of task design, assessment of relevant domains 
and lack of standardization.  
Clearly, there is a need for an instrument that is specifically tailored for stroke 
patients, and which is minimally dependent on the patient’s spatial skills, motor 
ability and language, and that can be administered in a time efficient manner. 
Importantly, it needs to also cover a wide set of social cognitive aspects which are 
commonly impaired after stroke. The validity of the test will obviously require 
standardized norms that represent a range of individual differences and which can 
illustrate trends of performance related to the characteristics of each normed category. 
None with standing some limitations, the assessment methods which have been 
reviewed in the literature are considered affective and sensitive in differentiating 
between healthy and clinical populations. The aim of creating this screen is to also 
increase the efficiency of the assessment so it can more accurately detect the defected 
functions. For instance, the length and the complicated details and language of the 
moral dilemmas’ scenarios can be challenging for assessing patients who often suffer 
from fatigue and limited attention span. Therefore, a nonverbal task would be more 
convenient and which can yield a more accurate assessment. Another example is 
reading the mind in the eyes test (RMET) (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997), the first version 
stimuli consisted of full face pictures displaying basic and complicated emotions and 
provided with two forced choices, was criticized by Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, 
Raste and Plumb (2001) as the forced choice between only two response options, had 
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too narrow a range of scores, which led to ceiling effects as the narrow range of 
scores was above normal. Therefore, task sensitivity was problematic and did not 
allow for differentiation between experimental and control groups (Golan, Baron-
Cohen, Hill & Rutherford, 2007). The revised RMET stimuli consisted of pictures of 
the eye region and four alternative answers account for a combination of complicated 
emotions and metal states, this version has been criticized for the difficulty of 
language used for answer alternatives which may generate bias towards the level of 
education (Billington, Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2007), and the IQ level (Baker, 
Peterson, Pulos & Kirkland, 2014), also for the lack of balance between positive and 
negative proposed alternatives in each trial which may result in random answering. 
Therefore, in the current study the reading emotions task of the social cognition 
screen (SCS) is designed to include pictures of the eyes region, displaying all basic 
and more complicated emotions, four alternative answers account for two positive and 
two negative emotions and the answers where typed vertically to facilitate the respond 
of the neglect patients. 
 
2.2 GENERAL AIMS AND METHODS 
Previously, an explanation has been provided as to why specific aspects of social 
cognition need to be incorporated into the novel Social Cognition Screen (SCS) 
whose aim is to increase the efficiency of the assessment and to more accurately 
diagnose defected functions. I also focused on the methods applied in the literature to 
assess social cognition capabilities, taking into account developing their strength and 
overcoming their limitations in designing the screens’ tasks. Here, I present the tasks 
and measures designed to assess key aspects of social cognition, taking into account 
post-stroke survivors’ common difficulties, such as using visual scenarios rather than 
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language, using vertical procedures to avoid neglect and using forced-choice 
procedures to avoid limitations due to aphasia. With an emphasis on developing the 
psychometric properties of the screen including internal consistency and stability over 
time, and the validity of the new tests in relation to other standard tests in the 
literature, norms progression and finally comparisons between the clinical sample and 
the healthy controls sample based on the extracted standards. 
2.2.1 The Social Cognition Screen’s Structure 
The SCS final structure consists of 9 nonverbal and 6 verbal measures. The non-
verbal tasks asses impulsivity, false belief, intention, moral reasoning, emotion 
reading, emotional empathy, desire, motivation and attitudes recognition. The verbal 
tasks assess faux pas, cognitive empathy, joke formation, proverbs comprehension, 
apathy and anger. In order to reduce the assessment time, the scenario of two tasks 
was employed to assess four aspects of social cognition including first and second 
false belief, descriptive and normative morality and emotional empathy. 
The screen includes tasks representing different aspects of social cognition 
necessary for everyday functions that theoretically and previously have been linked to 
different processes e.g. cognitive aspects such as false belief, intention, cognitive 
empathy, and the emotional aspects such as emotional empathy, emotion recognition 
and desire. Also, the screen includes measures that assess psycho-behavioural 
difficulties after stroke, namely apathy and anger, as well as two novel tasks assessing 
motivation and psychological attitudes. The novel tasks are provided with control 
versions to ensure a proper assessment of their sensitivity to measuring these abilities. 
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2.2.2 Task Development and the Description of Tasks 
2.2.2.1 The False Belief and Moral Reasoning 
Four animated short films were created using the MS Office PowerPoint 2012 
(Movie) program. These multiple tasks were designed to assess first and second-order 
false beliefs in different condition of false belief, i.e. known location vs. false belief 
location, a known possession vs. a false belief possession, known content vs. false 
belief content and known desire (action) vs. false belief double deception procedures. 
The duration of each film ranged between 50 and 85 seconds. During each film the 
participant was asked to answer five questions. Two control questions accounted for 
reality and memory, two assess first-order and second-order false beliefs, and a 
‘descriptive’ moral reasoning question was also asked. A similar format was prepared 
for all the questions, and the answers were to be given verbally and written by the 
examiner. The total scores and number for false belief questions was 8. An Example 
of false belief content scenario is shown in Appendix I-1. 
2.2.2.2 Moral and Emotional Empathy Reasoning 
This multiple task was designed to assess ‘normative morality’ (Mendez, 2009) 
and emotional empathy in everyday scenarios. It consisted of four comic strips 
depicting different social events, sketched in black ink on six A5 white cards. Each 
task represented the moral behaviour of a character in a short comic strip. Each 
scenario included an incomplete story of a character in different social situations. The 
first set of three cards contained the body of the story, and these were shown 
sequentially to the participant. In order to help the participant to differentiate between 
own decision and the agent decision in a later step (inhibit self-perspective demands), 
the participants were asked, “if this situation happened to you, how would you react?” 
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After describing their own reaction, the second set of cards is presented. The second 
set of cards shows the agent performing three different reactions to end the story (one 
represents a good deed and the other two show negative reactions). In order to 
complete the task, the participant is asked to choose the most moral way to behave in 
such a situation; The scores obtained on this task = 4 and were combined with the 
former task's score to complete total of 8 scores for both moral reasoning tasks.   
An example of this sample is shown in Appendix I-2.  
2.2.2.3 Emotional Empathy Task 
In adding another card to the same sequence of the moral cards, depicting an 
additional agent, the additional agent observes the reaction of agent to the moral 
situation, and is asked to infer the feelings of the observer by choosing from three 
forced choices. The total score = 4. 
Example of this sample is shown in Appendix I-3. 
2.2.2.4 Intention Deduction Task  
Four tasks were designed to represent the intention of a character in six comic 
strips. The comic strips were sketched in black ink on A5 white cards. The task 
concluded procedures in order to help the participant distinguish between own 
thought and the act of agent in fact (inhibiting self-perspective demands), then 
participants were asked to choose the logical end from the given alternatives.  The 
alternatives depicted the logical end, an absurd action which looked relevant to the 
context of the story but was in fact far from reality, and an everyday action. In another 
words, impaired intention recognition accounted for both over and lack of metalizing. 
The total score = 4. Examples are shown in Appendix I-4. 
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2.2.2.5 Emotion Reading Task 
This subtest consisted of ten photographs – five males and five females – 
showing the eye region with gaze direction looking forward in all stimuli. For each 
picture, four answer alternatives were provided which indicated four different 
emotional statuses (two of which were positive and two negative emotional states). 
These alternatives were printed vertically on A4 cards in order to reduce the effects of 
factors such as unilateral neglect on the task. Each picture was shown to the 
participant and he/she was asked to select the word that represented the emotional 
expression displayed in each image. The pictures contained six basic emotions (anger, 
sadness, happiness, disgust, surprise and fear) and four more complicated emotions 
(gladness, regret, kindness and pensiveness). 
The total score = 10. Examples are shown in Appendix I-5 
2.2.2.6 Desire and Motivation Recognition Task  
A multiple task was designed to assess desire and motivation. This task consisted 
of 28 trials, 14 estimated desire and desire control and 14 measured motivation and 
motivation control. In these tasks, eye gaze is considered as a goal-detection function 
along with verbal cues presented in each trial. In addition, the task is designed to assess 
motivation as the incentive underlying the desire e.g. a desire for reading stemming 
from a motivation to gain knowledge (As well as these, seven control trials assessed 
basic comprehension of the tasks. The stimuli are illustrated in Appendix I-6. 
Phase 1: To inhibit self-perspective demands, in all trials, pictures of desired 
objects and actions were shown to the participant who was asked about her/his own 
preferred of displayed object or activity in each trial (e.g., sport, gathering with friends).  
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Phase 2: to indicate a picture of a face with either fixed or moving eye gaze 
appeared at the centre of the screen along with the previous desired picture and a 
verbal cue at the top of the screen (e.g., John wants...). The fixed eye gaze on the 
specific picture was considered as a nonverbal cue for the wanted object or action. 
The total score=7. 
2.2.2.7 Motivation Task  
To estimate motivation, a task involving three phrases underlying different 
motivations was constructed. They appeared on the screen and the participant was 
asked to choose the alternative that explained why the individual depicted had a desire 
for this choice, and what this desire represented to the individual (e.g., food – 
reducing hunger, friendship – social contact), as the total score, Examples are shown 
in Appendix I-6. 
2.2.2.8 Psychological Attitude Reasoning Task 
This novel task was based on measuring an individual’s perspective on other 
peoples' stable pattern of positive or negative appraisals, and how patients' perceive 
and evaluate others' external impressions compared to healthy controls.  
This task consisted of five attitude inference tasks in the areas of exercise, 
knowledge, parenting, healthy food and safety. Each trial contained two comparable 
pictures of people in different social events, and the participant was asked to point to 
the image that depicted the person who had a positive attitude towards the topic and 
then to rate each image on a ten-point rating scale (where 0 indicated weak and 10 
indicated strong attitudes). These tasks were combined with another 10 control tasks 
to assess the subject’s basic comprehension of attitudes, in two designs of respond; 
reordering and choosing from multiple choices. The use of language was limited in 
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this task and the multiple choices were printed vertically and read to the patients. The 
stimuli are illustrated in Appendix I-7. 
2.2.2.9 Go/No-Go Task 
This computerized task was designed by Glyn Humphreys-University of Oxford 
and conducted by Keiko Kitadono, University of Birmingham. It consisted of 27 trials 
in which the subject had to respond to an imperative stimulus; a green square which 
accounted for Go trials and constituted the majority of trials (67% = 18 trials). On the 
remaining nine trials the green square was followed by another shape (a red circle 
representing the No-go trials) appearing, after the initial cue, at one of the following 
three intervals – 150, 200 and 250 ms, and during which the participants had to 
withhold their response. The response time and accuracy were used to evaluate 
impulsivity. The maximum total score on this task is 27.  
2.2.2.10 Joke Formation Task 
This task assessed the understanding and composition of humour.  Five items 
were used consisting of one-line, incomplete jokes, with four alternative endings for 
each joke. The subject was instructed to select the ending word or phrase, which 
creates a joke from the incomplete sentence. Different endings were suggested to 
complete this task with logical, illogical and physical endings acting as control 
alternatives, as well as the correct, funny answer. The total score is 5. 
Example: My wife asked me what was on the TV and I said: 
(a) News         (b) Flowers          (c) a Cat           (d√) Dust. 
2.2.2.11 Proverb Comprehension 
This task was designed to assess the social comprehension of proverbs as a form 
of figurative language. It was a pen and paper task that consisted of 10 proverbs, in 
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addition to a practice trial. Each proverb was accompanied by three alternatives 
suggesting the proverb’s meaning and these include the literal, misleading and correct 
meanings of the proverb. The subject was asked to choose an answer to fit the 
meaning of the proverb from the given alternatives. The total score = 10. The stimuli 
are illustrated in Appendix II-1 
2.2.2.12 The Cognitive Empathy Indicator 
Seven items were borrowed from the Empathy Quotient (EQ) (Lawrence, Shaw, 
Baker, Baron-Cohen & David, 2004). The items were selected after applying the 
whole EQ inventory on healthy controls (N=79). The total score on this sub-scale is 
14. The stimuli are illustrated in Appendix II-2  
2.2.2.13 Faux pas Recognition Test 
This test was created by Stone and Baron-Cohen in 1998. It consisted of ten 
stories that contain social faux pas, and ten control stories that contained a minor 
conflict but in which no actual faux pas was committed. The stories were short and 
they were exposed to the participant by placing the written text in front of him/her, 
with the examiner reading the text clearly. Each story was followed by a set of 
questions clarifying why that situation was considered to be awkward (comprehension 
question). In addition to intention and emotion empathy questions, each of the stories 
was followed by two control questions that the subject had to answer at the end, 
whether a faux pas has taken place or not. An example is provided in Appendix II-3. 
2.2.2.14 The Anger Indicator (AI)  
An objective self-report scale was recreated to measure characteristics, attitudes 
and symptoms of clinical anger. This scale consisted of 8 Likert-type items, with 
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answer alternatives ranging from: not at all= 0, slightly= 1, somewhat= 2 and a lot= 3. 
The scores are summed so that the higher scores correspond to greater level of anger.  
The items measured several self domains related to anger such as: intensity, 
orientation, interference with cognitive and health functioning. The highest score on 
this scale is 24. The items are provided in Appendix II-4. 
2.2.2.15 The Abbreviated Apathy Evaluation Scale (AAES) 
This paper and pen task consisted of 9 Likert-type items measuring apathy. Items 
were selected from the Apathy Evaluation Scale AES (Marin et al., 1991). The total 
score on this scale is 36, where higher scores indicated the presence of apathy. The 
items are provided in Appendix II-5. 
2.2.3 Participants 
All of the tests in this work have been conducted on two samples; healthy 
controls and brain lesioned patients. Participant from both groups were volunteers, 
white English speakers. 
(a) Healthy Controls Sample 
This sample consisted of 100 participants [48 (48%) males and 52 (52%) 
females], with ages ranging from 45-85 years old (M=66.43, SD=8.72); they had 
received an average of 12.32 years of education. Healthy participants were willing 
volunteers with no history of brain lesion who signed a consent form and were 
recruited from either (i) the School of Psychology, University of Birmingham, 
participant database, or (ii) The Cognitive Neuropsychology Centre-University of 
Oxford, or (iii) involved in public science activity such as Brain Awareness Week at 
the Science Museum – Oxford, and the Community Day – University of Birmingham.  
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(b) Stroke Patients Sample  
Patients sample consisted of 49 chronic stroke patients, [36 (73%) males and 13 
(27%) females], with ages ranging from 31-91 years old (M= 65.34, SD= 13.67). 
They had received an average of 11.87 years of education. All patients were 
volunteers with anatomical lesions due to stroke with a minimum 9 months since the 
time of the stroke. All participants have signed a consent form, and were recruited by 
the Cognitive Neuropsychology Centre-University of Oxford. See Table 2.1 for the 
demographics of the healthy controls and patient samples. 
Table 2.1 Demographics of healthy controls and patients sample 
Demographics 
Controls                
(N=100) 
Patients 
(N=49) 
Gender (M/F) (48/52) (36/13) 
Age (M ± SD) 66.43 ± 8.72 65.34±13.67 
Education 
  
Primary & Secondary (N) 35 20 
College & Non-University Diploma (N) 30 13 
University degree (N) 35 14 
 
(c) Education levels 
Educational levels of the study were divided to three levels; First primary and 
secondary schools, second consisted of college, levels and non-university diploma, 
and the last composed of bachelor degree and higher education.  The percentage of 
participants underlying each gender and age groups are shown in table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2 The percentage of the participants’ education levels in each age group by gender 
Gender Males Females 
Age groups ≤ 60 61 – 69 ≥ 70 ≤ 60 61 – 69 ≥ 70 
Education %       
Primary & Secondary  36.3 18.2 45.5 22.2 44.5 33.3 
College & NUD 41.7 25.0 33.3 39.2 30.4 30.4 
BA & Higher EDU 46.1 15.4 38.5 20.0 45.0 35.0 
 
2.2.4 Procedures 
The University of Birmingham Ethics Committee approved the study. Data from 
healthy controls were collected to assess tasks feasibility and understanding. 
Specifically, this was conducted to demonstrate whether individuals understand the 
tasks, whether the practice procedure is suitable to provide an informative 
introduction to the test and how the time of application can be reduced to the shortest 
possible time in order to take into account the health status of the patients who 
subsequently will be assessed on these tasks. In this phase, the tasks with weak 
contributions to the assessment were excluded. All statistical analyses were performed 
using SPSS v.21.0 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY, USA). 
2.2.4.1 The Reliability Studies 
The reliability of this screen was assessed in terms of internal consistency and 
stability over time. The internal consistency was assessed with Cronbach’s Alpha in 
both the control and patient groups. Stability over time was assessed using test-retest 
procedure for the same measure and same person. The retest was administered to the 
clinical sample only at least after four weeks. 
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2.2.4.2 The Development of Self-Reported Sub-Scales 
(a) The Cognitive Empathy Indicator: Seven items were borrowed from the 
Empathy Quotient (EQ), which is a 60-item questionnaire that is designed to measure 
empathy in adults (Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen & David, 2004). The items 
were selected after administering the whole EQ inventory in healthy controls (N=79). 
Factor analysis was conducted and the results showed factorial features highly similar 
to the factors featured in the original work. Seven items, with highest factor loading, 
were chosen to represent cognitive empathy. The internal consistency of this sub-scale 
was very good (Crobach’s α = 0.89).        
(b) The Anger Indicator (AI): Anger Indicator items were configured through two 
phases of item selection from the ‘Clinical Anger Scale’ (CAS) (Snell, Gum, Shuck, 
Mosley & Hite, 1995). In phase I, the items were reduced from 84 to 21 sentences by 
choosing an item from each cluster and providing Likert-type answer alternatives. The 
two versions were administered in 30 healthy controls. In phase II, a factor analysis 
was conducted and the items with highest factor loadings were chosen. The sub-scale 
illustrated good internal consistency (α = 0.81).   
(c) The Abbreviated Apathy Evaluation Scale (AAES): This paper and pen task 
consisted of 9 Likert-type items measuring apathy. Items were selected from the 
Apathy Evaluation Scale AES (Marin, Biedrzykci & Firinciogullari, 1991). A self-
reported questionnaire which was applied to different clinical samples including 
Stroke, Alzheimer's Diseases, Hypoxic brain damage, Depression and Traumatic 
brain injury. Data from 73 healthy controls were analysed using factor analysis and 
the items with higher factor loading were chosen. The sub-scale had a high level of 
internal consistency (α = 0.95). 
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2.2.4.3 The Validation Study 
Evidence of convergent validity of the SCS was gathered from analysing the 
relationship between the screen’s sub-tests individually and various established 
external measures of the same ability. A literature review on the methods that have 
proven effective assessment of various aspects of social cognition was conducted. The 
methods with better psychometric features and which were applied on clinical 
samples were chosen. Each subtest was presented along with the external validation 
version to the patient at the same session. The correlations with comparable 
standardised tasks are illustrated in the results section Table 2.4 
The validation version chosen for the Go/No-go task was ‘walk don’t walk task’ a 
subscale from a Test of Everyday Attention for children (TEA-ch) (Manly et al., 
2001), which is a battery of tests developed to assess disorders of attention in 
children. The walk don’t walk subtest assesses sustained attention and response 
inhibition, and predicts the reports of everyday action lapses in clinical populations 
(Manly, Robertson, Galloway & Hawkins, 1999). It was also found to be sensitive 
cognitive difficulties in individuals with post-traumatic brain injuries (Robertson et 
al., 1997). The measure consisted of four training and 20 main trials. The task 
consisted of an answer sheet depicted with paths that each was divided into 14 
squares. The participant are asked to listen to a tape that plays a specific sound (Go 
tone) which allows the participant to move across the squares and mark each step, and 
another tone (No-go tone) to stop moving and remaining in the same square. The stop 
signal appears unexpectedly and with increasing speed in each trial (Manly et al., 
2001).  
Regarding first false belief verification, the ‘Revised strange stories’ (White, Hill, 
Happè & Frith, 2009) was chosen. This measure was used to assess ToM in clinical 
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groups, and is sensitive to detecting ToM deficits in individuals who generally pass 
other direct and simpler tasks (Happè, 1994), including in individuals with focal brain 
injuries, and specifically with vmPFC damage (Shammy-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 
2007). The test consists of short stories presented and read one by one to the 
participant. At the end of each story, the participant is asked to explain why the main 
character acted in a particular way. The stories presented in dialogues similar to the 
animated false belief task created in the SCS, such as double bluff, false content and 
false possession. With respect to second false belief understanding, validation was 
assessed in relation to the second condition of the cognitive trials from the ‘Yoni task’ 
(Shammy-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007). The Yoni task has been shown to be 
sensitive to deficits in ToM among brain-damaged individuals (Shammy-Tsoory & 
Aharon-Peretz, 2007). This task involved judging mental states, thought and desire, 
based on verbal and eye gaze cues with minimal language and executive demands. It 
consists of 64 trials including cognitive, affective and control trials presented in first 
and second order conditions. The second order false belief trials were selected and the 
relation between accomplishing the Yoni second false belief and the second false 
belief animation task were investigated. Also, the first condition desire trials were 
selected and the performance was compared to the SCS desire recognition task.  
The Intention inference task (Sarfati, Hardy-Baylé, Besche & Widlocher, 1997) 
was used to validate the Intention Deduction Task of the SCS. This task has been 
shown to distinguish the performance of clinical samples (schizophrenic and 
depressed patients) when compared to healthy control sample (Sarfati, Hardy-Baylé, 
Besche & Widlocher, 1997), and invokes brain areas typically activated during the 
processing of intentionality including the PFC and the temporal poles (Brunet, Sarfati, 
Hardy-Baylé & Decety, 2000). The intention inference task is a nonverbal task that 
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required inferring the intention of characters in short comic strips. Each comic strip 
consisted of three pictures, which represented an uncompleted story about a character 
performing a very simple action. After viewing the story, the participants were asked to 
choose one of three answer cards, which represent the most logical choice to complete 
the comic strip sequence and which would explain the motivation to perform the action. 
Four scenarios were chosen to analyse the validity of the SCS intention task.    
The moral reasoning task was validated against the moral judgment task, which 
was created by Reniers et al. (2012) to study the neural correlates associated with the 
process of moral and non-moral decision-making. Unlike complicated moral 
dilemmas used in literature, the scenarios were short and written in a simple language 
to ensure understanding. In addition, the names were replaced by the letters X and Z 
to avoid individual associations with particular names affecting decision. The moral 
tasks involved the presentation of a scenario followed by a question asking 
participants to judge whether what someone did, or intended to do, would be ‘ok’ (e.g. 
X’s wife has cancer but they can’t afford the drugs to treat her. X says to his friend Z: 
“I am going to rob the pharmacy tonight.” Question: Is it ok for X to do this?)  
Evidence of convergent validity of the SCS Emotions Reading Task was 
validated against the ‘Reading the mind the eyes test’ (RMET) (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001) and ‘Reading the mind in face’ test (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright & Jolliffe, 1997). The RMET was developed at the beginning as 
an advanced test of ToM, to assess how well the participants can put themselves into 
the mind of other person and to describe their mental states. The test consisted of 36 
pictures of the region of the eyes with four words as answer choices. The participants 
were asked to choose that word best describes the mental state conveyed in the 
picture. Both tests have been used widely in various clinical and healthy groups in 
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descriptive and functional studies. Four pictures were used for validating all the 
complicated emotions (e.g. decisive, regretful, glad, kind) from the RMET. Knowing 
that RMET stimuli do not include basic emotions alternatives, the stimuli from 
‘Reading the mind in face’ test (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright & Jolliffe, 1997) were 
used to also include the basic emotions happy, surprise, fear, sad, anger and disgust.  
Emotional Empathy Task was validated using the emotional empathy items from 
the ‘Empathy Quotient’ (EQ) (Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen & David, 2004).  
EQ is a self-report scale designed to measure empathy. The factor structure of this 
measure was determined based on four reliability and validity studies. In order to use 
this measure for validating the emotional empathy task from the SCS, the items were 
selected after applying the whole EQ inventory on healthy controls (N=79). Factor 
analysis was conducted and the results showed factorial features highly similar to the 
factors features reported in the original work (Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen 
& David, 2004). The items with highest loadings on the emotional empathy sub-scale 
were chosen to calculate the validation coefficients. 
The Joke Formation Task from the SCS was validated in relation to the ‘Humour 
Cartoon Task’ (Gallagher et al., 2000). This task which was used in functional as well 
as clinical studies (Marjoram et al., 2005) and proved to be sensitive to individual 
differences. The original test consisted of 63 single-image cartoon jokes, depicted 
with black ink on an A4 paper. Thirty-one of these were designated to be 'theory of 
mind cartoons' other 32 jokes were physical "slapstick" or behavioural in nature and 
subsequently did not require ToM capabilities for their correct interpretation. Four 
cartoons were chosen to validate the SCS Joke Formation Task. The participants were 
shown each joke one by one and instructed to indicate to the observer when they 
believed they had understood its meaning. Then they gave a short explanation of their 
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interpretation of the joke's meaning. Responses were scored 1 for a correct answer 
and 0 for an incorrect answer. 
The Proverb Comprehension Task in the SCS was validated in relation to the 
‘Metaphor task’ (Happè, 1993). This task was conducted in clinical sample (autistic 
patients). Metaphors and proverbs are considered different types of figurative 
language; metaphor is a figure of speech where the meaning is not obvious, and 
proverb is a saying that is commonly used and normally has some sort of wisdom. 
However, both metaphors and proverbs are linguistic expressions whose interpretation 
is nonliteral, whereby the meaning of the expression as a whole cannot be computed 
directly from the meaning of its constituents. As such, they both require some 
understanding of intentions (Happè, 1993). Ten uncompleted sentences were chosen 
from the study’s measure, the participant was asked to choose a word from a list of 
target words, to finish each of 10 sentences. The list of target words contained 12 
words—10 target words plus two distracter words. Participants were not prevented 
from using the same word twice, and no item could be worked out through a process 
of elimination. The correct answer was scored 1 and the false sentences were given 0. 
Evidence of convergent validity for the Anger Indicator from the SCS was based 
on the ‘Clinical Anger Scale’ (CAS) (Snell, Gum, Shuck, Mosley & Hite, 1995). CAS 
is a self-report instrument designed to assess the syndrome of clinical anger within the 
array of psychological, physiological, affective, cognitive, motoric and behavioural 
symptoms, presumed to have relevance in the understanding and treatment of clinical 
anger. It consisted of 84 sentences divided in 21 clusters with four sentences in each 
cluster. The four statements in each cluster varied in symptom intensity, with more 
intense clinical anger being associated with the fourth statement so that higher scores 
corresponded to greater clinical anger (e.g., Item 1: A = I do not feel angry, B = I feel 
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angry, C = I am angry most of the time now, and D = I am so angry all the time that I 
can't stand it). 
2.2.4.4 Standardisation 
(a) Intergroup Differences 
In order to choose the most reliable cut-off scores, the potential confounding 
effects of age, gender and education were evaluated. These steps are important in 
order to determine the most reliable frame of reference when evaluating the 
performance of the clinical group. To evaluate the effect of age on performance, the 
control-standardisation-sample was divided into three age groups: 60-year olds and 
younger (n=20), between 61 and 69 (n=46), and finally 70-year olds and over (n=34). 
With respect to gender, the performance of the females and the males of the 
standardisation sample was evaluated. The SCS tests were performed by roughly 
equal numbers of males and females (for details see table 2.5). Finally, the effect of 
education on the performance of each test was evaluated by splitting the participants 
into three groups of education as follows: Level I was the lower level and referred to 
education no more than a secondary qualification; Level II included qualifications 
ranging between A levels and a non-university diploma; and Level III consisted of 
bachelor’s degree and higher education.  
Given the study design a MANOVA analysis would have been desirable.  
However, the MANOVA requires the assumption of correlated dependent variables, 
and is sensitive to normality and sample size (Stahle & Wold, 1990). In addition, the 
MANOVA is sensitive to missing data, and thus participants with uncompleted data 
are excluded from the analysis, which effectively reduces the current sample size to 
27 only. An imputation procedure may not be suitable for the current data given the 
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relatively small sample size of available data. Therefore, the analyses were conducted 
using a series of ANOVAs, whilst applying Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparison to guard against Type-I errors.  
(b) Norms Progression 
The SCS tests were administered in 100 control participants. However, only 27 
controls managed to finish all the measures of the SCS during one session. Therefore 
the number of controls was different for each the subtest as follows: Go/ No-go 
(n=70), false belief (n=59), intention (n=61), moral reasoning (n=56), emotion 
reading (n= 90), cognitive empathy (n=79), emotional empathy (n=61), desire (n=64), 
motivation (n=64), humour (n=86), proverbs (n=86), faux pas (n=71), anger (n=62), 
apathy (n=71), and attitudes (n=79). 
In order to determine a diagnostic score that differentiates between impaired and 
intact abilities, a cut-off score for each subscale was calculated. However, due to the 
raw scores distribution and the limited score range for some tests, direct percentile 
conversion was used. The cut-off scores were fixed as 2SD and less from the sample 
mean using the following equation: 
x=μ+Ζσ 
where (x) was the cut-off score for the measure, (μ) was the mean of the control 
performance in the assessment, (σ) was the standard deviation of the controls 
performance in the assessment, and Z was the value from the standard normal 
distribution table for the 95th percentile (-1.65) which indicates difficulties. 
2.2.4.5 Differences between Controls and Stroke Survivors 
The need for a reliable and valid instrument capable of assessing social cognition 
deficits following brain injuries, led to creating the SCS, which was specifically 
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designed to measure an array of social psychological phenomenon. In order to 
determine whether the statistical criterion for the cut-off scores is defining the marked 
impaired social cognition elements, a comparison between controls and stroke 
survivors’ performance was conducted.  
 
2.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
2.3.1 The Reliability Studies 
(a) Internal consistency 
The reliability of the tests in this battery was estimated with Cronbach’s Alpha, in 
both the control and patient samples. In the controls group, the overall internal 
consistency coefficient for the 15 measures was weak (α= 0.18) most likely due to the 
lack of variances among controls and ceiling effects on categorical tasks (pass/no 
pass), which were designed in simplified for use in stroke patients. Another reason 
could be the small number of participants that accomplished all the tests in this 
battery. Comparatively, reliability coefficients for questionnaires that have 4 answer 
alternatives maintained moderate to high alpha coefficients even after item reduction 
(e.g. cognitive empathy α = 0.9 and apathy α = 0.71). However, in patients sample the 
overall internal consistency for the 15 measures -after the abbreviated measures- 
maintained acceptable level (α = 0.7).  
(b) Stability over time  
The stability over time of the tests was assessed among patients’ sample with a test-
retest procedure for the same person, with the duration between the test and the retest 
intervals ranging from 4 to 22 weeks.  However, not all participants completed all the tests 
of the SCS, due to various reasons such as fatigue, moving to care home, and stroke. A 
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paired samples t-test was performed to assess stability on all tests. There were no significant 
differences between the test and retest scores, following Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons (see Table 2.3). In addition, correlation coefficients between the test and retest 
scores ranged from 0.551 to 0.958. All measures, except on the Go/No Go task, r=0.55, 
p=<0.05), were correlated significantly at (p <0.01), (see Table 2.3).  
2.3.2 Convergent Validity  
The measures of the SCS were studied in association to tasks within SCS and 
various established external measures that tap similar abilities and have been applied 
to stroke survivors, expect the novel tasks measuring motivation and attitudes. All 
correlations were significant at p<0.01, and mostly ranged between adequate (0.57) to 
strong (0.96). The coefficient of one measure assessing the validity for emotional 
empathy was weak (r=0.16), but significant, which suggests that the emotional 
empathy task of the SCS have a measurable association with the emotional empathy 
items selected from the EQ. Table 2.4 provides details on the validation tests and the 
correlations coefficients.     
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Table 2.3 Patients’ group test-retest reliability 
Tasks                     Test        Re-test    
                                      Range N Mean SD Mean SD r T Sig. 
Go/No-go 0-27 15 5.02 1.3 7.35 1.9 0.551* 0.17 0.87 
False Belief 0-8 24 6.64 1.06 6.83 1.09 0.850** -1.74 0.1 
Intention 0-4 29 3.24 0.91 3.34 0.86 0.803** -1.00 0.33 
Moral reasoning 0-8 35 6.72 1.02 6.88 0.93 0.711** -1.07 0.29 
Emotions Reading 0-10 29 6.21 1.72 6.62 1.7 0.737** -1.8 0.08 
Emo. Empathy 0-4 26 3.23 0.91 3.31 0.68 0.918** -1.00 0.33 
Cog. Empathy 0-14 19 7.58 3.52 7.89 3.04 0.802** -0.65 0.52 
Desire  0-7 22 6.18 1.59 6.41 1.26 0.928** -2.49 0.02† 
Motivation 0-7 22 6.23 1.19 6.55 0.96 0.800** -2.08 0.05† 
High Psy. Attitude 0-10 24 8.12 1.41 7.8 1.8 0.722** 1.22 0.24 
Low Psy. Attitude 0-10 24 2.92 1.6 2.83 1.3 0.681** 0.37 0.72 
Humour 0-5 39 2.82 1.57 2.92 1.7 0.943** -0.62 0.54 
Proverb 0-10 23 6.05 2.8 6.11 2.45 0.917** -0.24 0.82 
Anger 0-63 19 14.0 13.35 12.58 11.86 0.905** 1.09 0.29 
Apathy 0-36 17 15.69 4.88 15.88 5.4 0.958** -0.48 0.64 
Faux pas 0-60 16 44.94 15.21 47.13 13.83 0.914** -1.7 0.11 
*p <0.05, **p < 0.01 
† Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons requires p=0.003 for significance. 
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2.3.3 Standardisation 
2.3.3.1 Intergroup Differences  
In order to choose the most reliable cut-off scores, and to exclude potential 
confounding effects of age, gender and education on performance of participants 
within the control group, differences between male and females, age groups and 
education levels were examined. First, a gender differences was examined within the 
control groups on all tests, based on previous studies reporting gender differences on 
some measures such as emotion recognition and empathy (Schulte-Rüther, 
Markowitsch, Shah, Fink, & Piefke, 2008). A series of Bonferroni corrected 
ANOVAs comparing the performance between males and females revealed no 
significant differences on any of the measures included in the SCS (see Table 2.5). 
This indicated that mature males and females do not differ in their performance levels 
on various social cognition tasks, and therefore norms segmentation based on gender 
was not applied. 
With respect to performance differences based on level of education, a series of 
ANOVAs compared the performance of three groups (Level I, n=35; Level II, n=30; 
and Level III, n=35) on the various SCS measures. The ANOVA analysis also showed 
no significant differences between the groups on any of the SCS measures (see table 
2.6 for details). It seems that social cognition competence in healthy adults aged 45 
and older is independent of their level of education, and thus these results do not 
support segmentations based on level of education. 
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Table 2.4 The SCS correlations with other standardized measures 
SCS tasks  Validation task  Authors N r * 
Go/No-go Walk don’t walk  Manley et al., 1999 25 0.68 
First False belief R-Strange stories  White, Hill, Happè, & Frith., 2009 34 0.78 
Second False belief Yoni task  Shammy-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007 31 0.57 
Intention Intention inference task  Sarfati et al, 1997 46 0.81 
Moral Judgment Moral Judgment task  Reniers, Corcoran, Völlm, Mashru, Howard & 
Liddle., 2012 
31 0.70 
Emotions Reading Reading mind in the eyes test 
and Faces test 
 Baron-Cohen et al., 2001 
Baron-Cohen et al., 1997 
43 0.80 
Emo. Empathy Empathy Quotient  Lawrence et al., 2004 26 0.16 
Desire Yoni task  Shammy-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007 27 0.91 
Humor Humor cartoon task  Gallagher, Happè, Brunswicka et al., 2000 26 0.85 
Proverb Metaphor task  Happè, 1993 29 0.82 
Anger Indicator Clinical anger scale  Snell et al., 1995 25 0.96 
* All measures were correlated at p<0.01 
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Table 2.5 Gender differences within the control group on the Social Cognition Screen 
measures 
† Significant variance with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons;  
   Threshold (p = 0.003) 
 
Finally, the differences between age groups were investigated.  The Bonferroni 
corrected ANOVA analyses revealed significant difference in humour, measured by 
joke formation task (F (2,83)=7.997, p=0.001). The Scheffe Post hoc results indicated 
that the mean differences for the last and the first age groups (>70 and <60) was 
significant (I-J=-0.850, SD Error=0.22, p=0.001), such that increase in age was 
associated with significantly worst humour appreciation. However, the mean 
differences for the last and middle age groups (>70 and 61-69) was not significant (I-
J= -0.468, SD Error=0.177, ρ=0.035). Overall, there results indicated that people tend 
to lose their sense of humour as they age (see table 2.7 for more details). 
Measures   Males   Females   
 N mean SD N mean SD F p 
Impulsivity 
(Go/No-go) 
28 25.07 2.775 42 25.26 2.187 0.103 0.750 
False Belief 28 7.79 0.499 31 7.77 0.497 0.008 0.930 
Intention 29 3.90 0.409 32 3.97 0.177 0.827 0.367 
Moral reasoning  28 7.93 0.262 28 7.89 0.315 0.213 0.647 
Emotions reading 41 8.20 1.005 49 8.18 1.236 0.002 0.962 
Cog. empathy 41 8.36 3.904 46 8.78 3.169 0.276 0.601 
Emo. empathy 29 3.76 0.435 32 3.72 0.457 0.121 0.729 
Desire 29 7.00 0.00 35 6.60 0.736 8.550 0.005† 
Motivation 29 6.93 0.371 35 6.69 0.631 3.400 0.70 
Humour 41 4.61 0.586 45 4.22 0.902 5.464 0.022† 
Proverbs 41 8.51 1.098 45 8.64 1.171 0.290 0.591 
Faux pas 33 58.36 2.369 38 58.47 3.367 0.025 0.876 
Attitudes 38 7.647 0.928 41 7.81 .6421 0.828 0.366 
Anger 31 1.58 1.455 31 1.65 1.355 0.033 0.857 
Apathy 33 15.12 3.380 38 13.53 3.310 4.021 0.049† 
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Table 2.6 Performance differences on the Social Cognition Screen within the control group based on level of education 
     Education levels     
  I Primary & Secondary II College & Non uni. Diploma                III Bachelor Degree & above  
Measures n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD F P 
Go/No-go 20 24.70 3.045 26 25.42 2.403 24 25.33 1.834 0.565 0.571 
False belief 19 7.79 0.535 18 7.78 0.548 22 7.77 0.429 0.006 0.994 
Intention 19 3.89 0.459 21 3.95 0. 218 21 3.95 0.218 0.221 0.802 
Moral reasoning 18 7.89 0.323 17 7.94 0.243 21 7.90 0.301 0.147 0.864 
Emotion reading 31 7.87 1.024 28 8.14 1.268 31 8.55 1.028 2.938 0.058† 
Cog. Empathy 27 8.70 2.866 28 8.07 3.711 24 9.13 3.860 0.603 0.550 
Emo. Empathy 19 3.68 0.478 21 3.76 0.436 21 3.76 0.436 0 .195 0.823 
Desire 24 6.83 0.482 20 6.75 0.639 20 6.75 0.639 0.153 0.859 
Motivation  24 6.83 0.482 20 6.90 0.308 20 6.65 0.745 1.166 0.318 
Humour 31 4.32 0.702 27 4.43 0.879 28 4.48 0.802 0.304 0.739 
Proverb 31 8.48 1.208 26 8.69 1.123 29 8.59 1.086 0.236 0.790 
Faux pas 26 58.46 2.549 24 58.04 3.82 21 58.81 2.182 0.382 0.684 
Anger  23 1.57 1.308 22 1.59 1.297 17 1.71 1.687 0.052 0.949 
Apathy  26 14.31 3.927 23 14.00 2.828 22 14.50 3.461 0.120 0.887 
P. Attitudes   26 7.54 1.02 28 7.80 0.602 25 7.848 0.697 1.133 0.327 
*Significant variance with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons; threshold (p = 0.003) 
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2.3.3.2 Norms Progression and cut-off Scores  
Norms Progression was conducted using direct percentile conversion formula. 
The cut-off scores were calculated and fixed at 2SD and less from the sample mean, 
and the progression of cut-off scores was smoothed across the three age groups. Table 
2.8 displays the scores’ range, means and cut-off scores developed for all the tasks in 
each age group to distinguish individuals falling below the fifth percentile based on 
standardised residual scores. Generating age group cut off scores was necessary as the 
results of the age group comparisons showed significant differences on the joke 
formation task in addition to marginal boundary scores for four measures that their 
confidence levels ranged between (0.09 and 0.02). However, while these values are 
bigger than the Bonferroni corrected p-value, a bigger sample size may yield these 
differences significant as would be predicted by the acknowledge age-related decline 
in social cognition (Stanley, Lohani & Isaacowitz, 2014). The reported cut offs differ 
according to the age group for most of the measures, to account for the influence of 
age on individuals’ social cognition outcome.  
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Table 2.7 Age groups differences in performance on the Social Cognition Screen among control group. 
     Age groups     
  ≤60   61-69   ≥70    
Measures n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD F P 
Go/No-go 14 24.93 3.47 31 25.48 1.57 25 24.96 2.65 0.42 0.66 
False belief 11 7.91 0.30 27 7.89 0.32 21 7.57 0.68 3.12 0.05 
Intention 11 4.00 0.00 27 3.93 0.39 23 3.91 0.29 0.31 0.74 
Moral reasoning 11 8.00 0.00 25 7.88 0. 33 20 7.90 0.31 0 .68 0.51 
Emotion reading 16 8.44 1.09 41 8.20 1.07 33 8.06 1.22 0.59 0.55 
Cog. Empathy 16 9.06 3.38 34 8.47 3.35 29 8.52 3.77 0.17 0.84 
Emo. Empathy 11 3.91 0.30 27 3.67 0.48 23 3.74 0.45 1.17 0.32 
Desire 10 6.70 0.68 28 6.96 0.19 26 6.62 0.75 2.73 0.07 
Motivation  10 6.70 0.68 28 6.96 0.19 26 6.65 0.69 2.54 0.09 
Humour 17 4.88 0.33 38 4.50 0.65 31 4.03 0.95 7.99 0.001* 
Proverb 18 8.94 0.80 39 8.51 1.14 29 8.45 1.27 1.20 0.31 
Faux pas 11 56.18 3.84 32 58.97 2.71 28 58.68 2.41 4.251 0.02 
Anger  12 1.33 1.37 25 1.80 1.5 25 1.56 1.33 0.48 0.62 
Apathy  13 12.77 2.32 32 14.22 3.11 26 15.08 4.03 2.05 0.14 
P. Attitudes   13 7.88 0.72 36 7.81 0.96 30 7.57 0.56 1.01 0.37 
*Significant variance with Bonferroni correction formula for multiple comparisons; threshold (p = 0.003) 
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Table 2.8 Score range, means, and cut-off points within each age group 
Age Groups 
                                                                               ≤60                                                         61-69                                                     ≥70 
Measures Scores range n Mean SD Cut-off scores n Mean SD Cut-off scores   n Mean SD Cut-off scores 
Go/No-go 0-27 14   24.93  3.47 19   31 25.48  1.57 23   25 24.96  2.65 21 
False belief 0-8 11   7.91  0.30 7   27  7.89  0.32 7   21  7.57  0.68 6 
Intention 0-4 11   4.00  0.00 4   27  3.93  0.39 3   23  3.91  0.29 3 
Moral reasoning 0-8 11   8.00  0.00 8   25  7.88  0.33 7   20  7.9  0.31 7 
Emotion reading 0-10 16   8.44  1.09 7   41  8.20  1.07 6   33  8.06  1.22 6 
Cog. Empathy 0-14 16   8.20  3.38 3   34  8.47  3.35 3   29  8.52  3.76 2 
Emo. Empathy 0-4 11   3.91  0.30 3   27  3.67  0.48 3   23  3.74  0.45 3 
Desire 0-7 10   6.7  0.68 6   28  6.96  0.19 6   26  6.62  0.75 5 
Motivation 0-7 10   6.7  0.68 6   28  6.96  0.19 6   26  6.5  0.69 5 
Humour 0-5 17   4.88  0.33 4   38  4.50  0.65 3   31  4.03  0.95 2 
Proverb 0-10 18   8.91  0.80 8   29  8.51  1.14 7   29  8.45  1.27 6 
Faux pas 0-60 11   56.18  3.84 50   32 58.97  2.72 54   28 58.68  2.41 55 
P. Attitudes - 0-10 13   3.58  0.76 <5   36  3.42  1.03 <5   30  3.23  0.94  <5 
p. Attitudes + 0-10 13   8.52  0.86 >7   36  8.32  1.1 >7   30  8.44  0.93 >7 
Anger † 0-24 12   1.33  1.37 4   25  1.8  1.5 4   25  1.56  1.33 4 
Apathy † 0-36 13   12.77  2.32 17   32 14.22  3.11 19   29 15.08  4.03 22 
† Deficits are determined by high means  
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2.3.4 Differences between Controls and Stroke Survivors 
In general, the SCS succeeded in providing an informative and sensitive 
assessment across an array of social cognition tasks commonly affected by brain 
injuries and which have a direct impact on everyday social and psychological life. The 
comparison between healthy controls and stroke survivors of a particular age group 
revealed significant differences on all measures except three, which were marginally 
significant, falling above the Bonferroni corrected threshold for significance 
(p<0.003). There measures were desire (F(1,91)=( 8.397), p=0.005), motivation 
(F(1,91)=( 8.491), p=0.005), and apathy (F(1, 100)=(5.322), p=0.023). See table 2.9 
for more details on the comparisons of the performance of the control and patient 
groups on the SCS measures. 
Unlike the relation of desire and intention as a goal (r = 0.37, p=0.05), desire and 
motivation were highly associated (r = 0.94, ρ=0.0001), and this is justified because 
desires are considered to be the goal for satisfying an impulse ‘motivation’ (Reiss, 
2004), so motivation is a condition precedes desire, and desire satisfaction can lead to 
motivation satisfaction but the same cannot be said about the relation between desire 
and intention. For intense a sandwich can satisfy a hungry person, however, the plan 
for getting that sandwich (intention) may vary, and even after choosing a specific 
plan, the desire may not always accomplished as planned but changing the desire can 
lead to the satisfaction of the motivation, such as he goes to the shop but they run out 
of sandwiches so he eats a chocolate bar instead.  
While it can be argued that the non-significant differences between the groups on 
the aspects of social cognition (namely, desire, motivation and apathy) by sample size 
and choice of task, there is reason to believe that these aspects might be immune to the 
brain damage.  
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Table 2.9 Performance comparisons between the control and patient groups on the Social Cognition Screen measures 
  Controls   Patients    
Measures N Mean   SD  N Mean   SD      F    p 
Impulsivity 70 25.21 2.296  27 22.74 5.059  11.488 0.001 
False Belief 59 7.78 0.494  38 6.68 1.461  29.825 0.000 
Intention 61 3.39 0.309  48 3.27 0.984  24.713 0.000 
Moral reasoning 56 7.91 0.288  43 6.98 0.938  49.556 0.000 
Emotions reading 90 8.19 1.131  46 6.48 1.859  44.33 0.000 
Cog. empathy 78 9.10 3.086  31 6.52 2.897  16.122 0.000 
Emo. empathy 61 3.74 0.444  42 3.19 0.74  21.947 0.000 
Desire 62 6.84 0.486  31 6.19 1.621  8.397 0.005 
Motivation 62 6.89 0.370  31 6.35 1.33  8.491 0.005 
Humour 86 4.41 0.788  39 3.03 1.597  42.058 0.000 
Proverbs 86 8.58 1.132  39 6.56 2.125  47.878 0.000 
Faux pas 71 58.42 2.926  30 47.33 12.413  50.659 0.000 
Anger  64 1.63 1.374  27 4.96 3.492  21.254 0.000 
Apathy 71 14.27 3.414  31 16.16 4.612  5.322 0.023 
Psy. attitudes 79 7.732 0.792  37 6.90 0.928  24.87 0.000 
*Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons; threshold (p=0.003). 
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In considering desire, for example, it is plausible to assume that this ability is less 
likely to be affected by brain damage is it emerges during the early phases of 
development. From about 18 months of age, children are able to recognise desires in 
others and are able to distinguish between what other people want or desire, and what 
they do not want. From this age, they also understand the link between desires and 
emotions, recognising that desired objects cause happiness, whereas undesired objects 
may cause disgust (Repacholi and Gopnik, 1997). Moreover, they develop the ability 
to reason about other people’s desire before developing the ability to reason about 
others’ beliefs (Shahaeian, Peterson, Slaughter, & Wellman, 2011). Consequently, the 
function of understanding the other’s desire might operate in in more distributed 
network of brain regions, and thus, when a specific area is damaged, the mechanism 
subtending desire can continue to operate, albeit in a compensatory manner, perhaps.     
The lack of significance on the apathy scale can be interpreted due to the inherent 
bias within the control and patient samples. Since the main drive of apathy is lack of 
motivation and withdrawal from social activities, whereas higher level of motivation 
is considered the main trait of the volunteers characteristics; they tend to maintain 
higher levels of motivation and control on different aspects of their lives (Miller, 
1985; Mirheidari, Ghiami-Rad & Rostamifard-Ahari, 2011) and they expect that 
volunteering would satisfy their growth needs (Miller, 1985). The results of assessing 
apathy may change when this scale performance merges with other measures within a 
factor domain and also when assessing patients randomly following brain injuries in 
hospitals. It would be interesting to explore these relationships with item reduction 
methods such as factor analysis in order to explore the underlying common features of 
aspects of social cognition.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE DOMAIN STRUCTURE OF POST-STROKE DEFICITS IN 
SOCIAL COGNITION 
 
 
 
Synopsis 
In Chapter 2, I described the construction and validation of a new battery for the 
assessment of social cognition following brain injury. Resent evidence from brain 
functional studies has supported the notion of a modular structure underlying ToM 
abilities, with separate component parts involved in specific, differing mentalizing 
processes (Abu-Akel, 2003; Bodden et al., 2010; Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 
2007), and empathy (Eres, Decety, Louis & Molenberghs, 2015; Harari et al., 2010). 
These issues can be addressed through a large-scale clinical study that assesses the 
associations and dissociations between tests. Here I analyse social cognitive 
performance of a group of stroke survivors in terms of its latent factors, as revealed 
through Factor Analysis. This is in order to evaluate the potential contribution of 
clusters of variables (or factors) to impairments in social cognition in this sample, and 
analyse the relationship of these factors to cognitive dysfunction and brain lesioned 
areas.  
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
As described in the previous chapters, social cognition broadly refers to the 
outcome of cognitive processes and structures that enable people to form perceptions 
about ‘themselves’ in relation to other people, and to analyse psychosocial 
phenomena. It involves the impact of our perception on the way we think, feel and 
respond to others in social environment, and to what extent we correspond to the 
opinion of others to change the way we think, feel, and respond to the world. 
Stroke survivors and their family often report problems social interaction, 
personality, emotions and social behaviour. In many cases, the problems in social 
cognition are major determiners of successful outcomes (Andersson, Gunderson & 
Finset; 1999; Fett et al, 2011; Shimoda & Robison, 1998; Venna, Xu, Doran, Patrizz 
& McCullough, 2014), rather than domain general abilities (see: Fett et al, 2011, in a 
quantitative meta-analysis study).  
Social cognition elements are mostly multidimensional constructs (e.g. ToM, 
empathy, and apathy) and relatively little is known about the relationships among 
more specific aspects of each. It is also unclear which aspects are most affected and 
which are immune to brain damage, and more specifically what aspects are most 
likely to be affected due to a deficit in another. These issues can be addressed through 
a large-scale clinical study that assesses the degraded functions common after stroke 
in addition to help understanding the factorial structures underlying social cognition 
and the components utilised under each factor. 
There have been several recent attempts to explore underlying latent factors 
compromised by brain damage by using forms of factor analysis to extract common 
components behind test performance. An example has recently been reported by 
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Corbetta et al. (2015). After screening a relatively large number of patients 1-2 weeks 
post-stroke, Corbetta et al. entered 67 individuals into a principal components analysis 
using data from a set of cognitive tests of attention, language, memory and motor 
function.  The results highlighted three factors reflecting (i) language and memory 
(including both verbal and spatial memory), (ii) indices of right hemisphere damage 
(left motor impairment, bias against the left field, general performance and spatial 
memory) and (iii) indices of left hemisphere damage (right motor impairment, bias 
against the right field and poor attention shifting). Corbetta et al. proposed that 
behavioural variations after stroke could be accounted for by a small number of 
anatomically-grounded factors that would not necessarily reflect classic 
neuropsychological syndromes (e.g., distinguishing between language comprehension 
and production).  
In contrast to this, in an analysis focusing on language functions in left 
hemisphere stroke patients, Butler, Lambon Ralph and Woollams (2014) reported 
three underlying factors that are linked to phonology, semantics and executive 
cognition. Furthermore, these distinct factors were associated with brain lesions to 
different sites. Phonology was uniquely associated with lesions in central perisylvian 
areas including mid to superior posterior temporal gyrus, middle temporal gyrus, 
superior temporal sulcus and Heschl’s gyrus. The semantic factor was linked to left 
anterior middle temporal gyrus, and the underlying temporal stem. The third factor, 
‘executive’ cognition, which explained the least variance, did not relate to any brain 
regions. 
In the area of visual attention, Verdon et al. (2010) analysed the latent factors 
underlying performance on a range of clinical tests of spatial attention (e.g., cancellation, 
line bisection) and reported a distinction between deficits on tests requiring scanning of 
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egocentric space and those requiring attention to the spatial positions of features in 
objects (egocentric and allocentric neglect as posited by Chechlacz, Rotshtein, & 
Humphreys, 2012). Again they linked these separate components to different brain 
lesions; the ‘perceptive/visuo-spatial’ factor to the right inferior parietal lobule, the 
‘exploratory/visuo-motor’ factor with the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and the 
allocentric/object-centred’ factor to the deep temporal lobe regions. 
In the field of social cognition, this approach has been less evident and the vast 
majority of studies examined performance at the level of individual tests. 
Nevertheless, there are some indications from work within clinical population. For 
example, in relation to schizophrenia, Mancuso et al. (2011) used factor analysis to 
extract latent components across five tests of social cognition (covering emotional 
processing, social perception, attributional style, and Theory of Mind). They proposed 
that performance was dependent on three underlying factors: (1) hostile attributional 
style, (2) poor detection of low-level social cues (e.g. for facial emotion identification 
and lie detection), and (3) impaired inferential and regulatory processes (e.g. detecting 
sarcasm and managing emotions). Interestingly, factor 2 (poor detection of low-level 
social cues) accounted for variance in functional outcome over and above measures of 
neuro-cognition, suggesting a distinct contribution of this factor to everyday 
functioning.  In contrast, Bell et al. (2009) argued for a four-factor model involving (i) 
affect recognition, (ii) Theory of Mind, (iii) egocentricity, and (iv) rapport. However, 
it is an open question as to how well these analyses apply to patients with organic 
brain lesions rather than to schizophrenia. It appears that the exact relationship 
between aspects of social cognition following stroke has yet to be elucidated. 
Here, I used a statistical data reduction method the ‘Factor Analysis’ on the 
performance of the group of stroke survivors reported in chapter 2, to evaluate 
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potential latent variables contributing to impairments in social cognition in this 
population. In addition, the differences on factors performance between controls and 
patients will be carried out. This analysis would reveal which factors were affected (or 
not) post stroke.  
 
3.2 METHODS 
3.2.1 Factor Analysis  
Participants 
All of the tests in this work have been conducted on two samples; healthy controls 
and brain-lesioned patients. Participant of both groups were white English speakers.   
Patients’ sample 
In first expletory analysis the patients’ sample consisted of 49 patients [36 (73%) 
males and 13 (27%) females], with age ranging from 31-91 years old (Mean=65.66, 
SD=13.50), and years of education with an average of (Mean=11.87, SD=3.6).  
All the patient were volunteers at a chronic stage of recovery from stroke 
(>9months post stroke) with time average (Mean=13.44, SD=3.55) months, signed a 
consent form, and were members of the patient panel at the Cognitive 
Neuropsychology Centre (CNC), University of Oxford. 
Materials 
Participants were assessed using a novel battery of tests, The Social Cognition 
Screen (SCS), which was designed as a part of my Doctoral research with the aim of 
developing a screen to detect socio-cognitive deficits after brain injury. The SCS 
consists of 15 tests designed and adapted to be aphasia-friendly and commensurate 
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with the common difficulties experienced after stroke. More details and description of 
the tasks are presented in chapter 2. 
The tasks were examined with several methods in order to gain their 
psychometric features. Internal consistency for the patient sample showed an 
acceptable coefficient (α = 0.7). Stability over time was assessed using a test-retest 
procedure with the patients, with the duration between the test and the retest ranging 
from 4 to 16 weeks. All the test retest values were correlated significantly at level 
(p <0.01), more information provided at chapter 2, table 2.3.  
The validity of the measures was assessed in comparison with external tasks and 
tests of specific social cognition function published in the literature, except for 
motivation and attitudes as they were novel tasks and provided with a control version. 
All correlation coefficients between the test in the SCS and measures of particular 
functions in literature were significant at p <0.01. More information provided at 
chapter 2, table 2.4. 
Procedures  
Stroke patients, who were recruited by the CNC, Oxford University, were 
assessed on the SCS. However, at the time of conducting the factor analysis study, 
only 23 of the patients manged to complete the assessment on all the measures. Due to 
the lack of previous analysis particularly on stroke survivors’ sample, confirmatory 
factor analysis for the study is not possible (Nesselroade & Cattle, 1988). In order to 
extract the underlying factors that best explains the patients’ social cognition deficits, 
expletory factor analysis followed by a varimax rotation to maximize orthogonality 
and Kaiser normalization that extracts factors with an eigenvalue ≥ 1.0 has been 
conducted. Due to missing data on some measures for the patients’ sample, some of 
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data were excluded from the component analysis and therefore, the models produced 
were not reliable (KMO ≤0.05, and non-significant results of Bartlett Test). 
Generally, the results of factor analysis indicate an interaction between sample 
size and the number of variables, as the probability of error tends to be minimized and 
the accuracy of population estimates is maximized which will support the 
generalizability of the results (Osborne & Costello, 2004). Therefore, the models 
produced initially have not obtained the required specification.  In order to find a 
more adequate model, I maximised the patients sample size by adding a homogeneous 
age and education background group of healthy controls to the analysis. Table 3.1 
contains the final demographic data of the sample. Further statistical analysis 
addressed the variances of factor performances between healthy controls and patients 
to identify immune and fragile factors of social cognition. Also, the possible 
relationships between produced factors were explored. 
Table 3.1 Demographics of the sample of study 
Demographics Patients 
(N=23) 
Controls 
(N=16) 
Gender (M/F) (16/7) (10/6) 
Age 63.48±13.76 65.4±8.38 
Education  11.87±3.6 12.46±3.6 
Primary & Secondary School 10 6 
College & Non-University Diploma 6 4 
University degree 7 6 
 
3.2.2 Comparisons between the Mean Performances of Controls and Patients 
Participants 
The patient group consisted of 26 participants (19 males and 7 females) with a 
mean age of 63.39 (SD=12.92). The healthy controls consisted of 26 participants (13 
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males and 13 females) with a mean age 65.89 (SD=8.42). A t-test showed no 
differences between the groups in age [t (49.5)=0.41, p =0.05], or in the distribution 
of gender.  
Procedures 
In order to compare between patients and healthy controls, their raw scores on 
each SCS factor were converted into Z-scores, using the controls group mean and 
standard deviation across each factor. The calculation of the Z-scores were performed 
using the following standard formula  
 
where ) was the raw score of performance,   was the mean of controls in 
that assessment and  was the standard deviation of the controls’ performance for 
the assessment. 
 
3.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
In order to check the homogeneity of the controls sample added to the stroke 
survivors, an independent samples t-test comparing the mean age of the patient and 
control groups were conducted. The results revealed no significant difference 
(t(40)=0.581, p=0.564). There was also no significant difference between the patient 
and control groups in years of education (t(40)=0.512, p=0.692).  
Taking the data for the patients and controls together, the Anti Correlation Matrix 
(ACM) coefficient cut-offs were moderate and ranged between r = 0.54 and r = 0.93). 
The results of the KMO measure of sampling adequacy showed a moderate patterned 
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relationship (KMO= 0.70), with significant Bartlett Test of Sphericity (BTS= 0.34, 
p<0.001) which confirms the existing of patterned relationships—the variables were 
considered to be part of the factor if their factor loading was greater than 0.60. The 
model indicated four factors that explained the majority of the total variance (70%). 
The number of the significant factors, factor-loading measures, eigenvalues and the 
variances explained are reported in Table 3.2. 
3.3.1 The Domain Structure of Social Cognition Deficits in Chronic Stroke 
Survivors 
Factor 1 represents ‘Social Cognition Control’ (SCC) and explained the largest 
proportion of the behavioural variance representing 29.82%, or one third of the total 
variance. Eight measures were integrated in this factor and included proverb, humour, 
false belief, anger, impulsivity, emotional reading, faux pas and moral reasoning. The 
main feature shared by these measures, is that they represent socio-cognition abilities 
that, as one would expect, often become impaired in post-stroke patients. 
Interestingly, these social cognition abilities loaded along with impulsivity (the 
Go/No-Go task an inhibition control task), which suggest that deficits in social 
cognition in stroke patients may be aggravated by cognitive impairments. As such, 
this factor may reflect the contribution of executive load on performance (Fino et al., 
2014).  
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Table 3.2 The factor loadings, measures, eigenvalues and the amount of variance 
accounted for. 
Measures  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
SCC Motivation IO Mindreading 
Proverb 0.850 0.058 0.284 0.112 
Humor 0.841 -0.096 -0.183 0.206 
False belief 0.770 0.314 0.144 -0.095 
Anger  -0.744 † -0.364 -0.113 -0.073 
Impulsivity -0.699† 0.067 0.032 0.116 
Emotion reading 0.654 0.258 0.214 0.201 
Faux pas 0.620 0.456 0.032 -0.111 
Moral reasoning 0.611 0.332 0.383 0.227 
Desire 0.248 0.917 0.109 0.161 
Motivation 0.206 0.883 -0.040 0.173 
Cognitive Empathy -0.005 0.079 0.717 0.347 
Psy. attitudes 0.140 0.263 0.700 -0.253 
Apathy -0.190 0.253 -0.684† -0.223 
Emotion empathy 0.116 0.077 0.084 0.868 
Intention 0.228 0.358 0.235 0.630 
Eigen values 4.474 2.548 1.902 1.627 
Variance explained % 29.824 16.985 12.681 10.845 
Cumulative variance 29.824 46.809 59.490 70.334 
SCC =Social Cognition Control. IO= Interest in Others. 
† Higher means in these measures indicate greater deficits 
The relationship between ToM and Executive Functions (EF) has frequently been 
discussed in the literature (e.g., Aboulafia-Brakha et al., 2011, Saxe et al., 2006; 
Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses & Lee 2006), to determine whether ToM is a domain 
specific ability or rather part of a domain general function, and specifically, whether 
EF is necessary precisely for developing and acquisition of ToM, or for the execution 
of ToM as well. Indeed, it has been shown that degraded EF performance tend to 
associate with deficits in ToM (Aboulafia-Brakha et al, 2011), humour (Uekermann et 
al., 2008), identifying emotions and faux pas (Ahmad & Miller, 2011), and anger 
(Denny, 2014). Although there some evidence from a case study of a patient with 
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amygdala damage who failed ToM but his EF abilities found to be intact (Fine, 
Lumsden & Blaire, 2001). Furthermore, Havet-Thomassin et al. (2006) tested this 
association in a group of patients with frontal lobe brain injuries, using the ‘Stroop’ 
and ‘Trail making’ tasks as indicator to the EF and the ‘RMET’ for ToM. Their 
results indicated no causal effect and the performance on EF tasks did not predict the 
RMET. This relationship could reflect selective problem related to inhibition control.   
Overall, the current study results is in favour of the necessity of inhibition control 
ability, a specific element of the EFs, in accomplishing ToM and other related social 
cognition abilities, which might be instrumental to supressing self-beliefs and 
distinguish between self and others thoughts and beliefs. This would be in line with 
Saxe, Schulz, and Jiang (2006) that suggested the involvement of both domain-
general and domain-specific cognitive resources in adult ToM. However, hence, six 
other measures loaded in this factor, this result might apply to the rest of the measures 
loaded in this factor including proverbs, humour, emotion recognition, anger, moral 
reasoning and faux pas, it would be interesting to investigate the relations of the SCS 
measures with other elements of EF such as working memory, controlled and 
sustained attention, so as to identify the domain general particularly needed for 
specific aspect of social cognition.  
Factor 2 was labelled as ‘Motivation’ and included two highly correlated 
measures accounting for 16.99% of the total variance – understanding motivation and 
desire. The tasks are designed to assess visual prospective taking, which is perceived 
as a low-level mechanism (Apperly & Buttwefill, 2009). The motivation and desire 
tasks both require the processing and understanding of motivational drivers of 
behaviour. Here, the coupling across both tasks indicates that an underlying 
motivation-related factor may be selectively affected by brain lesion. Faux pas shared 
 110 
 
cross-loadings with this factor (0.456) and the SCC factor (factor 1)– perhaps because 
it requires not only executive control of attention but also the ability to apply social 
rules based on understanding the motivations behind the social behaviour. 
Interestingly, desire overlapped with motivation rather than intention, which may 
suggest that identifying others desire is linked to the drive underlying the goal 
directed behaviour rather than the strategy undertaken to satisfy that desire which may 
not be consistent with the desire.    
Factor 3, labelled ‘Interest in Others’ (IO) accounted for 12.68% of the variance. 
This factor loaded on three measures: cognitive empathy, apathy and psychological 
attitudes. The variables in this dual dimension factor are characterised with the social 
tendency to interact with others. The psychological attitudes task required making 
assumptions about a stable set of representations of others’ based on their preference 
for the stimulus and deciding whether they are in favour or disfavour of the attribution 
subject (Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, & Van Bavel, 2009). Positive psychological 
attitudes and higher degree of cognitive empathy correspond to lower level of apathy 
(Eslinger et al., 2012). They represent the positive tendency of this domain and reflect 
the openness to share experiences and interests with others, care to engage in social 
interactions including the consideration of others thoughts, feelings, and reactions in 
social contexts. On the other hand, negative psychological attitudes and lower degree 
of cognitive empathy correspond to higher level of apathy, which is characterized by 
lack of motivation, social withdrawal and refraining from new experience. The apathy 
task estimates the individuals’ motivation and tendency towards socialisation. A lack 
of interest in others could contribute to poor understanding of psychological attitudes 
and to apathy. It is interesting that apathy loaded on this factor and on the factor 
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linking desire and motivation reasoning. Apparently understanding motivation in 
others (factor 2) may be distinct from being motivated (factor 3).  
The final factor, factor 4, labelled ‘Mindreading’, loaded on two measures—un 
understanding others intention and emotional empathy—and accounted for 10.85% of 
the total variance. The variables in this factor are characterised by the ability to 
speculate others intentions by analysing the facts of the social context and the 
associated mental states believed to symbolise the observed action. Both variables 
may involve selective processes implicated in forming predictions about how others 
may feel in given context. Evidence from previous studies supported the association 
between these variables as they were found to rely on the activation of similar brain 
networks involved in social perception, namely the mPFC, superior temporal lobe and 
temporal pole, whilst emotion identification required the additional engagement of the 
amygdala as a part of emotional networks (Völlm, et al., 2005). 
Taken together, the data suggest that there are commonalities across a range of  
social cognition tests, rather than different tests isolating particular social component 
processes. The results pertaining to the relationships between the variables in each 
factor were consistent with the results of previous studies. For example, false belief 
and desire loaded onto two separate factors, namely the SCC factor and the 
motivation factor, respectively. This separation is consistent with findings in the 
literature (Bodden et al., 2010; Kalbe et al. 2010; Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 
2007) ascribing these abilities to distinct neural circuits. Interestingly, Decety and 
Cowell (2015) findings support the distinction between moral reasoning, which 
loaded onto the social cognition control factor (factor 1), and empathy, which loaded 
onto the mindreading factor (factor 4). Decety and Cowell (2015) examined the 
multiple physiological, hormonal, and neural systems supporting empathy and its 
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functions, in relation to justice and moral behaviour. They found that empathy 
produces social preferences that can conflict with fairness and justice. 
The model presented for social cognition factors revealed associations the SCC 
factor (factor 1) with a measure tapping inhibitory control (Go/ No-go task), which is 
an essential element of EF that enables the suppression of actions and reluctance to 
irrelevant stimuli involvement (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). This association perhaps 
highlights the effortful demands required for processing overlapped measures in this 
domain. In general, EF underscore accomplishing the tasks as it concerns the 
engagement of goal directed behaviour as well as modifying behaviours based on 
situational demands (Williams, Suchy & Rau, 2009). The remaining measures appear 
to represent social domains less dependent on inhibitory control and may rely on other 
cognitive domains, or alternatively, involved tasks that succeeded to control for the 
inhibitory demands for the task. For instance, the motivation, desire, intention, and 
emotion empathy procedures required the participant to state their own view before 
asking them to consider others’ minds and actions. This assumption can be 
investigated in more extensive study which includes a range of cognitive abilities such 
as attention, working memory, language, problem solving, and analysed with social 
cognition aspects to understand to what extend social cognition elements are reliant 
on other higher cognition capabilities in order to operate normally.  
Alternatively, if social cognition elements loaded independently on a factor, this 
may mean that the social factor is supported largely by a domain specific operation 
rather than being a part of a domain general operation, and may even constitute a 
distinct ability. Some social cognition factors are expected to load specifically with 
other social cognitive components for other reasons.  
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3.3.2 Comparisons between the Mean Performances of Controls and Patients 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to investigate the significant 
variances between the assessment of control and patient groups. After Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons, differences between the groups were considered 
significant at p≤0.012. The results revealed significant differences between the groups 
on three factors, where patients performed significantly worse than controls. 
Differences were observed in Social Cognition Control [F (1,50)=32.00, p<0.001], 
Interest in Others [F (1,50)=26.11, p<0.001] and mindreading [F (1,50)= 24.72, 
p<0.001]. However, the difference between the groups on motivation factor was not 
significant [F (1,50)= 4.529, p=0.038], although the difference was in the direction 
expected. For more details on ANOVA analysis between groups see Table 3.3 
Table 3.3 Comparison between controls and patients factors  
 Controls Patients   
Factors Mean SD Mean SD F P 
Social cognitive control  0.482 0.162 2.237 1.573 31.995 0 .000 
Motivation 0.494 0.491 1.343 1.976 4.529 0.038† 
Interest in Others  0 .493 0 .171 1.069 0.549 26.11 0 .000 
Mindreading 0.357 0.154 1.497 1.159 24.724 0 .000 
† Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons; threshold (p < 0.012)  
The findings of this investigation showed significant differences between controls 
and patients performances on three factors; social cognition control, interest in others 
and mindreading. The significant differences between patients and controls on the 
factors produced by the previous model confirm that stimuli used to assess each 
component were sensitive to detecting the defected performance, although the patients 
were volunteers and have passed the acute cognitive disruption following stroke.   
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However, the selective ‘motivation’ attribution deficit as low-level mechanism 
suggests that understanding of others’ desires and motivations alone will not be 
sufficient to function properly in a complex social situation. As an internalised early 
developing ability, desire attribution may be processed in multiple brain regions and 
this may be the reason that this factor was preserved, or least affected, comparing to 
other factors. Perhaps, as an independent domain more resistance to the brain damage 
following stroke, motivation and desire attribution could be a potential strength that 
cab be called upon during rehabilitation.  
Furthermore, in order to explore the relationship between the social cognition 
factors, correlation between the scores of four factors was conducted. The results 
revealed significant relations only between the social cognition control and the 
motivation factors (r=0.49, p=0.05), which raises the question as to whether deficits 
on social cognition control factor can predict deficits in motivation. To address this 
question, a multiple regression has been conducted were the z- standardised scores of 
social cognition control factor was set as predictor and the raw scores of motivation 
factor as the dependant factor. The analysis revealed a significant model, 
[F(1,24)=7.602, p<0.011], R2 =0.241, explaining 24% of the variance, where the 
social cognition control factor was positively associated with the motivation factor 
((se)=0.616 (0.233), t=2.757, p=0.011). Whilst the dissociation between SCC, IO and 
mindreading factors may highlight the differences between social cognition factors even 
within the same theoretical domain, for instance attributing others belief and intention 
have been used interchangeably under the ToM concept and as a cognitive domain by 
researchers, and this holistic view may not be adequate. Our result based on the analysis 
of latent characteristics of a set of variables illustrate a more specific trend of relationships 
that may differ within the same theoretical domain, for instance the dissociation between 
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reading emotions (in SCC factor), desire attribution (in motivation factor) and emotional 
empathy (in mindreading factor), although all may reflect affective aspects of social 
cognition. This may be explained partly due to neuro-circuits supporting each factor and 
can be investigated with quantitative analysis of the lesion, however, there might be other 
reasons involved such as selectivity. For example patients who assessed as intact SCC 
might be able identify others emotional states but may choose not to involve themselves 
with others’ emotional states (emotional empathy), and as Decety and Cowell (2015) 
suggested empathetic social preferences can conflict with social norms of morality 
and justice. 
To sum up, three of the social cognition factors; social cognition control, interest in 
others and mindreading are factors that may be operating independently, and possibly 
supported by distinct mechanisms. However, the motivation factor appears to be 
dependent on social cognition control. This assumption finds support in the observation 
that all the patients with defected performance on motivation factor were also impaired on 
social cognition control factor, but not the reverse. More broadly, the findings of the 
present study may have implications concerning research practices investigating social 
cognition and its correlates. When investigating the relationship between social cognition 
and higher cognitive domains, many studies tend to use a broad range of tasks, such as 
ToM, to index social cognition, and EF tasks such as the Stroop task to index higher 
cognitions, rendering the generalisability of such findings limited. Evidence from the 
factor analysis in this study revealed distinctions between variables used repeatedly and 
interchangeably in the literature, such as FB and intention. Furthermore, the limitation 
also applies to EFs. For instance, the ‘Stroop task’ assesses a specific form of inhibition 
(interference control). Therefore, it is not accurate to use it as an indicator for the wide 
variety of cognitive processes involved in EF. 
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3.3.3 Limitations 
The results of this chapter need to be considered with respect to a number of 
limitations. First, the study’s sample is relatively small. This may have affected the 
results of the current exploratory factor analysis, given that explanatory factor 
analyses are known to work better with larger sample sizes (Yong & Pearce, 2013). 
Therefore, a replication with a larger sample size is necessary, and thus factors need 
to be interpreted with caution. Moreover, the current results should be interpreted with 
caution due to the large number of variables. However, given the wide array of 
cognitive and socio-cognitive functions observed in stroke patients, clinical screens 
need to include a wide range of tests to minimize misdiagnoses and incomplete 
profiling of patients’ abilities.  
3.3.4 Conclusions 
In conclusion, the results lend support to the possibility that social cognition 
abilities may be distinguishable and can be classified into four underlying processes: (1) 
complex aspects that require domain general abilities (e.g. inhibition control) as to 
operate normally, and include cognitive, affective and social knowledge variables. 
Deficits on this factor can be linked to domain general deficits; (2) aspects that require 
automatic analysis of affective phenomena, depending on responses and consequences 
of observed behaviour. Deficits on this factor may reflect misunderstanding others’ 
motivations and desires; (3) aspects concerning social engagement, which when 
impaired, may lead to social withdrawal as well as deficits in reproduction of the 
previously learned behaviour in seemingly appropriate contexts; lastly, (4) 
uncomplicated mindreading aspects that can operate independently and act upon 
selective willingness to think about others’ cognitive and affective mental states. 
Individuals with impairments on this factor might be characterised by self-bias and 
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egocentric interpretations to the psychosocial phenomenon. Moreover, notwithstanding 
the study’s limitations, the current results are encouraging for further research 
concerned with the relations between these social cognition components and different 
aspects of EF, such as rule finding and working memory, along with other cognition 
domains linked to social cognition, and will provide insight into the functions 
underlying aspects of social cognition. Moreover, the factor analysis may help in 
highlighting most pertinent test domains for stroke patients. 
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CHAPTER 4  
 
THE COGNITIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL COGNITION 
DEFICITS AFTER STROKE 
 
Synopsis 
In the previous chapter, a factor analysis was applied to data collected from post 
stroke patients who completed the Social Cognition Screen (SCS), revealing four 
factors. The primary factor was ‘social cognition control’, which explained the largest 
proportion of behavioural variance. This to be expected given the fact that, clinically, 
post stroke socio-cognition deficits tends to be dominated by cognitive impairments. 
However, this factor consisted of several social cognition competences that were 
associated with inhibitory control, which is related to Executive Functions (EF). This 
finding raised several queries about the relations between the social components 
combined in this screen and other domain general capabilities including different 
aspects of the EF such as planning and working memory. 
In this chapter, I aim to advance our understanding of the cognitive processes that 
can affect the functioning of social cognition. Here I employ the Birmingham 
Cognitive Screen BCoS (Humphreys, Bickerton, Samson & Riddoch, 2012)—and 
extended battery of cognitive measures—in order to identify and explain the 
underlying cognitive domains that can contribute to the deficits of social cognition 
functions, as well as to detecting possible cognitive predictors.  
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4.1 INTRODUCTION  
As it has been reviewed, the term ‘social cognition’ embodies a multitude of 
cognitive structures and processes that influence social interactive mutuality between 
the individual and other people in social contexts. This includes, but not limited to, 
both the recognition and the implementation of social knowledge, moral norms, rules, 
emotions recognition and attribution. Social cognition studies have largely relied on 
ToM assessment as a key indicator of social competences, regardless of the viability 
of this assumption (Apperly, 2011). These studies often linked ToM with one or more 
elements of EFs, both during its development and acquisition (Miller & Marcovitch, 
2012; Sabbagh et al., 2006) as well as during production and execution of ToM 
processes (Henry et al., 2006; Samson, Houthuys & Humphreys, 2015; Saxe et al., 
2006). EFs refers to a set of functions involved in planning, set shifting, working 
memory, attention (Ball, Holland, Watson & Huppert, 2010; Lin, Keysar & Epley, 
2010), inhibitory control (Turner & Spring, 2012), self-regulation (Hofmann, 
Schmeichel & Baddeley, 2012), as well as the organization, management and 
execution of goal directed behaviours, especially those which involve novel and 
complex situations and which require creativity and the interaction between different 
cognitive processes (Gilbert & Burgess, 2008; Verdejo-García & Bechara, 2010, 
Cardoso et al., 2015). In addition, social cognition has been linked to higher cognitive 
demands such as intelligence, memory and language (Malle, 2002; Sellabona, 2013). 
For instance, in a quantitative meta-analysis investigation, significant association has 
been revealed between general intelligence and the reading the mind in the eyes 
(RMET) (Baker, Peterson, Pulos & Kirkland, 2014). 
Yet, investigations of the association between EFs and social cognition revealed 
inconsistent findings. For instance, Van Overwalle (2009) undertook a meta-analysis 
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to explore what areas of the brain are involved in social cognition, and with regard to 
people’s behavioural intentions, social beliefs, and personality traits. The results of 
over 200 fMRI studies suggest that the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) is the brain 
area that impacts how goals, intentions, and desires of other people are interpreted in 
the short term, and represented at more concrete level, while the medial prefrontal 
cortex (mPFC) was found to be more involved in determining more long-lasting 
impressions of others and the self and represented at more abstract level. Other tasks 
reﬂecting general-purpose brain processes that may potentially be involved with 
social cognition such as sequence learning, causality detection, emotion processing, 
and executive functioning were also examined but they did not appear to overlap with 
the brain areas that were activated during social cognition.  
Interestingly, evidence from ‘inhibition control’ (Turner & Spring, 2012) found 
to be crucial for solving cognitive (e.g. attention and working memory) and social 
cognition aspects’ tasks including attributing others' emotion, desire, belief and visual 
experiences, precisely when these experiences conflicted with the participant’s own 
experiences (Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan & Humphreys, 2005; Stone, 2005). 
As far as EF role in supressing self-prospective is concerned, some studies suggested 
a pivotal role in processing belief and desire attribution. In their study, Apperly, 
Samson and Humphreys (2005) assessed a patient with a right fronto-temporal lesion 
on a series of cognitive and socio-cognitive tasks. The patient performed more 
accurately on a reality-unknown belief condition task compared to reality-known false 
belief condition, in addition to degraded execution on tasks requiring the attribution of 
others’ desire, visual and emotional perspective as well as impaired performance on a 
set of social and non-social tasks demanding inhibitory control. Taken together, the 
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authors attributed the impaired pattern of performance to defective self-perspectives 
inhibition.  
However, there is converging evidence that self-prospective inhibition requires 
executive control. In a recent study, Samson, Houthuys and Humphreys (2015) 
investigated the link between self-prospective inhibition and more executive control 
abilities, by comparing the performance of two pairs of brain-lesioned patients. The 
first pair consisted of two patients with similar brain damaged areas; one of them had 
previously been known (from past case studies) to suffer from deficits in self-
prospective inhibition. The second pair showed similar executive control deficits in 
classic neuropsychological tests as the first pair but, with different brain lesions’ 
location. For the first pair (i.e., the patients with selective deficit in self-prospective 
inhibition, the results revealed that they do not necessarily have impaired resisting 
interference from distracting information other than their own prospective when 
mentallizing. The second pair (i.e., those patients with severe executive control 
impairments) does not appear to have difficulties in inhibiting their own prospective 
when mentallizing. The authors concluded that self-prospective inhibition is a 
selective deficit that cannot be explained by general executive control difficulties.  
Messa, Wang, Bickerton, Demeyere, Riddoch, and Humphreys (2015) found that 
post-stroke domain-specific deficits could only be understood in relation to linked 
changes in domain-general processes. They used the Birmingham Cognitive Screen 
(BCoS) (Humphreys, Bickerton, Samson & Riddoch, 2012). An assessment of 287 
patients was conducted to determine how neuropsychological deficits can be detected 
using a broad, time-efficient screen that can assess both ‘domain specific’ and 
‘domain general’ cognitive deficits and to generate a specific cognitive profile for 
individual patients. Their results were presented by means of graphical modelling 
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techniques to investigate the associations and interdependence between deficits within 
and across the domains of the BCoS tests. On an individual basis, there was no 
significant difference compared to the results from existing cognitive models. 
However, when the whole dataset was modelled, significant differences were found, 
indicating that domain-specific deficits are better understood when linked to domain-
general processes, which would help to evaluate neuropsychological deficits after 
stroke. 
Using factor analysis method to extract common components behind test 
performance and to explore the underlying concealed factors compromised by brain 
damage is an effective method used for understanding social cognition dysfunction. Fett 
et al. (2011) investigated the relationships between neurocognitive and social cognitive 
functioning and different types of functional outcome in a meta-analysis covering 52 
studies of patients with schizophrenia. The findings revealed four factors, and stronger 
associations have been found between ToM and functional outcomes rather than all the 
neurocognitive domains (except verbal fluency), and that emotional processing was 
more strongly associated with community function than attention and vigilance. It 
would be interesting to explore the relationships of deficits in a stroke sample.   
While previous chapter has provided some insight about the relationship between 
cognitive and socio-cognitive abilities, our understanding the relationship between 
these two broad multidimensional constructs remains limited. To shed further light on 
this line of inquiry, in this chapter I investigate which cognitive domains (including 
inhibition control, language, EF and episodic memory) influence the social cognition 
aspects included in the SCS? Which aspect of the EF deficits can best predict 
difficulties in belief attribution, and other aspects of the SCC? The identification of 
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specific relationships between EFs and social cognition operations, could lead to the 
identification of targets for treatment in rehabilitation plans. 
Therefore, the first goal of the current study was to determine the underlying 
factors that stand out the relationships between measures of social cognition and 
general cognitive domains through factor analysis in stroke survivors’ sample and 
reveal the cognitive aspects that mostly influence social cognitions functions. The 
second goal was to identify the general cognitive aspects that best predict impaired 
social cognition function. As was mention in chapter three, SCC factor composed of 
seven variables that associated with a go no go task that tap into general ability 
(inhibitory control), I hypothesised that some variables of SCC factor would associate 
with general cognitive domains.  
 
4.2 METHODS 
Participants 
The neuropsychology sample consisted of 25 patients volunteers [18 (72%) males 
and 7 (28%) females] with heterogeneous lesions due to the stroke. Participants’ age 
ranged from 31-86 years old (M= 63.56; SD= 11.68), and they received an average of 
years of education (M= 12.04; SD= 3.47). All the patients were white English 
speakers at a chronic stage of recovery from stroke (>9months post stroke). 
Participants gave informed consent in agreement with an ethics protocol approved by 
the U.K. National Research Ethics Committee, and were members of the patient panel 
at the Cognitive Neuropsychology Centre (CNC), Department of the Experimental 
Psychology-University of Oxford.  
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Behavioural Measures 
a. The Social Cognition Screen (SCS): 
Participants were assessed using two test batteries. First is a novel battery of tests, the 
Social Cognition Screen (SCS), which was designed as a part of my Doctoral research 
with the aim of developing a screen to detect socio-cognitive deficits after brain injury. 
The SCS encompasses 15 sub-scales/tasks that assess four domains of social cognition 
and which include (1) social cognition control, (2) motivation, (3) interest in others and 
(4) mindreading. The tasks were examined with several methods in order to ascertain 
their psychometric features. Internal consistency for the patient sample showed an 
acceptable coefficient (α = 0.7). Stability over time was assessed using a test-retest 
procedure with the patients, with the duration between the test and the retest ranging from 
4 to 22 weeks. All the test retest values were not significantly different from each other 
(see Chapter 2, Table 2.3). The validity of the measures was assessed in comparison with 
external tasks and tests of specific social cognition function published in the literature, 
except for motivation and attitudes, which were novel tasks with corresponding control 
versions. As shown in Chapter 2, patients’ performance on the SCS and the validation 
tasks correlated significantly (p <0.01) (see Chapter 2, Table 2.4).   
b. The Birmingham Cognitive Screen (BCoS): 
BCoS is an instrument designed to provide a sensitive, time-efficient, inclusive 
and informative analysis of the cognitive profile of stroke patients across a range of 
clinically important abilities namely: attention and executive function, language, 
memory, number skills and praxis and action. It can be administered in a single one-
hour testing session. It is also designed to minimize problems of neglect, aphasia and 
hemiplegia, which could influence the results of the BCoS. The BCoS is underpinned 
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by four philosophies, namely to use short, high-frequency words, use vertical layouts 
and multi-modal presentations (for neglect), use tests that are sensitive (will detect a 
problem if one is present) and indicate general domain deficits (e.g., problem in 
naming, but not exact problem) and design tests to incorporate several measures (to 
maximise time efficiency). This provides information about co-occurring deficits, 
which, due to their combined action, can affect social cognition to a greater or lesser 
extent. The cognitive profile also enables assessors to control for effects of co-
occurring deficits when analysing data. In addition, the BCoS provides measures of 
several executive functions (controlled, selective and sustained attention, working 
memory, rule finding and concept switching) not covered in many tests.  
The BCoS is comprised of 28 measures to assess domain specific abilities 
underlying each primary domain. However, only the scores of ten measures were 
chosen for this analysis. These measures fall into 4 domains and include: picture 
naming (language), immediate recognition, delayed recognition and story decay 
(memory), rule-finding including accuracy and rule (EF), spatial attention (EF) and 
controlled attention (EF/working memory) and finally figure copy and multi-step 
object use (planning/ praxis). The number domain was found to be closely related to 
the language domain (Messa et al., 2015), and so it was omitted here to reduce the 
number of tests included in the analysis. 
Procedures  
a. Sandside scores preparation 
Patients’ raw scores on the SCS measures and the BCoS were converted into Z-
scores, using the patient’s group mean and standard deviation across each measure, 
using the following standard formula: 
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where  was the raw score of the patient performance,  was the mean of the 
patients performance in that assessment and  was the standard deviation of the 
patients’ performance for the assessment. 
b. Factor Analysis 
An exploratory factor analysis, including all measures of the SCS and BCoS, was 
conducted with a varimax rotation to maximize orthogonality and Kaiser 
Normalization. Factors with an eigenvalue ≥ 1.0 were extracted and rotated. Since the 
overall sample size was limited, a conservative criterion was used to determine final 
factor structure. Measures with high (0.5 and above) communalities (i.e., the proportion 
of each variable's variance that can be explained by the principal components) were 
retained. Small coefficients (<0.3) were suppressed from the analysis. To avoid cross-
loadings and maintain the highest loading of interrelated variables within a distinct 
cluster, a threshold of (>0.48) was chosen (Yong & Pearce, 2013), and variables were 
considered part of a factor if their factor loading was greater than 0.48.  
c. Cognitive Predictors 
     To examine the association of cognitive measures loading with socio-cognitive 
measures within each factor was assessed in a series of regression analyses presented 
below to identify the variables can best predicts the social component impairments. The 
variables in each distinct factor that combines general cognitive domain with social 
cognition aspect was analysed; using the general cognitive domain as independent 
variable and the social cognitive aspect as dependent variables. 
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4.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The final rotated model of the factor analysis produced seven factors that 
accounted for 78% of the total variance in the patients’ performance. It demonstrated 
a good fit with 33% non-redundant residuals. Interestingly, the model linked four 
factors to social cognition factors, independently including; factors 2, 3, 5, 7, which 
endorses the independence of most of the social components operations. In addition, 
the factors produced showed consistent variable overlap with clusters of the SCS, as 
expected only some variables from the SCC factor, and replicating the associations of 
mindreading factor, indicating common patterns of deficits across many stroke 
survivors. Only two measures from the SCC factor (emotion reading and humour) 
overlapped with episodic memory (recognition and decay) and spatial attention from 
the BCoS, these results interesting in the indication of largely independent processing 
of the social cognition dimensions. These results are largely consistent with evidence 
from Mehta et al. (2013) systematic review on schizophrenic samples who found 8 
out of 9 studies supporting the distinction between social cognition and neuro- 
cognitive factors. Summary of the factors, eigenvalues and the variances explained 
are presented in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1 Principal Component Analysis for the SCS and the BCoS 
Measures F 1 
Social Rules 
F 2 
Impulsivity 
F3 
Sequencing 
Behavior 
F4 
Social 
Memory 
F5 
Social 
Behavior 
F6 
Verbal 
Attention 
F7 
Mindreading 
Motivation 0.930       
Desire 0.901       
Anger -0.568 -0.436 -0.376     
Faux pas 0.483 0.375    0.319 -0.416 
Impulsivity  0.900      
Proverbs  0.707 0.385     
False Belief 0.395 0.678      
Praxis   0.848     
Rule finding(EF)  0.327 0.797     
Episodic memory     0.816    
Spatial attention    0.724 0.454   
Story-decay memory -0.329   -0.557  -0.451  
Humour  0.459 0.359 0.523    
Emotion Reading    0.482    
Cognitive Empathy     0.837   
Apathy   -0.342  -0.726   
Moral reasoning 0.420  0.315  0.518   
Psy. attitudes  0.304 -0.346  0.507   
Language       0.897  
Controlled attention 0.438     0.719  
Emotional Empathy       0.922 
Intention 0.359    0.301  0.545 
Eigen values 3.422 2.724 2.510 2.509 2.463 1.970 1.618 
%Variance explained 15.553 12.384 11.408 11.404 11.197 8.952 7.355 
Cumulative % 15.553 27.937 39.344 50.749 61.945 70.898 78.252 
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4.3.1 The Domain Structure of Social Cognition in Relation to Cognitive Deficits 
among Stroke Survivors 
Factor 1 was labelled as ‘Social Rules’. This factor, which accounted for 15.6% 
of the variance explained, only loaded with social cognition components, and 
included motivation, desire, anger and faux pas. These components reflect abilities 
pertaining to understanding others basic drives and motivation. These abilities may 
constitute mechanisms that stroke survivors may resort to in order to understand 
social rules and to employ them in their social interactions. In terms of brain injuries, 
difficulties with interpreting others motivations may lead to simplified and incomplete 
analysis of social situations. The reversed associations between anger levels with the 
other measures in this factor may be a reflection of such difficulties due to frustration, 
for example (see Factor 1, Table 4.1).  
Variables loaded onto Factor 2 explained 12.38% of the variance and was 
labelled ‘Impulsivity’. The factor included impulsivity (measured by Go/no-go task), 
figurative language (assessed with the proverbs comprehension task), and ToM 
(assessed with the false belief animation task). The loading of the Go/no-go task onto 
this factor may reflect the contribution of inhibitory control on performance, which 
may result in tendency to leap to conclusion rather than analysing the facts and details 
of the social situation (Samson, Houthuys &Humphreys, 2015).  
Factor 3, labelled ‘Sequencing Behaviour’, accounting for 11.41% of the 
variance, consisted of two measures from the BCoS, namely rule finding accuracy and 
multi object use. These two measures account for controlled attention and praxis, 
respectively. The dominant ability captured in this factor is executive functioning, 
which according to the authors of the BCoS reflects one’s “ability to find rules in a 
sequence of stimuli and to switch mental set, when a rule changes” (Humphreys, 
 130 
 
Bickerton, Samson & Riddoch, 2012, p.6). Specifically, the tasks assess the ability to 
select and sequence actions to accomplish a specific goal, and as such it is a crucial 
ability for the execution of skilled actions and everyday multi-step object use.  
Factor 4, labelled ‘Social Memory’, combined two measures from the SCS and 
three measures from the BCoS, accounting for 11.40% of the variance. The factor 
loadings consisted of episodic memory (measured by story delayed recognition), 
spatial attention (assessed by the apple cancellation task), story decay (assessed by 
subtraction between immediate and delayed recognition), humour (measured with the 
joke formation task from the SCS), and finally emotion recognition (assessed with the 
emotion reading task). The episodic memory (Task recognition) which was provided 
with forced-choice discrimination on which items had previously been encountered.  
Factor 5, labelled as ‘Social Behaviour’, explained 11.20% of the variances and 
included measures that are linked to social cognition components, independent of the 
cognitive factors. The factor consisted of cognitive empathy, apathy, moral reasoning 
and psychological attitudes recognition, and thus it may reflect one’s social tendency 
toward social interactions. Interestingly, variables of this factor reloaded together as 
in the previous principal component analysis presented in chapter 3, Table 2 (SCS 
Factor 3 ‘Interest in Others’) confirming the interaction between these social 
cognition elements and the mutual effects between them.  
Factor 6, labelled ‘Verbal Attention’, accounted for 8.95% of the variance and 
consisted of two measures from the BCoS assessing language (picture naming) and 
controlled attention (auditory attention accuracy). This factor depends widely on 
language abilities and memory. The picture-naming task taps visual object 
recognition, and involved approaching the conceptual knowledge of the object and 
name retrieval. The task assessing controlled attention integrated working memory, 
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selective and sustained attention. Here, the task consisted of a set of words, and the 
examinee had to respond when hearing specific words (sustained attention) and to 
avoid the distractors words (selective attention). By the end of the task, the examinee 
was required to recall target and distractor words (working memory).  
Finally factor 7, labelled ‘Mindreading, accounted for 7.36% of the variance, and 
included two measures from the SCS, namely intention recognition and emotional 
empathy. These measures reflect one’s ability to speculate about others’ intentions by 
analysing the facts of the social context and the associated mental states believed to 
represent the observed action. Since emotional empathy is a selective process rather 
than automatic (Baron-Cohen, 2012), individuals may tend to consider others 
intentions when they decide to empathise with others.  
4.3.2 Cognitive Predictors Underlying Social Cognition Deficits 
Here I set out to examine the association of cognitive measures loading with social 
cognition. This analysis could reveal the extent to which these cognitive measures are 
involved in socio-cognitive functioning. From the above factor analysis, only Factor 2 
(Impulsivity) and Factor 4 (Social Memory) included cognitive and socio-cognitive 
measures that loaded together.  The association of socio-cognitive measures with 
cognitive measures within each factor was assessed in a series of regression analyses 
presented below to identify the variables can best predicts the social component 
impairments.  
Factor 2: Impulsivity 
Here I set out to examine the association of false belief (FB) with figurative 
language and impulsivity. Pearson correlation showed no association between FB and 
age (r=-0.16, p=0.41) or years of education (r=0.28, p=0.15). A t-test also revealed 
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that there was no difference between male (M±SD=7.00±0.92) and female 
(M±SD=7.00±1.16) participants in performance on FB understanding (p=1.0).  
To examine the association of these variables, a multi-step regression analysis was 
conducted. First, I asked whether inhibitory control can predict FB performance: The Z-
standardized score of the Go/no-go task was set as predictor and FB as the dependent 
measure. The analysis revealed a significant model, F(2,25)=8.43, p<0.001, R2 =0.25, 
explaining 25% of the variance. Parameter estimates showed that impulsivity was 
positively and significantly associated with the FB score, (se)=0.482(0.166), t=2.90, 
p=0.008. From this result it can be concluded that impulsivity can predict FB 
performance. 
Second, I asked whether inhibitory control can predict figurative language 
performance. The Z-standardized score of the Go/no-go task was set as predictor with 
Proverb task scores as the dependent measure. The analysis revealed a significant 
model, F(1,25)=7.892, p<.001, R2 =.24, explaining 24% of the variance. Parameter 
estimates showed that Go/no-go score was positively and significantly associated with 
the proverb scores, (se)=1.122(0.4), t=2.809, p=.009. From this result it can be 
concluded that impulsivity can predict figurative language performance. 
Lastly, I asked whether, conversely, figurative language and FB can predict 
impulsivity. The Z-standardized FB and proverb task scores were set as predictors and 
Go/no-go task scores as the dependent measure. The analysis revealed a significant 
model, F(2,24)=4.969, p<.001, R2 =.293, explaining 29% of the variance. Parameter 
estimates showed that proverb and FB scores were not significantly associated with 
the Go/no-go scores, (se)=1.275(1.085), t=1.176, p=.251. This result showed that 
figurative language and FB cannot predict impulsivity. 
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  Factor 4: Social Memory  
I examined the association of humour (joke formation) and emotion reading with 
three cognitive factors from the BCoS, which included episodic memory, memory 
decay and spatial attention.  First, Pearson correlation showed an association between 
emotion reading and years of education (r=0.495, p=0.009). A t-test also revealed 
better performance in male (M±SD=3.55± 1.43) compared to female (M±SD=2± 
1.16) patients in joke-formation (t=2.58, df =25, p=0.016).  
Next, I conducted a regression analysis in which I entered humour as a dependent 
variable and the Z standardized scores of episodic memory, memory decay and spatial 
attention as predictors while controlling for gender. This analysis revealed a 
significant model (F(4,20)=3.69, p=0.021, R2=0.425), explaining 42.5% of the 
variance. Parameter estimates showed that only episodic memory was a positive and 
significant predictor of humour ((se) =0.758(0.331), t=2.29, p=0.033). 
This analysis was repeated to examine the association of emotion reading with 
the Z-standardized scores of episodic memory, memory decay, and spatial attention as 
predictors, while controlling for years of education. This analysis revealed a 
significant model, F(4,20)=4.06, p=.014, R2=.448, explaining 44.8% of the variance. 
Parameter estimates, however, showed that none of the three cognitive measures were 
associated with emotion reading.  
    Next, I performed multi-step regression to test cognitive variable association 
with emotion reading, solely, while controlling for years of education. The results 
showed that years of education best predicts reading emotions, followed by spatial 
attention. This analysis revealed a significant model, F(2,22)=6.523, p=0.001, 
R2=0.372, explaining 37.2% of the variance. Parameter estimates showed that years of 
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education, (se) =0.959(0.312), t=3.08, p=0.006, and spatial attention, (se) 
=0.558(0.263), t=2.124, p=0.045, were positive and significant predictors of raeding 
others’ emotions.  
In Chapter 3, the high rates in failing the SCC factor indicated that most of stroke 
patients may have difficulties in forming novel social knowledge due to general 
domain cognitive failure or due to neural disconnection impeding access to episodic 
memory. This assumption was confirmed to a large extent in the current chapter. First 
the results confirmed an association confirmed -in chapter 3- and repeatedly in 
literature between inhibitory control and false belief attribution (Samson, Houthuys 
&Humphreys, 2015), and revealed that inhibition control can predict patients’ 
performance on belief attribution and figurative language. Also, level of education 
and spatial attention predict the ability to identify others’ emotions, the association 
between education and reading emotions was found to be related to general 
intelligence relationship with RMET (Baker, Peterson, Pulos & Kirkland, 2014), and 
also processing emotional facial expressions has long been related to spatial attention 
(e.g. Holmes, Vuilleumier & Eimer, 2003), suggesting that spatial attention can 
modulate the structural encoding of faces. Finally, episodic memory can predict 
humour performance indicating that participants may fail to access stored knowledge 
and form a reference for comparing the mean of humour. The relationship between 
episodic memory and humour was confirmed in prior studies (e.g. Sambrani et al., 
2014). 
Taken together, the varimax rotated principal component analysis resulted in 
seven factors that, combined, explained 78.25% of the variance. These factors 
reflected social rules, impulsivity, sequenced behaviour, social memory, social 
behaviour, verbal attention and mindreading. A main finding that emerged from this 
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analysis was that the majority of social cognition measures clustered in factors 
independent from cognitive measures. This result suggests that aspects of social 
cognition may dissociate from core cognitive processes. However, two factors appear 
to be related to EF Factor 2 overlapped with impulsivity and Factor 4 with memory 
and spatial attention. 
The findings of factor 2 ‘Impulsivity’ suggest that dissociation between age, 
gender, and education level with impulsivity were consistent with the results from the 
control group in (see Chapter 2, Tables 2.5, 2.6, 2.7). The investigation of multi-step 
regression of cognitive predictors of social cognition has shown that inhibitory control 
can predict FB and figurative language function, while, conversely, figurative 
language and FB cannot predict inhibitory control. This suggests inhibitory control is 
necessary for succeeding on understanding others’ belief and also to comprehend the 
figurative language, and when the go/no-go task is passed, we may expect to see good 
performance on the proverb and FB tasks. However, cases where the Go/no-go task is 
passed, but the figurative language and FB tasks are not, may indicate that the reason 
for failure cannot be attributed to poor inhibitory control, and that there are other 
reasons involved. 
The associations between years of education and reading emotions was notable, 
F=2.939, p=0.058 among control group; however, not significant (see Chapter 2, 
Table 2.6). Although the emotion reading task was designed to avoid the limitations 
of RMET, this result is in line with, Baker, Peterson, Pulos and Kirkland’s (2014) 
meta-analysis study investigating the RMET relation to intelligence. After brain 
injuries, education appears to play a protective role for emotion recognition. As with 
many cognitive competences, this may be due to increased controlled processes and 
conceptualization abilities (see Le Carrent, Lafont, Mayo & Fabrigoule, 2003). The 
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results of the regression indicated that years of education was the best predictor of 
reading emotions, followed by spatial attention. That spatial attention was found to 
affect our perception to identify and distinguish between various facial expressions 
was unsurprising, since face processing strongly depends on allocation of spatial 
attention (Crist, Wu, Karp & Woldroff, 2007). 
4.3.3 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was twofold. The first aim was to understand the 
integrated relations between general cognitive domains functions and social cognition 
functions. The second aim was to analyse the pattern of mutual dysfunctional 
processes between these two domains to identify which domain general processes are 
necessary for social cognitive functioning. The factorial structure of combined 
cognitive and social cognition assessment revealed consistency with the former SCS 
domain structure, and distinguished between the independent and reliant social 
cognition abilities, and identified the specific domain of cognition necessary for 
normal operation. While the factor analysis revealed that social cognition aspects 
most likely tend to operate independently, some aspects of cognition, and especially 
inhibition control, working memory, attention and episodic memory were associated 
with social cognition deficits such that inhibitory control predicted performance on 
figurative language and belief attribution, spatial attention (and level of education) 
predicted reading others’ emotions performance and episodic memory predicted 
humour performance.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 SOCIAL COGNTION DOMAIN DEFICITS: EXPLORING 
CONNECTIONAL ANATOMY RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
Synopsis  
In Chapter 3, I have shown that social cognition deficits tend to cluster in four 
domains in which the profiles of stroke patient vary. These domains corresponded to 
(1) social cognition control SCC, (2) motivation, (3) interest in others IO, and (4) 
mindreading. The goal of this chapter is to provide insight into the anatomical 
associations of socio-cognitive functioning and in particular to each of the four 
domains. In this regard, I investigated the associations of the behavioural data with 
the quantified anatomy of the patients’ lesions to identify potentially homogeneous 
affected tracks relating to the four factors of the Social Cognition Screen, a track-wise 
lesion-deficits analysis approach was used. This analysis revealed a unique 
association between distinct networks of white matter tracts and three factors of social 
cognition, namely; the fornix, hand superior U track and posterior segment of the 
cingulum damage predicted impairments of the SCC factor. The inferior longitudinal 
fasciculus (ILF), the 5th branch of the frontal insular track and the first, second and 
third braches of the superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF) lesions predicted the 
performance of the motivation factor. As well as the anterior thalamic radiation 
damage predicted the performance of the IO factor.      
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Patients with brain lesions provide a unique window into brain function; studying 
healthy participants highlights a range of regions critical for a specific cognitive 
function, while analysing patients’ assessments can determine which region of the 
network is decisive to that specific operation, which may refine our understanding of 
the relationship between brain anatomy and function. In this chapter, I aimed at 
investigating the anatomical associations of socio-cognitive functions and the brain 
regions involved in each of the four Social Cognition Screen (SCS) factors/domains. 
In Chapter 3, I analysed multiple aspects of social cognition using factor analysis that 
resulted in four factors: social cognition control (SCC), motivation, interest in others 
and mindreading. Results from Chapter 4 suggest that aspects of the SCC factor tend 
to engage brain areas related to higher cognition (e.g. inhibition control, memory, 
spatial attention, education years). The dependency of some aspects of social 
cognition on domain general functions is in lines with previous functional studies. For 
example, Saxe, Schulz and Jiang (2006) found both domain-general and domain-
specific cognitive resources are involved in theory of mind. Specifically, belief 
attribution was found to make use of brain areas linked to attention, response selection 
and inhibitory control, including the pre-supplementary motor area (pSMA), anterior 
cingulate cortex (aCC), the left and right intraparietal sulcus, the left and right frontal 
eye fields, the left and right frontal operculum, the left and right middle frontal gyrus, 
the right middle temporal gyrus, the left and right thalamus and the left and right 
midbrain. The brain regions associated with representations of others' thoughts 
included the posterior cingulate, the left and right temporoparital junction (TPJ), the 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the right anterior superior temporal sulcus (raSTS), 
the left insula and the left and right amygdala.  
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It is important to highlight that brain imaging studies link diverse frontal, partial 
temporal, and limbic regions false belief attribution (see ‘areas in frontal lobe’:  
Döhnel, et al., 2012; Happaney & Zelazo, 2004; Martín-Rodríguez & Lión-Carrión, 
2010; Rowe, Bullock, Polkey & Morris, 2001; Sommer et al., 2007; Stone, Baron-
Cohen & Knight, 1998, and ‘parietal lobe’: (Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino & 
Humphreys, 2004; Döhnel, et al., 2012; Enrici, Adenzato, Cappa, Bara & Teltamanti, 
2011; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Saxe, Schulz & Jiang, 2006; Samson et al., 2004; 
Sommer et al., 2007, ‘temporal lobe’: Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino & Humphreys, 
2004; Gallagher & Frith, 2003, ‘limbic regions’: Ball, Holland,  Watson & Huppert, 
2010).  
It worth noting that this diversity of brain regions also applies to other aspects 
social cognition embraced by the SCS, and particularly the SCC factor. For example, 
emotional states attribution has been linked to the ‘frontal lobe’ (Adolphs, 2002; 
Turner et al., 2007), ‘temporal lobes’ (Adolphs, 2002), and ‘lembic regions’ 
(Adolphs, 2002; Adolphs & Tranel, 2003; Adolphs et al., 1999; Coccaro, McCloskey, 
Fitzgerald & Phan, 2007; Eres, Decety, Louis & Molenberghs, 2015; Feinstein et al., 
2013; Gallese, Keysers & Rizzolatti, 2004; Rotshtein et al., 2010; Schienle, et al, 
2002; Turner et al., 2007). With regards to the motivation factor—the second factor of 
the SCS—the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) has been found to engage during both desire 
and motivation tasks (Kawadata & Zeki, 2008; Leotti & Delgado, 2011; Wang et al., 
2004). The OFC also has been found to be involve in the ‘interest in others’ factor—
the third factor of the SCS—and specifically during the processing of attitudes 
(Cunningham, Haas & Jahn, 2011), and apathy (Levy & Dubois, 2006). Apathy has 
also been associated with the activation of the thalamus (Ball, Holland, Watson & 
Huppert, 2010). In addition, cognitive empathy has been linked to engagements of the 
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ventromedial prefrontal cortex vmPFC, the SMA and the TPJ (Fan et al., 2011; 
Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Finally, the mindreading factor the forth factor of the SCS—
has been linked to the dmPFC in operating emotional empathy and intention (Enrici, 
Adenzato, Cappa, Bara, & Teltamanti, 2011); emotional empathy has also been 
associated with three other brain regions namely: the ACC (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011), 
the SMA (Fan et al., 2011), and the insula (Eres, Decety, Louis & Molenberghs, 2015; 
Fan et al., 2011).   
Given the complexity of the cognitive functions are not subject to centralize in 
one area of the brain but rather a group of symptoms (neurological syndromes) linked 
to damage set of neural networks. Notably, some of brain regions found to engage 
aspects belonging to different factors of the SCS (e.g. the OFC contribution in 
processing aspects belonging to all factors), perhaps emphasises the significance of 
these regions for the social cognition functioning. The degree of their contribution and 
to what extent these regions are crucial for the functioning of the domains covers by 
each factor is yet to be determined. Also, it is unknown what other alternative regions 
might support the functioning of these domains in case of lesions. Another point to 
highlight is that the above studies investigated aspects of social cognition individually 
and none of them adopted factor analysis or other component analysis methods, with 
emphasis on select areas. Also, there are no studies that investigated the white matter 
tracks that connect these brain regions and networks together. Indeed, there is paucity 
in researches concerning the white matter tracks that contribute to the operation of 
both domain general and domain-specific functions. For instance, lesion to the 
anterior segment of the left arcuate fasciculus that connects the posterior portions of 
Broca’s area and the sensory-motor cortex has been found to affect language 
production (Fridriksson et al., 2013), while the disconnection of the second branch of 
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the superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF 2) that connects the inferior parietal and the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortices has been linked to spatial neglect (Thiebaut de 
Schotten et al., 2014) and impulsive aggression (Lee et al., 2016). For instance, 
damage to Baroca’s area, situated predominantly in the posterior inferior frontal gyrus 
of the left hemisphere is associated with aphasia which is characterised by various 
language function and speech impairments (Dronkers, Plaisant, Iba-Zizen & Cabanis, 
2007), On a cognitive functioning level of hypertension patients, reduced integrity of 
bilateral SLF (generally without allocating specific branch of SLF) and deficits in 
functional connectivity in frontal and partial lobes were linked to decline executive 
functioning (Li et al., 2015). Similarly, damage to the right hemisphere and 
specifically to ventral regions within the parietal, temporal, and frontal cortices of 
result in unilateral spatial neglect syndrome which is characterised by an inability to 
attend and report stimuli on the opposite side of the lesion site (Corbetta & Shulman, 
2011). 
Neurological syndromes following stroke have been explored by Corbetta et al. 
(2015) using factor analysis to reveal the multidimensional core underlying the 
deficits.  In their study, they linked defected domains to disconnection in white matter 
tracts as they suggested that disconnected white matter bundles could explain variance 
in the behavioural deficits of patients. Specifically, Corbetta et al. analysed data 
collected from 67 post stroke survivors who were assessed on a set of cognitive 
measures including attention, language, memory and motor function. The results 
highlighted three factors reflecting (i) language and memory (including both verbal 
and spatial memory) which have been linked to damage in ventral and dorsal white 
matter of the left, frontal temporal and parietal cortices, (ii) indices of right 
hemisphere damage (left motor impairment, bias against the left field, general 
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performance and spatial memory), and (iii) indices of left hemisphere damage (right 
motor impairment, bias against the right field and poor attention shifting).  
In an analysis focusing on language functions in left hemisphere stroke patients, 
Butler, Lambon Ralph and Woollams (2014) reported three underlying factors that 
linked phonology, semantics and executive cognition to a specific white matter tract 
damage as well as cortical and limbic regions. In their study, the ‘phonology’ factor 
corresponded to the arcuate fasciculus component of the dorsal language pathway, the 
‘semantic’ factor was uniquely related to left anterior middle temporal gyrus, and the 
underlying temporal stem broadly corresponded to the ventral language route. The 
third factor, ‘executive’ cognition, which explained the least variance, did not 
uniquely relate with any brain regions in their analysis. Alternatively, executive 
function deficits in relation to abnormalities in white matter tracts was studied by 
Koini and colleagues (2016) who studied a cohort of adolescent patients with 
Neurofibromatosis type 1 (NF1—a disease associated with executive functions 
impairments including working memory and inhibition control deficits. They 
examined white matter integrity of anterior thalamic radiation (ATR), cingulate 
bundle (CB), and superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF) and found that damage to 
the ART damage was most strongly associated with inhibitory control, leading the 
authors to attribute a strategic role to the ATR in executive functioning.  
However, in the field of socio-cognitive neuroscience, using a data reduction 
approach has been less evident and the vast majority of studies examined performance 
at the level of individual tests (more details are available in Chapter 1). Nevertheless, 
there are some indications from work within clinical population. For example, 
Downey et al., (2015) studied impaired social cognition in FTLD in relation to the 
damaged regions and the integrity of white matter connections. They assessed social 
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cognition with ‘emotion identification’ and ‘sarcasm identification’ subtests derived 
from ‘The Awareness of Social Inference Test’ (TASIT). In addition, they used 
Diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) to extract white matter tract associations with social 
cognition performance. The impaired social cognition performance was associated 
with distributed and overlapping white matter tract alterations specifically affecting 
frontotemporal connections in the right cerebral hemisphere. Specifically, emotion 
identification was linked to the anterior thalamic radiation ATR, and sarcasm 
identification was linked to the fornix and the uncinate fasciculus. The authors noted 
that the most active white matter correlation of emotion and sarcasm operation were 
entwined with tracts formerly involved in associating cognitive and evaluative 
functions related to emotion responses, as a part of a broad range of cognitive 
operations corroborated by these tracts. However, it is an open question as to how 
well these analyses apply to patients with sudden organic brain lesions due to stroke 
rather than progressive collapse of the brain mechanisms due to degenerative 
disorders. Interestingly, the association between sarcasm and uncinate fasciculus—a 
bundle that connects the OFC to the temporal pole—has also been linked to episodic 
memory (Von Der Heide, Skipper, Klobusicky, & Olson, 2013). This is 
commensurate with our findings in Chapter 4 where I have reported a link between 
humour formation and episodic memory. Taken together, this evidence suggests that 
the uncinate fasciculus is part of a neural network that supports the SCC factor. 
Another segment of this network may be the fornix that acts as a major output tract of 
the limbic system, which involved in most aspects comprising the SCC factor, 
including attributing others thoughts (Saxe, Schulz & Jiang, 2006), emotional state 
attribution (Adolphs, 2002), impulsivity (Medford & Critchley, 2010) and impulsive 
aggression (Coccaro, McCloskey, Fitzgerald & Phan, 2007). Moreover, episodic 
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memory has also frequently been linked to fornix damage (Ly et al. 2016; McMackin, 
Cockburn, Anslow & Gaffan, 1995). Another part of this network could be the Hand 
U-shaped tracks, which run beneath the central sulcus from the parietal postcentral 
gyrus to the frontal precentral gyrus (Rojkova et al., 2016) and may support the role of 
the dmPFC in processing the SCC factor. Nonetheless, despite the importance of white 
matter tracts underlying social cognition functions related to the SCC factor, there 
remains a paucity of information regarding the association of tracts to other factors of 
social cognition.  
People tend to understand other’s behaviour by automatically analysing their 
motivation behind specific conduct, and this is probably due to our tendency to direct 
our behaviour towards fulfilling goals that are identical among the majority of people. 
Accomplishing goals result in gaining positive emotions that serve as incentives for 
desired goals and form the reward function. Rewards can be primary and non-
primary; primary rewards are driven to satisfy basic desires such as food and drink, 
and non-primary rewards require further appreciation beyond the processing of 
sensory components like money and sleek cars. Schultz (2015) suggests the key 
substrates for the brain’s function in reward are specific neuronal network including 
midbrain dopamine neurons, striatum, amygdala and the OFC. The motivation factor, 
as explained in previous chapters, represented the affective ToM assessment 
especially that factor’ tasks designed -in this thesis- with consideration to reduce the 
inhibition demands; as the participants asked about their own desire before making 
the attribution, in order to inspire them to distinguish between self-desire/ self-
motivation and others desire and motivation. Processing affective social cues has long 
been associated with the insula including representations of content of other’s 
thoughts (Saxe, Schulz & Jiang, 2006), empathy (Eres, Decety, Louis & 
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Molenberghs, 2015; Fan et al., 2011), impulsivity and inhibition control (Medford & 
Critchley, 2010). In their model of mentallizing circuits, Abu-Akel and Shamay-
Tsoory (2011) suggest that affective ToM is mediated by a network that engages the 
ventral striatum, amygdala, ventral temporal pole (vTP), ventral anterior cingulate 
cortex (vaCC), the OFC, the vmPFC, the inferolateral frontal cortex (ILFC), the 
superior temporal sulcus (STS) and the TPJ. These diverse regions are supported by 
a set of association white matter pathways such as the superior branch of SLF1 that 
runs from the superior parietal lobule and the precuneus to the superior frontal gyrus 
(SFG); the SLF2 that connects the angular gyrus to the posterior regions of the middle 
frontal gyrus; the inferior branch SLF3 which starts in the supra marginal gyrus and 
terminates in the pars opercularis, triangularis and the inferior frontal gyrus (Rojkova 
et al., 2016). Another association track that might support this process is the Inferior 
Longitudinal Fasciculus (ILF) that connects the temporal and the occipital lobes 
together. The ILF has been found to impact have on operating the emotional valence 
of visual stimuli, by mediating the transmission of the stimuli to anterior temporal 
regions and neuromodulatory back-projection from the amygdala to early visual areas 
(Catani et al., 2003), the ILF was also found to predict metalizing abilities and self-
reported autism trait (Bradstreet, 2014). Another pathway that supports the connection 
between the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) to the limbic region is the Fronto-Insular 
Tracts (FIT) which is the U-shaped tracts that connect insular cortex with various 
regions of the frontal operculum (Catani et al., 2012; Rojkova et al., 2016). This 
system of U-shaped fibres organised around the peri-insular sulcus connects the IFG 
and the pre-central gyrus (PrCG) to the insula. Anterior to this tract is a group of four 
U-tracts connecting the PrCG and the pars opercularis, pars triangularis and pars 
orbitalis of the IFG to the insular gyri (Catani et al., 2012).  
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  An important region for processing social appropriate behaviour and belief 
attribution is the thalamus. It has been found to be engaged during attention, response 
selection and inhibitory control (Saxe, Schulz & Jiang, 2006), abilities that are 
important for social functioning, and among patients’ cohorts was linked to disrupted 
mentallizing processes such as apathy and socially in appropriate behaviour (Ball et 
al., 2010; Mamah et al., 2010). Frontal projection tracts and especially the ATR that 
connects the fronto-thalamic and fronto-striatal projections pass through the 
anterior limb of the internal capsule and projects to the whole surface of the 
frontal lobe.   
Another key brain region to social cognition functioning and joint attention is 
the STS; the sulcus separating the superior temporal gyrus from the middle 
temporal gyrus. The right posterior of the STS was active during the processing 
emotional empathy (Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta & Lenzi, 2003) as well as 
intention attribution (Carter, Hodgins & Rakinson, 2011; Enrici, Adenzato, Cappa, 
Bara, & Teltamanti, 2011) that form the mindreading factor of the SCS. Rojkova et 
al. (2016) in their investigation of frontal lobe neural connection suggested that 
parts of the posterior STS is supported by the ‘arcuate fasciculus’; a sidelong 
association track that constitutes of long and short fibres linking the perisylvian cortex 
of the frontal, parietal, and temporal lobes (Catani & Thiebaut de Schotten, 2008).  
The ‘arcuate fasciculus long segment’ (FAls) is arching around the Sylvian 
ﬁssure, which separates the frontal and the parietal lobes superiorly from the 
temporal lobe. The fronto-temporal portion of the arcuate fasciculus connects the 
pars opercularis (i.e., Broca) to the auditory cortex and the posterior portion of the 
middle and inferior temporal gyri. Shorter fronto-parietal bundles link the ventral 
portion of the precentral gyrus to the postcentral gyrus and the supramarginal 
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gyrus. These braches form the ‘anterior segment’ of the arcuate fasciculus 
(Rojkova et al., 2016). The arcuate fasciculus is linked to several cognitive functions 
including the left hemisphere bundle which linked to some aspects of language 
(Catani et al., 2005; Catani & Mesulam, 2008; Fridriksson et al., 2013). The arcuate 
fasciculus of the right hemisphere was found to also play a role in visuospatial 
processing (Thiebaut de Schotten et al., 2008).  
To best of my knowledge, there are no studies that investigated white matter 
damage concurrently with social cognition deficits in a cohort of post-stroke 
survivors. Here, I explore neuroanatomical basis of post stroke impairments of social 
cognition by the mean of underlying latent factors affected by brain damage, in order 
to potentially link between damage of specialised brain regions, including the 
underlying white matter neuro-circuits, and social cognition impairment. To address 
this goal, a dual strategy for the analysis has been adopted: (i) a voxel lesion symptom 
mapping (VLSM) analysis, and a (ii) track-wise lesion-deficit analysis. Regarding the 
VLSM, the study’s sample is volunteers patients sample with inhomogeneous focal 
lesions and include a set of lesions that cover the entire brain, an aspect that might 
affect the results of the small sample size, possibly due to losing the overlapped 
voxels (Baldo, Wilson & Dronkers, 2012). The alternative strategy is based on the 
fact that in a brain composed of localized but connected specialized areas, 
disconnection leads to dysfunction (Catani & ffytche, 2005), as a track is considered 
disconnected when a patient’s lesion overlapped with a voxel at a probability 
exceeding 50% of a given track (Chechlaz; 2015; Thiebaut de Schotten et al., 2011; 
Thiebaut de Schotten et al., 2014). This method helps to identify the white matter 
pathways that key for a specific social cognition function through statistical methods 
even in cases in which there is no overlap. 
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It is hypothesised that (i) a white matter network consisting of the uncinate fasciculus, 
fornix, hand U shaped tracks, anterior thalamic radiation (ATR), cingulum bundle 
(CB), and the superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF) may predict deficits in Factor 
1 of the SCS, namely, the factor of social cognitive control; (ii) A ventral anterior 
more distributed network might be involved in motivation factor process that connect 
the ventral striatum, amygdala, ventral temporal pole (vTP), ventral anterior cingulate 
cortex (vaCC), the OFC, the vmPFC, the inferolateral frontal cortex (ILFC), the 
superior temporal sulcus (STS) and the TPJ (Abu-Akel & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). A 
set of disconnected white matter pathways including the Inferior Longitudinal 
Fasciculus (ILF), the Fronto-Insular Tracts (FIT) and the SLF theoretically might 
predict the deficits on motivation factor; (iii) the thalamus has been linked to various 
impaired social behaviour (Ball et al., 2010; Mamah et al., 2010), which forms the 
main feature of the ‘interest in others’ OI factor. The ATR that pass through the 
anterior limb of the internal capsule and projects to the whole surface of the 
frontal lobe is hypothesized to predict the impaired performance of the IO factor; and 
finally (iv) the lesions of the anterior and the long segments of the right arcuate 
fasciculus may predict deficits on the mindreading factor; this is based on  the 
‘arcuate fasciculus’ support the STS (Rojkova et al., 2016), and the right STS link 
to processing emotional empathy (Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta & Lenzi, 
2003) as well as intention attribution (Carter, Hodgins & Rakinson, 2011; Enrici, 
Adenzato, Cappa, Bara, & Teltamanti, 2011) that form the mindreading factor. 
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5.2 METHODS  
Participants 
Twenty-six post stroke survivors with heterogeneous stroke type and lesioned 
regions participated in this study. The cohort consisted of white English volunteers 
[19 (73%) males and 7 (27%) females]. Participants’ age ranged from 31-86 years old 
(M= 62.81; SD= 12.07), and they received an average of 12 years of education (M= 
12.09; SD= 3.49). All the patients were at a chronic stage of recovery from stroke 
(>9months post stroke). Participants gave informed consent in agreement with an 
ethics protocol approved by the U.K. National Research Ethics Committee, and were 
members of the patient panel at the Cognitive Neuropsychology Centre (CNC), 
Department of the Experimental Psychology-University of Oxford. Patients’ clinical 
and demographic are reported in Table 5.1. 
Participants were assessed on the Social Cognition Screen (SCS), which was 
designed as a part of my Doctoral research with the aim of developing a screen to 
detect socio-cognitive deficits after brain injury. The SCS encompasses 15 sub-
scales/tasks, which were validated and standardized (see Chapter 2 for more details 
on screen creation and psychometric features). A rotated principal component analysis 
extracted four factors of social cognition that correspond to (1) social cognition 
control, (2) motivation, (3) interest in others and (4) mindreading (see Chapter 3 for 
more details). 
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Table 5.1 Patients’ clinical and demographic data. 
   ID Age Gender 
 
Lesion side handedness Stroke type 
 
Onset 
(months) 
P 3001 69 F R R TACI   14 
P 3053 54 M B R POCI   13 
P 3041 64 M B L NA   18 
P 2046 60 M L R TACI   11 
P 3030 67 M R R MCA   10 
P 2027 72 F R R ACI   14 
P 2022 62 F L R PACI   10 
P 3057 72 M L R NA   13 
P 2003 31 M L R PACS   17 
U21 61 M R R NA   25 
P 3012 44 F L R MCA   12 
P 3043 54 F L R NA   13 
P 3101 68 F L R NA   13 
P 3174 66 M L R NA   14 
P 3108 77 M R R SAI   9 
P 3038 58 M L R ACI    17 
P 3104 67 M R R CVA   9 
P 3076 63 M B R LA   11 
P 3079 63 M L L LA   11 
UB 11 44 M L R NA   144 
P 2019 86 M R R ACI   14 
P 2057 79 M R R TACS   17 
P 3089 69 F B R CL   11 
P 3102 79 M R R PACS   10 
P 2045 71 M R R PACI   14 
P 3178 48 M L R NA   16 
F= Female; M=Male; L=Left; R=Right; B=Bilateral; CVA = Cerebrovascular Accident, ICH = Lobar 
intracerebral haemorrhage, MCA = Middle Cerebral Artery, PTCA = percutaneous transluminal 
coronary angioplasty, TACI = Total Anterior Circulation Infarct, TACS = Total Anterior Circulation 
Stroke Syndrome, SAI=subacute infarct, LA=lacunar infarct, CL=cerebellar lesion, NA=not available. 
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Procedures  
(a) Behavioural Measure 
The raw scores of the patients on the SCS measures were converted into Z-scores, 
using the controls group mean and standard deviation across each factor. The 
calculation of the Z-scores were performed using the following standard formula  
                                                         
where ) was the raw score of performance,  was the mean of controls in that 
assessment and  was the standard deviation of the controls’ performance for the 
assessment. Cut-off scores for each factor were established as ± 2SD from the mean 
scores of the controls. The patients’ raw scores also were converted to standardised 
scores, using the mean and standard deviation of the control group scores across each 
factor. The patients’ performance on each factor where then classified based on the 
cut-off z-scores of the controls. The patients’ and controls’ performance on the SCS 
factors are depicted in Figure 5.1. The patients’ and controls’ Z-standardised scores 
on the four factors of the SCS are presented in Table 5.2. Scores that exceeded the 
cut-off scores are in bold.  
Figure 5.1 Patients and controls performance on the four factors of the SCS 
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Participants were assessed on the Social Cognition Screen (SCS), which was 
designed as a part of my Doctoral research with the aim of developing a screen to 
detect socio-cognitive deficits after brain injury. The SCS encompasses 15 sub-
scales/tasks, which were validated and standardized (see Chapter 2 for more details 
on screen creation and psychometric features). A rotated principal component analysis 
extracted four factors of social cognition that correspond to (1) social cognition 
control, (2) motivation, (3) interest in others and (4) mindreading (see Chapter 3 for 
more details). 
(b)The Delineation of Lesions 
Brain imaging preparation for this study was conducted by the laboratory team of 
the Cognitive Neuropsychology Centre, Oxford University. Data processing was 
carried out using a specially developed toolbox for fully automated pre-processing 
and lesion mapping of brain CT scans (for full details see Gillebert et al., 2014, cited 
in Schechlacz, et al., 2015). “Automated lesion delineation, for each post stroke 
survivor’s brain images, was processed through a voxel-based outlier detection 
procedure implementing the Crawford-Howell parametric t-test for single case-control 
comparisons. 
The parametric t-test has been used to generate an outliner t-score map coding the 
degree of abnormality of each voxel compared to the normal range based on control 
CT scan. The t-score maps were thresholded to generate binary lesion maps in MNI 
space, which in turn were converted to the native CT space enabling the researcher to 
verify lesion reconstruction based on the original CT scan. The binary lesion maps for 
all patients were used in the track-wise lesion-deficits analysis to calculate lesion 
volumes”. Cases that were manually delineated were normalized into an age 
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appropriate template space using Chris Rorden’s Clinical toolbox for SPM (Rorden et 
al., 2012). 
5.2.1 The Voxel Lesion Symptom Mapping (VLSM) Analysis 
We used ‘behaviour-defined approach’ where the continuous behavioural data 
and lesion information were analysed on a voxel-by-voxel bases. Patients were 
classified based on showing specific behavioural deficit, then lesion reconstructed 
maps of impaired patients were overlaid to find common lesioned areas and compared 
to lesion overlays from the patients without the deficits (see Adolphs et al., 2000; 
Thiebaut de Schotten et al., 2012). 
In order to investigate the overlapped lesioned areas with poor assessment on the 
SCS domains, first we ran a classical VLSM analysis using MRIcron program—a  
non-parametric mapping (NPM) approach for continuous variables, which employed 
the Brunner Munzel test and t-test among other statistics. Details of the program and 
analysis are available at (http://www.cabiatl.com/mricro/npm/). The statistical 
outcome maps identified the potentially associated voxels where it was or was not 
possible to detect effects at a minimum overlap threshold that had 10% of the cohort 
possessing a lesion on a given voxel and their distribution of the SCS scores. 
5.2.2 Track-Wise Lesion-Deficit Analysis 
In order to assess if there was a relationship between the amount of damage to a 
particular track (i.e., patient fractional score) and their assessment on each factor of 
the SCS, patients’ lesion volumes were classified using Catani’s atlas for fraction 
segmentation of white matter tracks (Rojkova et al., 2016; Catani & Thiebaut de 
Schotten, 2012). The lesion volumes were used linear regression, which was 
calculated using IBM’s SPSS, version 21. The quantitative lesions data of the patients 
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are presented in continuous measures that have been classified based on the summary 
fraction lesion of Catani’s atlas to 87 segments including association, commissural 
and projection pathways in left and right hemispheres. To identify whether white 
matter tracks damage were able to predict impairment of specific SCS factor, the 
patients’ scores of the SCS factors were used respectively in each trial as dependant 
variables, while the total lesion size and age were controlled and covariates in all the 
trials, in addition to the hypothesised tracks’ quantitative volume. For a more 
conservative approach, the significant regression models that accounted for lesion size 
merely without the tracks were omitted.  
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5.3 RESULTS  
5.3.1 Behavioural Measures 
Table 5.2 The patients’ Z-standardised scores on the four factors of the SCS, the 
impaired scores are highlighted in Bold  
 
ID† 
Factor 1 
Social cognition 
control 
cut-off Z-score 
(0.85) 
Factor 2 
Motivation 
cut-off Z-score 
(1.49) 
Factor 3 
Interest in others 
cut-off Z-score 
(0.86) 
Factor 4 
Mindreading 
cut-off Z-score 
(1.17) 
P 3001 4.925 3.950 1.750 1.8 
P 3053 5.880 6.005 2.395 2.34 
P 3041 1.182 2.810 1.561 3.96 
P 2046 3.846 8.290 0.623 2.34 
P 3030 1.072 0.395 1.066 3.96 
P 2027 3.921 0.395 1.920 2.34 
P 2022 1.710 1.080 0.991 2.34 
P 3057 1.676 2.810 0.500 3.96 
P 2003 1.101 0.395 1.426 0.95 
U21 1.348 0.395 1.081 0.41 
P 3012 2.821 0.395 1.333 0.41 
P 3043 2.280 1.780 0.293 0.41 
P 3101 1.064 0.395 1.093 0.95 
P 3174 1.101 0.395 0.866 0.95 
P 3108 5.585 0.395 0.940 0.41 
P 3038 1.101 0.395 1.006 0.95 
P 3104 4.515 0.395 0.700 2.34 
P 3076 2.460 0.395 2.570 0.41 
P 3079 1.020 0.395 0.628 1.8 
UB 11 1.590 0.395 0.676 0.95 
P 2019 2.601 1.095 0.736 0.41 
P 3089 1.851 0.395 0.260 0.41 
P 3102 1.724 0.395 0.860 0.41 
P 2057 0.692 0.395 2.106 0.95 
P 2045 0.760 0.395 0.456 1.8 
P 3178 0.740 0.395 1.153 0.95 
† The order of patients is based on the number of malfunctioning factors. 
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5.3.2 The VLSM   
The VLSM analysis that runs per voxel using full lesion masks did not yield 
significant results. This is probably due to the small sample size and the heterogeneity 
of the site of the stroke (Baldo, Wilson & Dronkers, 2012). Lesion overlap images for 
the whole cohort are presented in Figure 5.2. As it can be seen in Figure 5.2, the 
cohorts’ lesion covered quite a defuse area and did not have a high degree of overlap; 
maximum 7 patients with 67.94% of patients overlap, Table 5.3.  
5.3.3 Track-Wise ‘Hodological’ Lesion-Deficit Analysis 
To overcome the spatial heterogeneity, and to identify the tracks whose lesion 
had a predictive value, the fractional values of white matter tracks were used to 
investigate the associations between severity of the white matter tracks damage and 
SCS factors deficits.  
5.3.3.1 The Predictors of Social Cognition Control Factor (SCC)  
A linear regression was performed to identify tracks that are associated with SCC 
factor scores.  The age and total lesion size was controlled as independent variables, 
because in previous study by Karnath, Frhmann, Berger, Küker and Rorden (2004) 
found that using lesion size as a regressor in the voxel-wise analysis undermines the 
findings so they do not survive the correction for multiple comparisons. The analysis 
revealed that damage to the left and right bundles of the uncinate fasciculus was 
unrelated to the SCC factor (F(4,21)=0.170, p<0.591, R2 =0.031). There was also no 
association between the left or right Anterior Thalamic Radiation (ATR) bundles and 
the SCC factor (F(4,21)=0.240, p<0.912, R2 =0.044).  
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Figure 5.2 Lesion overlap for stroke participants (N=26) 
Table 5.3 Voxels overlap for the whole cohort (N=26) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of   
  Patients 
Number of voxels 
covered by overlap 
% of patients  
lesion overlap 
1 61283 67.935 
2 19516 21.635 
3 7104 7.875 
4 1798 1.993 
5 395 0.438 
6 101 0.112 
7 10 0.011 
 158 
 
However, the ‘fornix’ and the ‘hand superior U track’ together significantly 
predicted patients’ performance on SCC factor. The results of the regression indicated 
that the two predictors explained 49.4% of the variance (F(4,21)=5.135, p<0.005, R2 
=0.494). Specifically, the fornix ((se) =-58.548 (20.357), t= -2.876, p=0.009) and the 
hand superior U tract ((se) = -45.636 (12.118), t= -3.766, p=0.001) were negatively 
associated with performance on the SCC factor.   
Applying the same analysis to the left and right sides of the posterior segment of 
the cingulum tracks, the results yielded a significant model, explaining 36% of the 
variance (F(4,21)=2.883, p<0.048, R2 =0.335). However, only the right bundle of the 
track showed significant negative association with performance on the SCC factor 
((se) = -195.78 (63.73), t= -3.072, p=0.006), while the left bundle association was 
non-significant ((se) = 72.67 (84.69), t= 0.858, p=0.401).  
With respect to the right and left hemispheres of the first, second and third 
branches of the superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF), the analysis showed on a 
marginally significant model (F(4,21)=2.375, p<0.085, R2 =0.312),  explaining 31% 
of the variance. Parameter estimates, however, suggested a significant negative 
association between only for the first right SLF tract (SLF1R) and performance on the 
SCC factor ((se) = -54.74 (18.63), t= -2.938, p=0.008). 
5.3.3.2 The Predictors of the Motivation Factor 
Regression analyses exploring predictors of performance on the motivation factor 
resulted in several significant models. First, the regression analysis of the ‘Inferior 
Longitudinal Fasciculus’ (ILF) yielded a significant model (F (4,21)=4.962, ρ <0.006, 
R2=0.486), explaining almost 49% of the variance. It showed a positive significant 
association between performance on the motivation factor and the left bundle of the 
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inferior longitudinal fasciculus ((se)= 6.85(2.21), t=3.01, p=0.005), while the right 
hemisphere bundle did not reach significance ((se)= 2.28(1.48), t=1.54, p=0.138).       
Moreover, the investigations of ‘the fronto-insular tracts’ (FIT) included 5 tracks 
bilaterally (10 tracks all together).  Using backward regression, the analysis revealed a 
significant model explained 53% of the variance (F (4,21)=5.913, p<0.002, R2 =0.53). 
The third track bilaterally was marginally associated with the performance on the 
motivation factor: ‘left fronto-insular track (FIT3L) ((se) = -1.746 (0.968), t=-1.804, 
p=0.084), and the right bundle (FIT3R) ((se) = 1.23 (0.674), t= 1.829, p=0.082). 
However, there was a significant association between the left bundle of the fifth track 
(FIT5L) ((se) = 4.518 (1.282), t= 3.524 p=0.002) and performance on the motivation 
factor. In addition, an analysis investigating the association of the first bundle of ‘the 
superior longitudinal fasciculus tract’ (SLF1) bilaterally, produced a significant model 
explaining 65% of the variance (F (4,21)=9.77, p<0.0001, R2 =0.650). It was found 
that the left ‘SLF1’ tract ((se) = -16.837 (4.73), t= -3.56, p=0.002), as well as the 
right ‘SLF1’ tract ((se) = -20.701 (5.147), t= -4.02 p=0.001) were significantly and 
negatively associated with performance on the motivation factor. Similarly, the 
analysis of the left and right branches of SLF2 and SLF 3 together yield a significant 
model that explained 47% of the variance (F (6, 19)=2.836, p<0.038, R2 =0.472). The 
SLF2R tract was negatively associated with performance on the motivation factor 
((se) = -19.945 (8.31), t= -2.399, p=0.027), while the left branch association was not 
significant ((se) = -1.79 (5.90), t= -0.303, p=0.765). With regard to the SLF3, also 
the right branch association was positively significant ((se) = 8.265 (3.69), t= 2.24, 
p=0.037), while the left branch did not yield significant result ((se) = -0.196 (5.60), 
t= -0.075, p=0.941). 
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5.3.3.3 The Predictors of the Interest in Others (IO) Factor 
The regression analysis for the IO factor and the ‘Anterior Thalamic Radiation’ 
track (ATR) bilaterally resulted in a significant model explaining 38% of the variance, 
(F(4,21)=3.268, p=0.031, R2=0.384). The parameter estimates showed that only the 
right bundle of the ATR was significant, and negatively associated with performance 
on the IO factor ((se)= -40.57(13.42), t=-3.02, p=0.006), while the left branch 
association was not significant ((se)= 6.86 (4.94), t=1.391, p=0.179). 
5.3.3.4 The Predictors of the Mindreading Factor  
The regression analysis for the right branches of the ‘arcuate fasciculus’ anterior 
and ‘long segments’ with mindreading factor did not yield significant results 
(F(4,21)=2.218, p=0.102, R2=0.297). However, there was a suggestive negative 
association between the arcuate anterior segment ((se)= -2.091 (1.107), t=-1.889, 
p=0.073) and performance on the mindreading factor , and the arcuate long segment 
((se)= -3.021 (2.189), t=-1.38, p=0.182). 
 
5.4 DISCUSSION 
The aim of this study was to explore the link between social cognition domains 
and anatomical brain regions. In the first step, a VLSM approach was carried out with 
a ‘behaviour-defined approach’ where the continuous behavioural data and lesion 
information were analysed on a voxel-by-voxel bases. This approach did not produce 
significant results. This is more likely because the methodology of the VLSM relies 
on identifying voxels that are significantly related to a particular behaviour of interest 
in a group of patients, and involves running a statistical test (e.g., a t-test) at every 
voxel, comparing scores on a behavioural measure (e.g. the SCS factors scores) in 
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patients with versus patients without a lesion in particular voxel. This procedure 
might result in losing the overlapped voxels by adding data of patients who might not 
have the exact lesion localization and size (Baldo, Wilson & Dronkers, 2012). 
However, the anatomical location of overlapping lesions of the sample mostly 
accumulated in sub-cortical areas and medial frontal subcortical regions (Figure 5.2), 
including the putamen, insula, pallidum, heschl, amygdala, thalamus, extreme 
capsule, external capsule and the internal capsule, as well the location of the Superior 
Longitudinal Fasciculus and the superior occipitofronatal fasciculus (Woolsey, 
Hanaway & Gado, 2008). In addition, the overlapping lesions also included some 
cortical areas including the insular, central opercular and frontal operculum cortices 
and the angular, inferior frontal, middle temporal, precentral, postcentral and superior 
temporal gyri. However, while the pattern of lesion may reflect the type of stroke, it 
may not prove the impact of the lesion on the mechanisms.  
To overcome the spatial heterogeneity, and to identify potentially homogeneous 
affected tracks relating to the SCS factors, a track-wise lesion-deficits analysis 
approach was also conducted. As stated above, this approach relies on describing the 
disconnection caused by lesion at individual level. A tract is considered disconnected 
when a patient’s lesion overlapped on a voxel with probability exceeding 50% to a 
given tract (Chechlaz; 2015; Thiebaut de Schotten et al., 2011; Thiebaut de Schotten 
et al., 2014). The fractional values from white matter tracks was used in regression 
analysis to look for relationships between severities of white matter track damage and 
impaired social cognition factor assessment. The results revealed several significant 
models indicating that the majority of the influential tracts belonged to frontal lobe 
circuits and which in particular connect the frontal, partial and temporal lobes 
together (Rojkova et al., 2016). The diversity in the white matter tracks associated 
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with different factors suggests the diversity of domain specific operations that 
underlie various social cognition factors. 
(a) White matter tracks linked to the SCC factor 
The results revealed a right hemisphere network consisted of the fornix, the cingulum 
posterior segment, the hand superior U-shaped tract, and the first branch of the superior 
longitudinal fasciculus. The fornix connects that frontal, temporal lobes and limbic 
organs together, the cingulum posterior segment comprises of fibre bundles of different 
lengths and runs within the cingulate gyrus to the all-around the corpus callosum, and 
the longest ﬁbres run from the para-hippocampal gyrus and the uncus to the medial 
portion of the OFC (Rojkova et al., 2016). It also contains short U-shaped ﬁbres that 
link the medial frontal and parietal to different portions of the cingulate gyrus (Rojkova 
et al., 2016), and the hand superior U-shaped track which runs beneath the central 
sulcus from the parietal postcentral gyrus to the frontal precentral gyrus (Catani et al., 
2012; Rojkova et al., 2016), finally the superior branch of SLF1 that runs from the 
superior parietal lobule and the precuneus to the superior frontal gyrus (SFG) (Rojkova 
et al., 2016).  
This central oriented white matter network connected the limbic, sub-cortical and 
cortical region subserving regions belonging to the frontal, partial and temporal lobes 
which are involved in various social cognition functions related to the SCC factor. 
These regions include the dmPFC, dACC, PFC, R-STS and R-TPJ that have been 
linked to false belief attribution (Dohnel et al., 2012; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Saxe, 
Schulz & Jiang, 2006; Sommer et al., 2007); the OFC which has been linked to moral 
reasoning (Mendez, 2009), the right dPFC, inferior partial circuits, pre-SMA, and 
ACC, which have been linked to inhibition (Medford & Critchley, 2010; Scheffer, 
Monteiro & Martins de Almeida, 2011; Simmonds, Pekar & Mostofsky, 2008). 
 163 
 
Moreover, the superior frontal gyrus (SFG) has been linked to humour comprehension 
(Chan et al., 2013; Shibata et al., 2014); the PFC which has been linked to reading 
emotions (Tsuchida & Fellows, 2012); limbic regions which have been linked to 
emotional state attribution (Adolphs, 2002; Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; 
Schienle, et al, 2002); and frontal and temproparital regions which have been linked 
to impulsive aggression (Lee et al., 2016).  
To sum up, this investigation provides support for the predictability of the 
integrity of the fornix, cingulum, the hand superior U-track and the SLF1 of deficits in 
social cognition control. Difficulties with social cognition control (the SCC factor) 
have been linked to fornix white matter disconnection, which previous studies have 
linked to memory (Ly et al. 2016; McMackin, Cockburn, Anslow & Gaffan, 1995). 
This may suggest that processes of the SCC factor are affected by the retrieval of 
information, in addition to inhibition control. 
(b) White matter tracks linked to the motivation factor 
The results point to an association of a distributed bilateral network of white 
matter tracks with dysfunction in the motivation factor; There white matter tracks 
include the right branch of the ILF, the left 5th branch of the FIT, the first branch of 
SLF bilaterally and the right hemisphere second and third branches of the SLF. This 
distribution and multiplicity of the white matter networks subserving the ‘Motivation’ 
factor could explain this factor’s resistance to the adverse effects of stroke. Also some 
regression model illustrated positive associations of some of these predictors, which 
may indicate the over load on these tracks as a result to the brain tissue lesions due to 
the stroke. For instance, the ILF fibre bundle that connects occipital lobe with the 
anterior part of the temporal lobe (Ashtari, 2012), has impact on operating the 
emotional valence of visual stimuli, by mediating the transmission of the stimuli to 
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anterior temporal regions and neuromodulatory back-projection from the amygdala to 
early visual areas (Catani et al., 2003), supports a number of areas more classically 
associated with vision as well as affective mentallizing circuits including the ILFC, 
STS and the vTP (Abu-Akel & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011), and perhaps damage to 
adjacent regions such as amygdala (linked to both reward and metallizing operations) 
could appose burden on the ILF track resulting in impaired performance of this factor, 
and the same assumption could be made on the FIT-5 track relation to the insula. 
Interestingly, the disconnection of both left and right bundles of the SLF1 predicted 
the defected performance on this factor, which may constitute a main carrier in 
processing the operation of this factor. The SLF1 also produced a marginal significant 
model that associated negatively with the SCC factor, given that results of correlation 
between factors (see CH3) showed significant positive correlation between SCC and 
motivation factor, however, the regression model did not support the prediction 
relation between these factors, this relation may explain the contribution of SLF1 to 
both factors. In their atlas to the frontal lobe, Rojkova and colleagues (2016), suggest 
that the SLF is a system composed of three parallel longitudinal branches passing 
through the dorsolateral portion of the white matter, situated above the ventricles and 
the lateral sulcus, and connecting the parietal and the frontal lobes. The SLF1 runs 
from the superior parietal lobule to the SFG, supports areas related to metallizing and 
reward processes. On a cognitive functioning level, bilateral SLF was linked to 
attention and executive functioning (Li et al., 2015).  
The second branch SLF2 that connects the angular gyrus to the posterior regions 
of the middle frontal gyrus supports regions related to affective mentallizing (e.g., 
desire) including the TPJ (Chiavarino et al., 2010). On a cognitive level, SLF2 was 
linked to dysfunction of parietal frontal circuits that result in left spatial neglect 
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(Thiebaut de Schotten et al., 2014). Lastly, the inferior branch SLF3, that starts in the 
supra marginal gyrus and terminates in the pars opercularis, triangularis and the 
inferior frontal gyrus (Rojkova et al., 2016), sub-serving areas including the caudate, 
putamen and nucleus that has been related to motivation in previous studies (Leotti 
and Delgado, 2011).  
(c) The white matter tracks predictor of interest in others (IO) factor 
The result illustrated a significant impact of lesion to the right hemisphere branch 
of ‘anterior thalamic radiation’ (ATR), on performance on the IO factor. The ATR is a 
fibre pathway that passes through the anterior limb of the internal capsule and projects 
to the whole surface of the frontal lobe, involving a reduced probability for the ventral 
portion of the precentral gyrus and the middle frontal gyrus (Catani, 2012; Rojkova et 
al., 2016). It plays a critical role in transmitting cognitive, sensory and motor 
information between the thalamus and cortical areas. The predictive relation between 
the deficit on IO factor and the disconnection of the ART might be due to the role of 
ART in facilitating somatic, sensory, and motor representation of other peoples' 
mental states, and the thus damage to this track could result in poor mirroring and 
mentallizing of the observed mental and bodily states. In a previous study, 
degradation of the ATR has been evident in patients with Parkinson disease (Planetta 
et al., 2013), and this evidence might support the deficit of the kinetic aspects of 
social cognition behaviour presented in IO factor. Studies of cognitive empathy have 
also been linked to cortical areas including midcingulate cortex (MCC) and dmPFC 
(Fan et al., 2011; Eres, Decety, Louis & Molenberghs, 2015), the fusiform gyrus that 
involve in face and body perception and the premotor cortex that associate with 
mirroring and imitating of others' actions, as well as limbic regions including the 
thalamus (Nummenmaa, Hirvonen, Parkkola & Hietanen, 2008). Apathy has been 
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linked to frontal lobe and to bilateral basal ganglia damage (Hama et al. 2011), in 
addition to the thalamus (Ball et al., 2010). The right branch of ATR as a projection 
track perhaps is main tributary that connects the diversity of brain regions involved in 
this factor’s variables. 
(d) The white matter tracks related to the mindreading factor 
The results did not find robust associations between the Arcuate Fasciculus (AF) 
and Mindreading (the 4th social cognition factor). However, there was a marginal 
negative association between the anterior and long segments and performance on the 
mindreading factor.  This result might change with bigger sample size study. Future 
studies need to consider further investigations to identify the tracts supporting the STS 
in addition to brain regions responsible for automatic cognitive operations 
underpinning social cognition such as ACC, Pre-SMA and basal ganglia (Satpute & 
Lieberman, 2006; Saxe, Schulz & Jiang, 2006). 
5.4.1 Limitation and future research 
The most limitation of this study was the number of participants as with newly 
established assessment tool, it is important to assess a larger group of patients for 
better emerging of the variation between the samples’ members. These results 
therefore need to be interpreted with caution. Also for allowing the opportunity to 
divide the patients sample based on lesion site. Examining larger group also will 
provide more accurate overlap for the association of SCS factors with brain regions in 
a VLSM study and this will help to identify the white matter tracks more crucial for 
factors’ operation. Future studies should consider examine whether reduced white 
matter integrity in other brain regions or tracks is more strongly associated with 
different factors of social cognition.  
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5.4.2 Conclusion  
Altogether, the results from previous studies may be affected by confounding 
factors such as structural disconnectivity of the white matter networks necessary for 
social cognition functioning. The social cognition factors of the social cognition 
scores showed different associations with white matter networks; the SCC factor is 
supported by a right hemisphere network that comprised of association, commissural 
and U-shaped tracks that connected frontal central, temporal and limbic brain regions. 
The motivation factor formed more inferior network that depends on widely 
distributed brain regions of both hemispheres and comprised of association and U-
shaped tracts that connected limbic regions with partial and frontal regions, while the 
interest in others’ factor was linked to a projection track that connected the thalamus 
and the limbic regions to distributed area of the frontal lobe. However, the findings of 
this study suggest that identifying the quantitative damage to the white matter circuits 
can significantly predict the social cognition factors dysfunction among stroke 
survivors.  
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CHAPTER 6 
SOCIO-COGNITIVE DEFICITS AFTER STROKE:  
A CASE STUDY REPORT 
 
 
Abstract 
Focal brain injuries of specialised cognitive structures and processes can 
significantly impair one’s socio-cognitive abilities and functioning. SC is a post stroke 
survivor, with large cortical and sub cortical lesions involving the left orbito-frontal 
cortex. Post stroke, SC presented with apparent problems in everyday social 
behaviour and involuntary swearing which were not apparent before the brain lesion. 
His cognitive and social cognition abilities were assessed using the SCS, BCoS and 
OCS. The results showed selective impaired social cognition domains related to 
mindreading and the ability to attribute mental states to others (SCC, motivation and 
mindreading) rather than openness and socializing with people (interest in others). 
These deficits co-occurred with SC having some language impairments and some 
deficits in verbal working memory, but also relatively good performance on tests of 
executive functioning. The results suggest that aspects of social cognition may 
dissociate from core cognitive processes and there may be impaired access to stored 
knowledge about social norms perhaps due to damage to fronto-temporal connections.  
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Social cognition broadly refers to the outcome of the cognitive structures and 
processes influencing the interaction between individuals in social contexts. This 
includes, but is not limited to, how people think about other people, and how that in 
turn influences their feelings, behaviour, and social interactions. Following a brain 
injury, patients and carers often report changes in personality, emotional impairments, 
interaction with the environment, social reasoning and social behaviour. For instance, 
an individual may be unable to understand how their behaviour affects others, as they 
fail to read others’ emotions and thinking (Callahan et al., 2011; De Achaval et al., 
2010). As a result, the individual may show inadequate emotional feelings and 
expressions.  
In addition, problems related to emotional processing, including impaired mood, 
emotion regulation and emotion perception, can detrimentally influence many aspects 
of patients' social interactions and participation in social networks (Scott et al., 2012). 
For example, apathy is a common problem after a stroke (Sagen et al. 2010; Mayo et 
al. 2009), whereby patients find difficulty starting any spontaneous activity such as 
starting or sharing a conversation (Lane-Brown & Tate, 2009). Conversely, some may 
become impulsive after stroke (Hainline, Devinsky & Reding, 1992), and this could 
affect their problem-solving and decision-making abilities, so they may tend to choose 
inappropriate options that often result in undesirable consequences (Scheffer, 
Monteiro & de Almeida, 2011). Social cognition has been found to mediate the link 
between neurocognition, as processes of linking and appraising information, and 
social functioning (Schmidt, Mueller & Roder, 2011), and this may determine stroke 
survivors’ engagement to the rehabilitation plan and consequently the outcome of this 
process on reducing the impairments caused by stroke. Therefore, assessing the 
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cognitive and socio-cognitive abilities of individuals after stroke is important to 
estimate the impact of the damage on normal behaviour functioning and is essential 
for early intervention care planning.  
Previous studies in social cognition have endeavoured to identify the impact of 
brain damage on executive functioning and the necessity of executive functioning for 
social cognition operations. Executive functions are a set of cognitive functions 
including, but not limited to, planning and working memory, that depend on 
distributed networks driven by the frontal lobe. However, some research have 
advocated for a division of executive processes into ‘cold’ logic-based EF and ‘hot’ 
emotional-based EF (see Ask & Granhag, 2007; Cavrak, 2010; Greene et al., 2001; 
Roiser et al., 2009). Executive functions have been found to be impaired post-stroke 
and traumatic brain injuries, and as a result of both focal and diffuse injuries 
(Cicerone et al., 2006; Goss, 2013; Samson, Houthuys & Humphreys, 2015). For 
example, in a meta-analysis study, Yang and Raine (2009), investigated 43 functional 
brain imaging studies that linked abnormalities of frontal lobe’ structure to antisocial, 
violent and psychopathic individuals. Their finding emphasis on the significant link 
between functional impairments in antisocial individuals, and the prefrontal structure, 
particularly in PFC, OFC, ACC and dPFC.  Moreover, Cardoso, Branco, Cotrena, and 
Paz Fonseca (2015) studied, in a sample of patients with ischemic strokes, the 
interrelation between “cold” (logic-based) EF, using measures of cognitive flexibility 
and working memory, and “hot” (emotion-based) EF using the Iowa Gambling Task 
(IGT), which taps emotional decision making. They found no significant correlations 
in performance between the two sets of tests, suggesting some degree of 
independence between ‘cold’ and ‘hot’ executive processes.  
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In addition to its role in executive functioning (for a review see Fuster, 2001), 
there is also evidence to suggest that the OFC plays a key role in at least some aspects 
of social cognition (Kemp et al., 2013). Specifically, the OFC has been implicated in 
the processing of impulsivity (Toplak, Jain & Tannock, 2005), moral judgment 
(Mendez, 2009), emotional states attribution (Adolphs, 2002), emotional response to 
facial expressions of anger (Beyer, Münte, Göttlich & Krämer, 2015), self-related 
desire (Wang, Volkow, Telang et al., 2004), desire attribution (Kawadata & Zeki, 
2008), reward related activity and motivation (Leotti & Delgado, 2011), attitudes 
(Cunningham, Haas & Jahn, 2011), social knowledge faux pas (Stone, Baron-Cohen 
& Knight, 1998), and apathy (Levy & Dubois, 2006).  
Other studies have also suggest that patients with OFC damage can have problems in 
social cognition that can be unrelated to other cognitive deficits associated with frontal 
lobe function. For example, Roca et al. (2010) report that OFC patients fail on ‘faux pas’ 
tests of social interaction (judging whether a statement is appropriate or inappropriate 
according to the social context) but not necessarily on other tests of executive function. 
The authors suggested that the OFC may play a particular role in social decision making. 
More classically, patient such as Phineas Gage have been noted as having marked 
problems in social cognition after damage to the OFC (Haas, 2001) although his 
intellectual abilities were intact (Harlow, 1848, cited in, Kihlstrom, 2010).  
Given the incosistency regarding the tripad relationship of executive functioning, 
social cognition and OFC, there is a need for a better understanding of how the 
different aspects and factors of social cognition may interact with each other 
following damage to the OFC. Therefore, the current study aimed to assess both 
executive and socio-cognitive processes of a patient, SC, who suffered a large lesion 
involving the left OFC. Following damage to the left OFC, SC presented with 
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apparent problems in his everyday social behaviour, including involuntary swearing 
which was not apparent before the brain lesion. However, the swearing problem could 
inferred due to either impaired representation or limited access to stored knowledge 
about social norms following damage to fronto-temporal damage (Humphreys & 
Ford, 2005). Our hypothesis states, if his social cognition performance was consistent 
over time and did not differ from what is expected from chance consistency, then the 
problem (the swearing) could be interpreted due to impaired access to knowledge, and 
if the assessment was inconsistent, then the problem result from impaired 
representation. Thus, this single-case study offers an opportunity to investigate how 
damage to the OFC impacts social cognitive abilities and whether these abilities are 
associated with executive functions in which the OFC is involved. The single-case 
study approach can also complement the group-based approach which is often limited 
by the heterogeneity of the lesions and their extent within the study sample.  
Post stroke changes in social cognition have been investigated in the current 
thesis (Chapter 3) resulted in four factors of social cognition that were linked to 
possible different cognitive mechanisms (Chapter 4), and which can be quantitatively 
linked to damage to specific white matter circuits (Chapter 5) of networks subtending 
these factors. Social cognition abilities were assessed using the SCS, and executive 
processes using the standardized measures on The Oxford Cognitive Screen (OCS) 
and the Birmingham Cognitive Screen (BCoS) tests; Humphreys et al., 2012). The 
OCS was administered within few days post-stroke, and BCoS was administered six 
months post-stroke. The aim of this case-study is three folds: (1) To examine whether 
any deficits in social cognition are linked to impair executive processes; (2) whether 
SC’s performance on the SCS is consistent over time, and (3) whether lesions of his 
white matter tracts can be associated with his performance on the SCS factors.  
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6.2 METHODS 
Participants 
Data were collected from 67 English-speaking healthy controls with ages ranging 
from 46-81. Participants were willing volunteers with no history of brain lesion who 
signed a consent form and were recruited from either (i) the School of Psychology, 
University of Birmingham, participant database, or (ii) The Cognitive 
Neuropsychology Centre, University of Oxford, or (iii) involved in public science 
activity such as Brain Awareness Week at the Science Museum - Oxford, and the 
Community Day - University of Birmingham. See Table 6.1 for the demographics of 
the healthy controls. 
Data were also collected for a single patient; SC. Patient SC is a 60 year-old 
right-handed white man with secondary school education and was formerly involved 
in computer sales. SC presented with apparent problems in his everyday social 
behaviour, including involuntary swearing which were not apparent before the stroke. 
Table 6.1 Demographics of patient SC and healthy controls. 
Demographics Controls  (N=67) Patient SC 
Gender (M/F) (34/32) Male 
Age 65.7 ± 7.9 60 
Education  N (%)  
    Primary School  1 (1.5%)  
    Secondary School 26 (38.8%) Secondary school 
    College 8 (11.9%)  
    Non-University Diploma 7 (10.7%)  
    University degree 21 (31.3%)  
 
His processed CT scan lesion map indicated that the stroke caused a large 
damage (lesion volume= 22.30), mostly to the left frontal and temporal brain areas 
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including; frontal and temporal poles, central opercular, frontal medial, frontal 
operculum, frontal orbital, subcallosal and insular cortices, as affected various gyri 
including the heschl's, para cingulate, superior temporal, superior frontal, para 
hippocampal and middle frontal gyri (see Figure 6.1). Damage also extended to the 
white matter tracts, the quantitative data revealed damage including lesions in long 
association fibres connecting the frontal and temporal lobes; the uncinate, the 
posterior and long segments of the arcuate fasciculus, the inferior occipito-frontal 
fasciculus (IFOF), the cingulum, corpus callosum and all three segments of the 
superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF). In addition to lesions on the U-shaped tracks 
running beneath the central sulcus from the parietal postcentral gyrus to the frontal 
precentral gyrus including lesions to the face and hand U-tracks ‘inferior, mid and 
superior segments’, as well as all the five branch of the insular tracks that connect the 
frontal lobe into the external capsule to reach the insula.   
 
Figure 6.1 The VLSM analysis of SC’s CT scan. The areas marked in red are detected as 
lesioned tissue when contrasted relative to 100 control scans using FWE p<0.05. 
Measures 
Participants were assessed using the novel social cognition screen (SCS). It consists 
of 15 tests designed and adopted to be aphasia friendly (see table 6.2 for the 
descriptive statistics of social cognition measures, and Appendix I for task 
descriptions) . 
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SC’s cognitive competences were assessed using the OCS within few days after the 
stroke and six months later using the BCoS. The OCS has been designed to provide quick 
assessment for cognitive functions following brain injuries, which acts as an indicator to 
the affected abilities that will need further investigations (see table 6.3 for the OCS 
description measures). 
BCoS provides the norms and cut-off points for impaired abilities, with the tests 
being designed to be applicable to patients suffering from disorders such as aphasia 
and neglect. It consists of 28 tasks which  assess five broad cognitive domains 
including attention and executive functions, language function, long term memory, 
number skills  and praxis (see table 6.4 for the descriptions of the BCoS measures). 
The SCS was administered to SC twice over six sessions, which took 10 months to 
complete. It is important to note that the time gap between the two screens was about  
two months, which minimizes practice or familiarity effects with the tasks or test 
items. Test instructions were repeated when necessary in order to best judge that SC 
understood the tasks. All the social cognition tasks were repeated in order to test for 
consistency of performance (cf. Warrington & Shallice, 1979).  
 
6.3  RESULTS 
6.3.1 Social cognition assessment 
A single case vs. group calculator -Singlims_ES.exe (Crawford et al., 2010) was 
used to estimate the significance differences between SC’s performance and that of 
the healthy control group.  The performance of the healthy controls and SC on the 
social cognition measures is shown in table 6.3 in bold are scores where SC 
performed outside of the control range (2 SD relative to the mean). 
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Table 6.2 Descriptive statistics of social cognition measures of the control 
participants. 
Measures Mean  SD  Minimum Maximum  
Go/No-go     correct responses 
                      false positive  
                 RT (ms)  correct action 
8.08 
16.64 
2327.57 
1.25 
2.40 
1038.71 
 4 
6 
702.17 
9 
18 
1038.71 
 
False belief 7.77 0.51  6 8  
Intention  3.93 0.38  2 4  
Moral reasoning 7.91 0.29  7 8  
Emotion  8.10 1.07  6 10  
Desire 6.82 0.46  5 7  
Motivation 6.72 0.63  5 7  
Attitudes           high rate 
                           low rate 
8.32 
2.74 
1.50 
2.08 
 0 
0 
10 
10 
 
Humour 4.53 0.73  2 5  
Proverbs 8.55 1.13  6 10  
Anger 3.86 3.33  0 13  
Emotional Empathy 3.68 0.48  3 4  
Cognitive Empathy 14.24 4.45  4 23  
Apathy 29.27 5.24  20 43  
Faux pas 57.89 3.14  48 60  
 
Except four measures: go/no-go task, apathy, cognitive empathy and attitudes 
which SC fared well, he scored significantly worse than healthy controls on 11 out of 
15 tests. The impaired functions included three out of the four SCS factors. 
Specifically, impairments were discerned in the social cognition control, motivation 
and mindreading factors, but not in the interest in others factor. 
Item Consistency 
Item consistency was assessed across the two test occasions for those assessments 
which contained four-answer alternatives (reading emotions, humour, desire), where 
the probability of generating a correct or incorrect answers by chance was less than in 
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the other assessments. For these analyses, SC’s performance was compared with the 
levels of performance expected from his level of correct responses and assuming 
chance consistency across test sessions. The results showed that SC’s performance 
across the two assessments did not differ from chance consistency on reading emotion 
, desire or humour .  
Table 6.3 SC’s performance compared to the mean performance of the control 
participants on the Social Cognition Screen 
Measures Controls* SC **    T  P  
Go/No-go     Go                                                              
                     No-go 
                     RT                                                          
16.64 ± 2.40 17 0.15 0.44 
8.08 ± 1.25 8.5 0.33 0.37 
2327.57± 1038.71 2284.44 -0.04 0.48 
False belief 7.91 ± 0.30 6 -6.096 0.000 
Intention 4.00 ± 0.00 3 -9.574 0.000 
Intention Control 3.96 ± 0.19 4 0.21 0.42 
Moral reasoning 8.00 ± 0.00 7 -9.574 0.000 
Emotion reading 8.44 ± 1.09 5 -3.062 0.003 
Desire 6.70 ± 0.68 3 -5.188 0.000 
Desire Control 6.94 ± 0.24 4.33 -10.71 0.00 
Motivation 6.70 ± 0.68 3 -5.188 0.000 
Motivation control 6.88 ± 0.55 4.67 -3.96 0.00 
Attitudes  ( High rate)                   8.52 ± 0.86 9.6 0.829 0.423 
                  ( Low rate) 3.58 ± 0.76 3.3 -0.355 0.728 
Attitudes Control 8.48 ± 1.43 7.5 -0.68 0.25 
Humour 4.88 ± 0.33 2 -8.481 0.000 
Proverb 8.91 ± 0.80 6 -3.540 0.002 
Anger 1.33 ± 1.37 17 10.989 0.000 
Emotional Empathy 3.91 ± 0.30 3 -2.904 0.015 
Cognitive Empathy       8.20 ± 3.38 10 0.514 0.615 
Apathy 12.77± 2.32  13 0.925 0.096 
Faux pas 56.18± 3.84 45 -2.795 0.018 
Faux pas Control 58.84 ± 1.66 45 -8.25 0.00 
* Only 27 of the 67 control participants completed the entire battery of the SCS.  
**The table presents the mean performance of SC across the two test occasions  
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6.3.2 General Cognition Assessment 
(a) The Oxford Cognitive Screen (OCS) 
SC's cognitive ability was assessed 2 days post stroke using OCS and the results 
showed deficits on 7 out of 11 cognitive domains included in the OCS (see table 6.4 
for more detail). The assessment presented deficits in picture naming and semantics, 
sentence reading, number writing, recognition memory and spatial attention. The 
impairment in spatial attention was most dramatic. 
Table 6.4 SC’s scores on the OCS measures  
Task Name Measure Cut off  
< 5% 
SC 
Picture Naming Overall accuracy      3 1 
Semantics Overall accuracy      3 2 
Orientation Overall accuracy      4 6 
Visual Field Overall accuracy      4 4 
Sentences Reading Overall accuracy      14 0 
Number Writing Overall accuracy      3 2 
Calculation Overall accuracy      3 4 
Broken Hearts Overall accuracy      42 9 
Space Asym (left inattention >0, right <0)      -2 -8 
Obj Asym (left inattention >0, right <0)      0 0 
Imitation Overall accuracy      8 11 
Recall & Recognition Verbal Memo Recall  Recognition      3 2 
Executive Task Circles      5.95 6 
 Triangles      5 6 
 Mixed      4 8 
 
(b) The Birmingham Cognitive Screen (BCoS) 
Nine months post-stroke SC's cognitive abilities were assessed using the BCoS 
which provides more detailed screening than the OCS (see Table 6.5 for the tests and 
SC’s performance). SC was substantially impaired on the tests of auditory attention 
(covering working memory, rejection of related distractors and sustained attention). 
There were also deficits in picture naming and in verbal recall and reading (sentences, 
non-words, numbers) plus also a slight deficit in figure copying. 
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Table 6.5 SC’s scores on the BCoS measures. 
†Poor performance due to aphasia 
 
Cognitive Domain Task Cut off points 
≤64 yr 
SC  
ATTENTION 
 Spatial 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Controlled     
 
 
 
 
Apple cancellation - total 
Apple asymmetry - full 
Apple asymmetry – incomplete 
Left  visual neglect 
Right visual neglect 
Left visual bilateral 
Right visual bilateral  
Left tactile neglect 
Right tactile neglect 
Left tactile bilateral 
Right tactile bilateral 
Auditory  - WM 1 - practice 
Auditory  - WM 1 - recall 
Auditory  - accuracy 
Auditory – sustained  attention  
B’ham – accuracy  
& rule 
42 
<-2  or  >2 
<-1  or   >1 
4 
4 
8 
8 
4 
4 
7 
8 
>1 
3 
51 
>1 
Accuracy <6 
Rule  <1 
50 
0 
0 
4 
4 
8 
8 
4 
4 
8 
8 
3 
1 
0 
0 
10 
2 
LANGUAGE 
             spoken 
 
 
              writing          
 
Instruction comprehension 
picture naming 
sentence construction 
Nonwords  - accuracy 
Nonwords  - time 
Sentences - accuracy 
Sentence  - time  
Words + nonwords 
   
3 
11 
8 
5 
>14 sec 
42 
23 sec 
3 
 
3 
13 
8 
6 
10 
40 
25 
3 
Long Term Memory 
             orientation 
 
             episodic 
 
 
 
 
Personal 
Time and space (MC) 
Story – free call  1 
Story –  recognition 1 
Story – free call  2 
Story – recognition  2 
Story – decay 
Task – recognition 
 
8 
6 
6 
13 
8 
13 
>1 
9 
 
7 
6 
0† 
15 
0† 
13 
2 
9 
NUMBER 
                reading       
                writing 
                calculation   
 
Total  
Total 
Total 
 
8 
5 
2 
 
4 
5 
2 
PRAXIS 
 
 
Figure copy 
Multi – step object use 
Gesture production 
Gesture recognition 
Imitation 
 
42 
11 
10 
5 
9 
 
38 
12 
12 
3 
12 
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6.4 DISCUSSION 
SC, a patient with left hemisphere damage to the OFC and temporal lobe, had 
selective impairments in cognition as well as a range of deficits in three of the four 
factors of the social cognition screen, namely, the social cognition control factor, the 
motivation factor, and the mindreading factor. On his first standardised tests of 
cognition (OCS), SC showed impaired performance on tasks tapping the attention 
domain (spatial attention: egocentric and allocentric neglect), verbal memory (recall 
and recognition), as well deficits in the language domain including reading, access to 
semantic/ conceptual knowledge about objects, word finding and number writing.  
On second cognitive assessment (BCoS), SC generally fared well especially on 
tasks tapping spatial attention but had sustained selective deficits on the auditory 
attention task from the BCoS (tapping selective attention, working memory and 
sustained attention), various reading tasks (reading sentences, non-words and 
numbers). There was also a small deficit on figure copy. SC’s memory deficit was 
more apparent on recall than recognition and this, along with the poor reading 
performance, may reflect poor internal speech (Hinke et al., 1993). The noteworthy 
that SC’s poor performance on the auditory attention task, however, is less easy to 
attribute since this task primarily depends on maintaining items in working memory 
using them for target selection. Strikingly, SC performed well on the executive tests 
(tringles and circles trails in the OCS and rule finding and switching in the BCoS) in 
both the initial and follow-up assessments. He also fared well on go/no-go task from 
the SCS assessing inhibition.  
The generally good profile for cognitive performance (barring tests dependent on 
internal verbal representations i.e. auditory controlled attention) contrasts with SC’s 
scores on the tests of social cognition. As stated above, SC impaired social 
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competences were apparent in three of the SCS factors: The social cognition control 
factor, the motivation factor and the mindreading factor. The social cognition factor 
reflects multiple features merging between logical and emotional aspect of cognition. 
On the one hand, it involves elements of social cognition such as reading emotions, 
false belief, proverb interpretation and humour linked to higher cognition abilities 
including visual attention, inhibition, memory and academic level (See chapter 4, and 
Ahmed & Miller, 2011; Kiang et al., 2007; Uekermann et al., 2008). On other hand, it 
assesses representations and variables affected by emotional appraisal such as anger 
and faux pas. SC’s deficits on this factor are unlikely to reflect poor language 
abilities, as even though he suffers from aphasia, patients with even worse language 
abilities were able to pass tests of social cognition including first and second order 
false belief (Apperly et al., 2006). The deficits are also unlikely to reflect impairments 
in EF, given the SC performed well at the executive tasks in the screening tests.    
One other interesting aspect of SC’s performance is the consistency of the deficit 
over time. SC exhibited impaired performance in two intervals of the SCS assessment, 
and this means that his performance did not differ from what is expected from chance 
consistency, this suggests that SC’s impairment can be attributed to poor access to any 
learned representations (Humphreys & Ford, 2005; Warrington & Shallice, 1979), 
rather than impairment in the representation itself.     
It should also be noted that on the attributing others desire and motivations tasks 
of the SCS, SC failed not only the experimental task but also the control task. In these 
cases, it seems likely that the cognitive load on working memory may have been too 
great for him to make judgements to the control as well as the experimental stimuli. In 
such instance it is hard to deduce whether there is a problem in social cognition. It 
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would be useful to test this in follow-up examinations where the load on working 
memory is reduced. 
Taken together, these results concur with findings showing impaired social 
cognition, but spared cognitive and executive function abilities following damage to 
the frontal lobe. This is similar to the profile of Phineas Gage whose damaged to the 
OFC was linked to marked problems in social cognition (Haas, 2001), but intact 
intellectual abilities (Harlow, 1848, cited in, Kihlstrom, 2010). This is also consistent 
with findings from patients with variant frontotemporal dementia (Lough, Gregory & 
Hodges, 2001) whose poor theory of mind performance was independent from their 
relatively intact executive functioning. Yet, one might say that the swearing problem 
present in SC could be related to cognitive dysfunction verbal working memory and 
controlled attention (see Chapter 4).  
In considering SC’s lesion map (see Figure 6.1), it is clear that a large number of 
left hemisphere tracks were affected. Of these tracks, I note damage to the three 
segments of the superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF) and the fronto-insular tracks. 
Within these bundles, the results from Chapter 5 suggest that the integrity of the left 
SLF, segment 1 (SLF1) and the left fifth fronto-insular tracks can influence 
performance on the motivation factor of the SCS. This result underscores the 
importance of signle-case studies as they can provide convergence evidence 
pertaining to the association of specific tracks with functioning in a particular domain.  
However, it is important to acknowledge the reverse where many of the lesioned 
tracks in SC did not emerge as significant predictors of performance on the SCS 
factors (see Chapter 5). It might be speculated that group analyses may lead to 
erroneous assumption about the extent of the networks subtending social cognitive 
functioning. The case of SC suggests that damage to left hemisphere tracks can lead 
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to decrement in performance, and thus it emphasizes the potential role of both 
hemispheres in social congnition. Alternatively, the group analysis in Chapter 5 may 
simply indicate greater predictive power for right hemisphere tracks compared to left 
hemisphere tracks, which is plausible given evidence assigning greater importance to 
strucutures associated with social conduct, decision-making and emotional processing 
within the right compared to the left hemisphere (Tranel et al., 2002). Future research 
will be able to address this question by comparing left versus right hemisphere 
damage on social cognition.  
In addition, SC lesion profile shows damage within the anterior temporal cortex. 
In this regard, SC’s frontal and temporal sub-cortical regions were largely affected, 
especially the Uncinate Arcuate Fasciculus that connects anterior temporal lobe with 
the orbital and medial prefrontal cortex (Schmahmann & Pandya, 2007). As lesion 
volume exceeding 50% suggests tract disconnection (Chechlacz et al., 2015; 
Thiebaute de Schotten et al., 2014), the lesion volume of this track in SC (lesion 
volume = 0.675) is most likely disconnected. In light of the role of the anterior 
temporal cortex in representations of social norms (Zahn et al., 2008), this temporal 
damage may have reduced SC’s sensitivity on the normative rules about moral 
behaviour, faux pas statements. 
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
Taken together, these results suggest that SC has impairment in social cognition. 
There was some selectivity in this deficit, with aspects involve attribution, social 
norms and knowledge more than aspects related to social interaction. These deficits 
co-occurred with SC having aphasia and some deficits in verbal working memory, but 
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also relatively good performance on tests of EF including inhibition control. The 
results suggest that aspects of social cognition may dissociate from core cognitive 
processes, and that social cognition impairment may be associated with limited access 
to stored knowledge about social norms following damage to fronto-temporal damage 
(Humphreys & Ford, 2005).  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
Synopsis 
 
As stated in the thesis, social cognition is a multi-dimensional function with 
possible multiple cognitive processes supported by white matter tracks connecting 
brain areas the underpin specific component of social cognition. As evident from the 
findings presented in the various chapters, social cognition is susceptible to brain 
abnormalities and injury due to stroke. A key goal of the current thesis was to validate 
the utility of a social screen that is both comprehensive and efficient. The study also 
offered an opportunity to ask key question that pertains to the neurobiological 
underpinning of social cognition. Specifically, it offered insight into whether (1) 
specific anatomical lesion predicts the patients’ performance on the social cognition; 
and (2) there are, aside from higher cognition, other indicators of social cognition 
impairments following stroke. In the following section, I summarize the thesis key 
findings, its implications, and future direction for research.  
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7.1 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERES 
Chapter 2: The Social Cognition Screen 
Building on previous literature, reviewed in Chapter 1, the goal of Chapter 2 was 
to develop a social cognition screen to specifically, address social cognition 
difficulties arising from brain injuries. To the best of my knowledge, there are no 
psychometric instruments that provide a comprehensive profile of social cognition 
deficits in this population. Moreover, it aimed to design and improve tasks that 
capture the multidimensionality of social cognition processes and overcome the 
limitations of previous scales by formulating clear definition of the variables, 
validating and standardizing the tasks, and to ensure that are suited for use in brain-
damaged individuals. The measures of the social cognition screen (SCS) were 
designed to address a wide range of social cognition phenomena necessary for 
everyday social interactions that they tap common problems in post-stroke patients 
and importantly sensitive to inter-individual differences. The final version of the SCS 
comprised of 15 tasks and measures assessing: impulsivity, apathy, anger, attribution 
others false belief, emotion states, intention, desire, motivation, moral reasoning and 
psychological attitudes, in addition to faux pas, cognitive and emotional empathy, 
humour and figurative language. The screen includes newly created assessments for 
many of the abilities noted above. This test battery takes approximately one hour to 
complete, and can be applied for diagnostic and research purposes, and a description of 
the SCS tasks and measures was provided. 
The procedures for assessment and extracting the psychometric features of the 
SCS, led to results ranging between adequate to excellent findings. The application on 
healthy control sample aims were (i) to evaluate the newly designed tasks in terms of 
their suitability, sensitivity and clarity for later implementation on the clinical sample, 
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and also (ii) to develop a frame of reference and norms to enable comparisons and 
determine the diagnostic differences. During data collection from healthy controls, 
modifications were made to improve some measures to fit the aspired objectives such 
as time efficiency and clarity. Inter-group comparisons revealed no significant 
differences between healthy control participants based on gender and the level of 
education, however, the age groups comparisons revealed significant differences 
between age groups on humour task. Therefore, age norms were developed, and the 
cut off scores for each measure was determined. The clinical group application 
included further goal beside the assessment; to develop the psychometric properties of 
the screen. The reliability studies including internal consistency and stability over 
time; the internal consistency for the SCS maintained acceptable level (α = 0.7), and 
the stability over time with duration between the test and the retest intervals ranging 
from 4 to 22 weeks, showed no significant differences between the intervals 
indicating reliable properties of all the measures. The results of the study convergent 
validity of the new tests in relation to other standard tests in the literature, all 
correlations were significant at p<0.01, except the go no go task p<0.05, and the 
correlations ranged between adequate (0.57) to strong (0.96) coefficients, which 
suggests that the SCS tasks have a measurable association with standard measures. 
Chapter 3: The Domain Structure of Post-stroke Deficits in Social Cognition 
This chapter aim was to identify the social cognitive behavioural and 
neurological syndromes caused by stroke, that reflect impaired functions including 
changes in personality, mood, thinking and social behaviour. The aim of this chapter 
was to describe the association linking different social cognition aspects together 
through analysing the cross-subject deficits. For this objective, a data reduction 
method was employed using factor analysis. Factor analysis helps identifying 
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common features of the variables by capturing the correlation of behaviour scores 
across subjects, to reveal the core of underlying behavioural dimensions. The model 
produced for the SCS comprised of four factors that explained the majority of the total 
variance. 
The first factor, ‘Social Cognition Control’ (SCC), loaded with the impulsivity 
assessment of go/no-go task which accounts for inhibition control ability along with 
seven other variables, and thus encompassing almost half of the tasks. These tasks 
were the false belief, faux pas, and anger, reading emotions, moral reasoning, humour 
and figurative language tasks. This factor explained the largest proportion, and 
accounted for one third of the behavioural variance, and on which most of the patients 
(23 out of 26) were impaired. It is noteworthy that the loading along with the go/no-
go task may suggest that social cognition variables may be affected by cognitive 
impairments, reflecting possibly the contribution of executive load on performance 
(Fino et al., 2014). Indeed, this is to be expected given that, clinically, post-stroke 
socio-cognition deficits tend to be dominated by cognitive impairments.  
The second factor, ‘Motivation’, comprised two variables: desire and motivation. 
This factor represents processing and understanding of the motivation underlying 
behaviour. Interestingly, desire overlapped with motivation rather than intention, 
which may suggest that identifying others’ desire is linked to the drive underlying the 
goal-directed behaviour rather than a strategy undertaken to satisfy that desire 
(intention) which may not be consistent with the desire.  
The third factor, ‘Interest in Others’ (IO) loaded on three measures: cognitive 
empathy, apathy and psychological attitudes. The variables in this dual dimension 
factor are characterised with the social tendency to interact with others, as it would 
characterise social behaviour. It is interesting that apathy loaded on this factor and on 
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the factor linking desire and motivation reasoning. Apparently, understanding 
motivation in others (factor 2) may be distinct from being motivated (factor 3). 
Finally, factor 4, ‘mindreading’, loaded on two measures: understanding others’ 
intention and emotional empathy. Both variables may involve selective processes 
implicated in forming predictions about how others may feel in a given context.   
The structure of this analysis factor analysis did not comply with the theoretical 
notion assuming social cognition as a unitary function (ToM), nor with the purported 
dual division of the cognitive and affective domains of ToM. This structure exhibited 
a relationship that could be more interpreted in terms of their dependency on general 
cognitive abilities rather than operating independently. The analysis investigating the 
association between factors showed only one significant correlation between the SCC 
and motivation factors which may indicate that processing motivation is partly 
dependent on general cognitive abilities, at least in part through the association of the 
SCC with inhibitory control.  
A comparison between the between the patients and controls showed significant 
differences on 3 factors, namely: social cognitive control, interest in others and 
mindreading. This confirms that the stimuli used to assess each component were 
sensitive to detect impaired performance. It is important to note that while there was 
selective sparing of motivational abilities, it is evident that understanding of others’ 
desires and motivations alone is not sufficient to function properly in a complex social 
situation. Nonetheless, motivation appears as an independent domain that is more 
resistance to brain damage following stroke. 
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Chapter 4: The Cognitive Implications for Social Cognition Deficits after Stroke 
The aim of chapter four was to investigate the associations and dissociations 
between social cognition domain deficits and ‘general cognitive’ deficits. Given that 
in the previous chapter (Chapter 3), the first loading factor reflected poor executive 
control, I tried to answer the question to what extent impairments in ‘general 
cognitive’ processes including memory, language, praxis and executive function can 
impact on social cognition performance.  
Patients’ scores on SCS and the BCoS were combined and analysed using factor 
analysis. The final rotated model produced seven factors that accounted for 78% of 
the total variance in the patients’ performance. The factors produced showed 
consistent variable overlap with clusters of the SCS, indicating common patterns of 
deficits across many stroke survivors. Only two measures overlapped with episodic 
memory (recognition and decay) and spatial attention from the BCoS. These results 
are interesting as they indicate largely independent processing of the social cognition 
dimensions, and that are consistent with previous evidence of such dissociations in a 
meta-analysis covering 52 studies of patients with schizophrenia (Fett et al., 2011). 
The first factor, ‘Social Rules’, loaded with social cognition components 
including motivation, desire, anger and faux pas, reflecting the abilities pertaining to 
understanding others’ basic drives and motivation. These abilities may constitute 
mechanisms that stroke survivors may resort to in order to understand social rules and 
to employ them in their social interactions.  
The second factor, ‘Impulsivity’, consisted of three measures included 
impulsivity, figurative language, and false belief. The loading of the Go/no-go task 
onto this factor may reflect the contribution of executive load on performance, which 
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may result in tendency to leap to conclusions rather than analysing the facts and 
details of the social situation. Factor 3, labelled ‘Sequencing Behaviour’, consisted of 
two measures from the BCoS, namely rule-finding accuracy and multi-object use. 
Factor 4, labelled ‘Social Memory’, combined two measures from the SCS and three 
measures from the BCoS. The factor loadings consisted of episodic memory, spatial 
attention, story decay, episodic memory and finally humour and emotion recognition 
from the SCS. Factor 5, labelled ‘Social Behaviour’, included measures of social 
cognition components and independent of the cognitive factors. The factor consisted 
of cognitive empathy, apathy, moral reasoning and psychological attitudes 
recognition, and thus it may reflect one’s social tendency toward social interactions. 
Interestingly, variables of this factor reloaded together as in the previous principal 
component analysis confirming the interaction between these variables and 
representing a stable domain of social cognition. Factor 6, labelled ‘Verbal Attention’, 
consisted of two measures from the BCoS assessing language (picture naming) 
involved approaching the conceptual knowledge of the object and name retrieval and 
controlled attention (auditory attention accuracy).This factor relies on language 
abilities as the stimuli for the attention task consisted of set of words, and assesses 
sustained attention, selective attention and working memory. Finally factor 7, labelled 
‘Mindreading’ included two measures from the SCS, namely intention recognition 
and emotional empathy. These measures reflect one’s ability to speculate about 
others’ intentions by analysing the facts of the current social context and the 
associated mental states believed to represent the observed action (automatic process) 
rather than more complex demands such as memory, EF (controlled process). 
The results of regression analysis confirmed inhibitory control is necessary for 
succeeding on understanding others’ belief and also to comprehend the figurative 
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language. After brain injuries, education appears to play a protective role for emotion 
recognition, years of education was the best predictor of reading emotions, followed 
by spatial attention.  
Chapter 5: Social Cognition Domain Deficits: Exploring Connectional Anatomical 
Relationships 
The main aim of this chapter was to explore the possible link between localising 
the anatomical regions critical across multiple social cognition and cognitive domains. 
I tried to find out how much of the variance in social cognition can be explained by 
anatomical damage, and to what extent damaged neural circuits can predict impaired 
social cognition function. A track-wise lesion-deficits analysis approach was used. 
This approach relies on describing the disconnection caused by lesion at individual 
level. The linear regression analysis revealed several significant models, relating nine 
white matter tracks to three of the SCS factors suggesting that processing social 
cognition factors likely rely on specific white matter tracks of networks involved in 
the processing of social cognition functions. 
First, a right hemisphere network consisting of the Fornix, the Hand superior track 
and the Cingulum posterior segment predicted the performance on the SCC factor. 
Second, a rather distributed network containing fibre bundles of both hemispheres 
predicted performance of the motivation factor. These included the left and right 
bundles of the first branch of the Superior Longitudinal Fasciculus (SLF) and the right 
bundles of the second and third segments of the SLF, the left branch of the Inferior 
Longitudinal Fasciculus (ILF), and the left branch of the fifth bundle of the Fronto-
Insular tract. Finally, the right segment of the Anterior Thalamic Radiation (ATR) track 
predicted the performance of the Interest in Others factor. All together, these results 
bring insight to the distributed brain regions identified in the literature as mechanisms 
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involved in in purportedly separate social cognition processes, are in fact structurally 
connected to support a specific domain function.  
Chapter 6: Socio-Cognitive Deficits after Stroke: A Case Study Report 
The significance of white matter pathways subtending the SCS factors was 
examined in a single case study of a stroke survivor with left hemisphere lesions to 
frontal and temporal areas. Following stroke, SC presented with apparent problems in 
everyday social behaviour and involuntary swearing which were not apparent before 
the brain lesion.This study aimed to assess possible reason of his exhibited problem 
and also to uncover potential convergence evidence pertaining to the association of 
specific tracks with functioning in a particular domain. SC is a stroke survivor, with 
large cortical and sub cortical lesions to the left hemisphere involving areas in the 
frontal and temporal lobes and left orbito-frontal cortex. His cognitive and social 
cognition abilities were assessed using the SCS, BCoS and OCS. The results showed 
selective impaired social cognition domains related to the ability to attribute mental 
states to others (SCC, motivation and mindreading) rather than openness and 
socializing with people (interest in others). These deficits co-occurred with SC having 
some language impairments and some deficits in verbal working memory, but also 
relatively good performance on tests of the executive functions. The results suggest 
that aspects of social cognition may dissociate from core cognitive processes and 
there may be impaired access to stored knowledge about social norms perhaps due to 
damage to fronto-temporal connections.  
The results from the track-wise lesion-deficit analysis conducted on the clinical 
group in Chapter 5 suggested the involvement of the left first segment of the SLF and 
the 5th insular track in the functioning of abilities subsumed in the motivation factor. 
As the patient's lesions were limited to the left side, we can say with greater degree of 
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confidence that they these tracts are associatted with performance on the motivation 
factor of the SCS. This convergence of evidence from the group and the signle-case 
studies underscores their combined contribution to ascertaining the association of 
specific tracts with functioning in a particular domain.  
 
7.2 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Previous research’s studying psychosocial phenomena tried to investigate 
whether social cognition is a monolithic function that operate as a part of general 
ability or governed by more than one system. Currently, the main trend between 
researchers is directed toward a division based on the functions to cognitive and 
affective aspects of social cognition. However, studies that relied on single or few 
variables to assess social cognition reached contradictory results (e.g. Ahmed & 
Miller, 2011; Muller et al., 2010), and some affective aspect of social cognition have 
frequently been associated with general cognitive domains such as emotion 
recognition (Baker, Peterson, Pulos & Kirkland, 2014), and desire attribution (Fizke, 
Barthel, Peters & Rakoczy, 2014). Furthermore, anatomical regions linked to 
processing of key social cognitive abilities such as theory of mind found to be 
dissimilar (see: Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014, in a meta-analysis 
of functional brain imaging studies), probably driven by the use of for diverse tasks 
and stimuli.  
More insight on social cognition operations can be provided using data reduction 
methods such as factor analysis. Factor analysis regroups variables into a limited set 
of clusters based on shared variance, so that relationships and patterns can be easily 
interpreted and understood (Yong & Pearce, 2013). Using factor analysis on data of 
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patients with brain lesions could provide a unique window into impaired factors’ 
relationship with brain regions, and general cognitive functions decisive to a specific 
operation underlying the factor. This approach could refine our understanding of the 
relationship between brain anatomy and function. 
The findings of the current investigations suggest that social cognition is an 
outcome of a rather multiple interdependent capabilities. The factor analysis of data 
collected from post-stroke survivors with the social cognition screen (SCS) produced a 
unique structure that did not comply with the theoretical notion assuming a unitary 
function (ToM), nor a dual division to cognitive and affective domains. The 
underlying four factors of the SCS that govern the production of social cognition are 
as follows: (1) The Social cognition control (SCC): the factor’s main feature is control 
indicating that social competences depend on domain general abilities; (2) Motivation: 
an automatic process involving analysing the preference, advantages and motivations 
underlying others behaviour; (3) Interest in Others (IO): a factor that underlies the 
socialisation function and describes social behaviour and tendency for interacting with 
others, and lastly (4) Mindreading: a process that might involve automatically 
speculating about others behaviour using social schema, where one might speculate 
about others’ intentions as in what others will do next in a sequenced context, or about 
how others will feel (emotional empathy) based on a sequenced behaviour in a given 
context. Notably, the IO and mindreading factors are independent and did not 
associate with other factors which suggest that their operation maybe subjected to 
selectivity.  
The dissociation between SCC and mindreading factors, although both require 
speculating about others’ cognitive states (false belief and intention), perhaps can be 
interpreted due to different underlying processes (Tager-Flusberg, 2001). Intention 
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attribution requires speculation about others’ mental states believed to represent the 
immediate observed action (automatic process) and follows the logic sequence of the 
observed behaviour, while false belief is a more controlled process requiring more 
complex demands such as working memory and inhibitory control.  It requires the 
ability to distinguish between a known fact and to give an explanation of a behaviour 
that conflicts with the observed known fact.  
The dissociation between the factors suggests their independency, possibly 
reflecting natural variation in people’s social cognitive abilities, and more broadly 
how their perception world map onto their individual belief and attitudes. For 
instance, although patient SC (Chapter 6) was impaired in SCC, motivation and 
mindreading, but nonetheless held positive attitudes towards others that did not affect 
his interest in social interactions and being around others.  
More in-depth investigation regarding the relationships between social cognition 
aspects and general cognitive domain resulted in linking only two domain general 
functions (episodic memory and spatial attention) from the BCoS with social 
cognition. These results are interesting as they indicate largely independent 
processing of the social cognition dimensions. However, the patients’ high rate failure 
on the SCC factor (23 out of 26) may point out that abilities required for faux pas, 
anger and moral reasoning—that loaded along with other social cognition aspects in 
this analysis—may not require direct specific general cognitive ability in order to 
operate normally. 
The results of regression analysis confirmed that inhibitory control is necessary 
for understanding others’ belief and also to comprehend the indirect social meanings 
conveyed in the figurative language. Interestingly, the proverb task, tapping figurative 
language ability, loaded with false belief rather than the language domain or episodic 
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memory. This may suggest that the social knowledge implicit in this task and 
similarly in false belief understanding is associated with inhibition control functions 
that may explain the patients’ tendency to jump to conclusions rather than analysing 
the facts and details from the social context. 
Moreover, the track-wise lesion-deficits analysis confirmed the significance of 
the role of white matter bundles connecting brain regions involved social cognition 
processes. The analysis revealed that specific white matter bundles were uniquely 
associated with three factors of the SCS, which suggest a potential of further type of 
validity in clinical neuropsychological research classically known as validity by 
systematic-empirical investigations (Franzen, 2000), which adds another credit to the 
SCS as a diagnostic assessment tool. Franzen (2000) explains that “validity in clinical 
neuropsychological research involved either the demonstration that scores derived 
from a test can accurately separate neurologically impaired individuals from un 
impaired individuals or the demonstration of a statistical relationship between scores 
on a neuropsychological test and the result of a medical neuro-diagnostic procedure 
such as CT scan” (ibid, p.27). The SCS accomplished both goals; sensitivity in 
distinguishing impaired individuals on certain factors and associating their deficits 
with lesions to specific white matter networks that connect brain mechanisms 
together.  However, the fourth factor, ‘mindreading’, which explained the least 
variance, was not associated with any of the hypothesised white matter tracks.      
The distinction between neural networks for operating different factors increases 
the importance of the current findings, and potentially offers an explanation for the 
engagement of some brain regions (e.g. OFC, PFC, STS, TPJ) in processing functions 
reflected in all the four factors. However, the precise and extent of the contribution of 
these regions seems to differ in relation to each of the factors. The neural connections 
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associated with the SCC factor consisted of the hand superior U tract , adjoining the 
paracentral U tract and runs beneath the central sulcus from the postcentral gyrus to 
the frontal precentral gyrus (Rojkova et al., 2016), and the fornix and the cingulum 
tracks which are subcortical central regions. The motivation factor is dominated by 
connections mostly belonging to the ventral and temporal parts of the brain, including 
all the branches of Superior Longitudinal Fasciculus (SLF); more ventrally the second 
segment of SLFII that connects the angular gyrus to the posterior regions of the 
middle frontal gyrus (Rojkova et al., 2016); the Inferior Longitudinal Fasciculus (ILF) 
that connects the temporal and occipital lobes (Catani et al., 2003); and the fifth 
bundle of the Fronto-Insular track that connects sub-central gyrus to the posterior 
insula (Catani et al., 2012). Lastly, the anterior thalamic radiation (ART) is more 
likely to be the main white matter pathway for associated with IO factor. The ART 
projections pass through the anterior limb of the internal capsule and project on the 
whole surface of the frontal lobe and found to be more dominated to the anterior limb 
and frontal lobes, as the projections showed a reduced probability for the ventral 
portion of the precentral gyrus (Rojkova et al., 2016). 
Converging evidence pertaining to the association of specific white matter tracks 
with functioning in particular social cognition domain was attained from the single 
case study (Chapter 6). The results pointed to the association of the left SLF I and the 
5th frontal insular tacks with motivation factor. This result underscores the importance 
of the single-case study as it confirmed social cognition syndromes relationship with 
some connections collaborated in left hemispheres. They may also suggest that 
damage to left hemisphere tracks can lead to decrement in performance, and thus the 
potential role of both hemispheres in social cognition. Alternatively, the group 
analysis may simply indicate greater predictive power for right hemisphere tracks 
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compared to left hemisphere tracks, which is plausible given evidence assigning 
greater importance to structures associated with social conduct, decision-making and 
emotional processing within the right compared to the left hemisphere (Tranel, 
Bechara & Denburg, 2002). Overall, these findings underscore the importance of the 
single-case study as it confirmed the contribution or role of specific connections in 
left hemispheres to social cognition. 
(a) What have we learned? 
The results of the current thesis may further elucidate the relationship between 
social cognition, general cognitive domains, structural connectivity and the integrity 
of white matter pathways. Post-stroke social cognition deficits are a common 
difficulty affecting the majority of stroke survivors’ everyday life, and can have great 
consequences on the patients’ clinical rehabilitation process. Therefore it is 
recommended that patients’ social cognition need to be assessed after the incidents 
routinely.  
As social cognition consists of a set of social competences, there is a need to 
employ a battery that can capture the diversity of these competences and their 
underlying processes. As pointed out, these competences cluster into four factors. In 
this context, three aspects are worth noting: (1) some aspects of social cognition may 
dissociate from core cognitive processes. Therefore, an assessment of the patient’s 
general cognitive profile may not be an adequate substituted for social cognition 
assessment, albeit it can act as an indicator of impulsivity, and potential difficulties in 
attributing belief and emotion states to others and misunderstanding figurative 
language and humour; (2) the dissociation between the interest in others (IO) factor, 
which represents social behavior, with the other three factors of SCS that encompass 
inferring others mental and emotional states as well as knowledge of social norms and 
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rules, may indicate that IO factor is governed by a self-regulatory mechanism that do 
not operate unless they are activated and it is an example of  many processes by which 
moral reactions can be disengaged from inhumane conduct’ (Bandura, 1986; 1988c as 
cited in Bandura, 1989, p. 54) ; and (3) the extent of the resistance of these factors to 
brain damage differs, with the motivation factor being most resistant and the SCC is 
most fragile.  
Moreover, while damage of particular white matter pathways may indicate the 
presence of impairment in a specific aspect of social cognition, the distributed nature 
of these tracks in both hemispheres (e.g. the association of both left and right bundles 
of the SLF1 motivation) raises the possibility that affected functions are potentially 
recoverable by stimulating contra-lateral bundles, or regions they connect.  
(b) The implications of the findings to the fields of social cognition and 
neuropsychology  
The findings of this study have a number of important implications for future 
practice. Given the grave consequences of stroke on socio-cognitive abilities, social 
cognition is undoubtedly an important target for intervention and treatment in stroke 
patients. There is a crucial need for a routine assessment of these abilities as they may 
enhance the success of the rehabilitation process and reduce the patients’ disabilities. 
The success of the rehabilitation process can ease the burden on the individual, and 
the caregivers, and reduce the economic costs afforded by societies, and loss of 
productivity. The brevity and comprehensive nature of the screen has practical 
application as it allows for a relatively quick and thorough assessment of social 
cognition factors, which could then provide further guide to the patient’s 
rehabilitation plan. It also can be a valuable research tool of social cognitive 
functioning in stroke-survivors and particularly for research with a longitudinal 
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design. Future studies may address the possibility of creating a shorter and 
computerised version of the screen that could further facilitates the assessment and 
reduce the burden on patient. This is important area of research as routine assessments 
are often curtailed by the patient’s short attention span, fatigue, and lack of physical 
movement following the stroke. 
The current findings add to a growing body of literature on neuropsychology, 
integrating the information of social cognition assessment and mental operations with 
the white matter topography of stroke. The damage caused by stroke is largely affecting 
subcortical regions.  Presenting models of subcortical white matter damage and 
cognition is substantial for better understanding this disease (Corbetta et al., 2015).  
 
7.3 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS  
The current thesis provides novel additions to the existing psychometric and 
neuropsychological studies of social cognition. Presenting a psychometric instrument 
that inclusive, informative and sensitive to abnormalities in multiple domains of social 
cognition, provide a valuable tool for a comprehensive profiling of the patient’s social 
cognitive abilities. The validation of the social cognition screen and standardization 
with cut off scores that complies with age norms performance are important features 
that substantiate it use in clinical settings. In addition, the screen includes two novel 
assessments (with matched control tasks): attributing motivation and psychological 
attitudes to others. These assessments are important given that impairments in this 
domain can be important to recognise when tailoring individual rehabilitation plans.   
In the field of socio-cognitive neuroscience, using a data reduction approach has 
been less evident and the vast majority of studies examined performance at the level 
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of individual tests. In the light of the current findings, social cognition domains, 
determined by component analysis, provide a gateway for a better understanding of 
the operations and functions that directly and affect our social behaviour.  
Another novel contribution of this thesis is the findings of the track-wise lesion-
deficit analysis. This analysis revealed the role of unique white matter pathways in 
processing specific social cognition factors. These findings suggest that the 
distributed brain regions identified in the literature as mechanisms for these factors 
are in fact involved in various social cognition aspects. This is evident by the 
structural connections these pathways make between various brain regions that are 
involved in several socio-cognitive functions. This study also emphasised that 
selected brain regions and the white matter pathways that connect them together and 
contribute to the operation of both domain general and domain-specific functions. 
A main limitation in this study is the sample size. Large sample sizes within this 
population can be challenging mainly due to two reasons: the participants and the 
prolonged testing. The participants were volunteers’ patients and many would stop 
attending the sessions for various reasons such as moving to care home, having 
another episode of stroke, and fatigue. Naturally, the production and validation of the 
screen requires extensive and prolonged testing. While efforts were made to 
accommodate the patients, dropouts were inevitable. However, there is need to 
replicate this study with a larger sample to further confirm the validity and reliability 
of the screen. A bigger sample is also necessary to ascertain the findings from lesion-
symptom mapping study, and which will further allow for a more detailed 
investigation into which particular sub-regions are important for the functioning of 
each the social cognition factors. 
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7.4 CONCLUSION 
What we know about social cognition is largely based upon empirical studies that 
investigated how we internalize social cognition knowledge and skills and how we 
incorporate these competences in successful social interaction. This thesis aimed to 
advance our knowledge of social cognition deficits by investigating stroke patients. It 
also aimed to produce a practical and comprehensive screen of social cognition 
function, which is often impaired following stroke. The social cognition screen can be 
a resource to both research and clinicians in that it can be used to determine the 
impaired functions, and further our understanding of the neural correlates of specific 
socio-cognitive domains. More importantly, the comprehensiveness and the efficiency 
of the screen can improve the tailoring of the rehabilitation process and overall care 
for this patient population.   
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Appendix I 
 
Appendix I-1: False Belief and Moral Reasoning Task 
1- A father holding a baby together with the mother who is pushing a pram are 
shopping; the father enters the shop and the mother is still outside looking at the 
vitrine, she puts her handbag inside the pram and continue looking at the dresses in 
the vitrine. Here I stop and ask the participant, “Can you tell me what is in the pram 
now?” – a “reality question”. After answering I ask, “where is the baby now?” – a 
“working memory question.  
 
 
1- Father with the baby go into the shop, mother leaves her bag inside the pram: what’s in  
   the pram (Reality question),  where is the baby? (Memory question) 
 
 
2- I continue running the task, while the woman is busy watching the pram moving 
towards the street. The mother is still looking at the vitrine, unaware of pram. An old 
lady appears in the scene; she sees the moving pram and she runs after the pram. Here 
I stop the scene and ask, “what does the old lady think is in the pram?” – a “first order 
false belief” question. In order to assess ‘descriptive morality’ (Mendez, 2009), I ask a 
moral judgment question “from a moral point of view, how do you classify the old 
lady’s action, is it good, acceptable or bad?”  
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2- The pram moves and the old lady runs after the pram. (first false belief: What the old 
    lady thinks is in the pram?) (Moral reasoning: taking into account the old lady is  
     trying to save the baby – is this good, acceptable or bad). 
 
3- At the end to assess second false belief I say, “Let us assume this story happened in 
a slightly different details”, then I display the second part of the task. The characters 
at the beginning of the scene are similar to the first part; the man goes inside the shop 
holding the baby and the mother remains outside looking at the vitrine, but the old 
lady appears in the scene before the mother puts her bag inside the pram. The old lady 
saw this but the mother did not notice and continues staring at the vitrine; then the 
pram moves and the old lady runs after the pram and the mother sees the old lady 
running after the pram, the I ask, “What does the mother think that the old lady thinks 
is in the pram?” – a “second false belief question” 
 
3- Second Scenario: the old lady was standing there while the mother was putting her 
   bag inside the pram, but mom did not see the old lady at first, then mother sees her.  
   (second false belief): what does the mother think that the old lady thinks is in the pram?  
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 Appendix I-2: Moral Reasoning Task 
 
First set of three cards on the left are presented to the participant and the examiner.  
Explains: Say there are three drivers trying to find a space in a congested car park, 
First car belongs to a healthy person, she decides to park in disabled space, second 
driver does the same. Now if you were in this situation, what would you do?  
After answering own behaviour, the examiner presents the second set of three cards 
on the right. Saying we have three options for the third driver, what do you think the 
third driver ideally should do? 
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 Appendix I-3: Emotional Empathy Task 
 
When the participant choses the ideal behaviour, a relevant car is shown to him and 
the examiner says: let’s imagine the driver of the third car did the same as the others 
drivers did, namely, parking in a disabled place, and while she was getting away she 
sees a car belongs to a disabled driver had to go and find a farther space to park his 
car; now what do you think the girl will feel? 
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 Appendix I-4: Intention Deduction Task 
 
The first set of three cards on the left was presented to the participant and the 
examiner explained: these set of cards show a story; following the sequence of this 
story, if you were baking what would you do next? After giving a self-perspective 
answer, the second set of three cards on the right was presented and asked: Following 
the sequence in the story, what do think this woman will do? 
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Appendix I-5: Emotion Reading Task 
 
amused amused kind 
sad surprised afraid 
 
 
 
angry hateful energetic 
relaxed happy angry 
 
 
afraid comfortable 
disgusted happy 
 
 
 
relived pensive 
optimistic disgusted 
 
 
sad regretful 
kind fearless 
 
   
 
Sad afraid 
relived fearless 
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Appendix I-6: Desire and Motivation Recognition Task 
Phase 1 Controlling self-perspective desire:     
The participant was asked to see the activity/places displayed in each trial and say 
which one an old lady may prefer?   
 
 
Phase 2 Desire question 
Picture of the agent appears in the middle, first eye gaze to the left and right then the 
agent fixes her eye gaze in a specific direction. And we ask: what does the agent 
prefer 
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Phase 3 Motivation question 
After answering the above questions, the participant was directed to choose one 
answer he/she thought reflected the motive behind the old lady’s choice. 
A sample of desire control trial 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A sample of motivation trial 
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Appendix I-7: Psychological Attitudes Task 
Samples of Psychological attitudes 
Rate their attitude toward healthy food 
 
Samples of Control tasks 
Sample 1 Reorder the following pictures based on number of calories from high to 
low 
 
Sample 2 Chose the correct answer; How many kilos do these apples weigh? 
 
 
 
 
Less than a Kilogram                        a kilogram                        More than a kilogram 
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Appendix II-1: Proverb Comprehension Task 
0- A bird in hand is worth two in a bush. 
 
a. hunting 
b. risk 
c. opportunities 
1- A friend in need is a friend indeed. 
a. friendship 
b. importance 
c. loyalty 
2- Blood is thicker than water 
a. heart  
b. family 
c. friendship 
3- As you sow, so shall you reap 
 
a. cultivation 
b. time 
c. consequences 
4- Facts speak louder than words 
 
a. saying 
b. cheering 
c. doing 
5- Do as you would be done 
 
a. responsibilities 
b. action 
c. wishes 
6- Cut your coat according to your cloth 
 
a. sewing 
b. frugal 
c. payments 
7- Easy come, easy go 
a. going 
b. gaining 
c. losing 
8- All that glitters is not gold 
 
a. appearance 
b. metals 
c. deception 
9- Birds of a feather flock together 
 
a. quell  
b. affinity 
c. opinion 
10- A tree is known by its fruit 
 
a. offspring  
b. relationships 
c. leaves 
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Appendix II-2: Cognitive Empathy Indicator 
14- I am good at predicting how someone will feel 
15- I am quick to spot when someone in a group is feeling awkward or uncomfortable. 
22- Other people tell me I am good at understanding how they are feeling and what 
they are thinking. 
34- I can tune in into how someone else feels rapidly and intuitively. 
35- I can easily work out what another person might want to talk about. 
36- I can tell if someone is masking their true emotion. 
38- I am good at predicting what someone will do.  
 
Appendix II-3: Example of faux pas story 
 Kim's cousin, Scott, was coming to visit and Kim made an apple pie specially for 
him. After dinner, she said, "I made a pie just for you. It's in the kitchen." "Mmmm," 
replied Scott, "It smells great! I love pies, except for apple, of course." 
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? 
If yes, ask: Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?    
(Comprehension question): Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it 
awkward?        
(Comprehension question): Why do you think he/she said it?     
(Intention question): When he smelled the pie, did Scott know it was an apple pie?     
(Emotion Empathy): How do you think Kim felt?     
(Control question):  In the story, what kind of pie did Kim make?    
 (Control question): How did Kim and Scott know each other?  
 
Example of a faux pas control story 
Vicky was at a party at her friend Oliver’s house. She was talking to Oliver when 
another woman came up to them. She was one of Oliver’s neighbours. The woman 
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said, "Hello," then turned to Vicky and said, "I don't think we've met. I’m Maria, 
what's your name?" "I’m Vicky." "Would anyone like something to drink?" Oliver 
asked. 
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?  
If yes, ask: Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?    
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?  
Why do you think he/she said it?       
Did Oliver know that Vicky and Maria did not know each other?  
How do you think Vicky felt?     
Control questions:  In the story, where was Vicky?  
Did Vicky and Maria know each other? 
 
Faux Pas Aphasia Version 
2- Why shouldn't she have said it?  
- Because she is her friend 
- Because it was a surprised party 
- Because Lisa likes Helen's dress 
2-Why do you think she said it? 
- She was trying to make Helen feel jealous 
- I don't know 
- It was a surprise party 
2- How did she felt? 
- Happy 
- Disappointed 
- Jealous 
4- Why shouldn't she have said it? 
- You shouldn't walk into a new apartment and criticize it. 
- They were old curtains 
- They were new curtains  
 4- Why do you think she said it? 
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- She liked the curtains 
- She tried to hurt Jill's feelings 
- She didn't realize they were new curtains 
4-How did Jill felt? 
- She felt fine 
- disappointed 
- I don’t know 
 
Appendix II-4: The Anger Indicator (AI) 
1- I feel angry. 
7- I feel angry about myself a good deal of the time. 
9- My anger is so intense that I sometimes feel like hurting others. 
11- I feel irritated a good deal of time. 
13- My feelings of anger occasionally undermine my ability to make decisions. 
15- My feelings of anger interfere with my capacity to work. 
19- My feelings of anger are beginning to interfere with my health. 
21- My current feelings of anger undermine my interest in sex. 
 
Appendix II-5: The Abbreviated Apathy Evaluation Scale (AAES) 
3- Getting things started on my own is important to me. 
5- I am interested in learning new things. 
8- Seeing a job through to the end is important to me. 
12- I have friends. 
13- Getting together with friends is important to me. 
15- I have an accurate understanding of my problem. 
16- Getting things done during the day is important to me. 
17- I have initiative. 
18- I have motivation. 
